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In order to pNpare herself for the task of world

i

conquetrtti Japan, like Nat1 Germany • car:ried tht'Ough within

ten years a complete spiritual, political; economic, and
military mobilization of the nation.

The

mobi11~ation

began

in 1931, when the "Manchurian Incident" put the nation in a
wa~l1ke

mood and the

m111t~ry

in the saddle.

then courted and won the band of the

Jl&b~rtsy.

The military

the giant

financial e.nd. industrial combines, to form a deadly duo

dedicated to subjugating the world.

Throusb the events of

this '•decisive decade" from 19,1•1941• Japan was converted
from a promising democracy into a totalitarian mili ta:ey

state whose

euper-struetu~

followed the Nazi blua•print but

whose foundations were 't'tholly Japanese.
The m111tar1sta and the

~~~b,&tsy

combined to e:fffJct a

spiritual. mo'bilir.ation coneieting of a :ruthless purge of all
~------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~not~--------~---

Old Japan.

L1be:r·alism and indiv1dua.lism 41 freedom end demoo ...

racy, llhicb had given Japan the semblance of a modern nation,

were denounced as causes of disunion and d$Cay and expunged
a.e~

dangerous tbought!J.

Qs that of Nazi Germany.

Instead, Japan was subjected to a

tn the spiritual field it was even

more successful because it he"d a.n anc 1ent religion to build
upon..

As 1n Germany; this new tota.li tarianism. based on

revivtll of ancient ways and ancient eupereti tione:t was
hailed: in Japa.n as the wave of the future and was presented
to the world as means for its salvation.
The mili ta.rists and the Zail?!tsy :infiltrated into the
political rea.lrn by bringing about the suppression of all
poli tiea.l pe.rtiee and the creation of a one-party state
functioning under the Fueher principle as centered in the
Emperor with the war-lords and the economic combines as his
These two groups maintained leadership in the

spokesman..
country..

The single pe,rty orga,nization with ita control of

the Diet became a puppet of the military; the Foreign Office
wae a Geisha girl for the war• lords; the Emperor stood in
the background and issued Imperial Rescripts under the
d.ireot1on of the mllitariets and the Zf!1batfi!Y•
The economic mobilization, carried through by the
~9,1batsy

under the aegis of the military, established com...

ete state

eontro±---ev-e-r-1-n-dtu:~t:ry,

oapital and labor; over production

comm&ree 9 a.nd trade J
~md

consumption.

particular realm the combines were supreme.
unmade

la\1TS

and regula.t1one at will.

ove-;¥"------+---

In this

They made and

They controlled tdth

an iron band the economic destines of Japan.

efficiency that ita results surprised trhe world.

The

wa~lords

knew wha.t they l'tanted• and they useo eveey method

it,

at their disposal to aoh2.eve

These are the l'tays in which Japan wa.s prepared for
w-at-.

The purpose of this pttper will be to sho"r how the mil•

1 tart et,s aahi.eVed the
the.t it ena.bl$d

th~m

powe~

tht1t. thf'hy d1d 11

pow~~

to go over the heads of' • tJ,nd th$ :pro•

tests of, the ()1vil.Hm bra.noh of government and
Empeu7or himself it'

eo g;rea.t

n~cessat>y •.

~ven

th((t

The bistol'J of the t.rax-..,.lords

needs to be exa:m1ned in o:rdet• to furnl eh a baekg:r.>ound m:itld.ed

tor

a. stud;y suc;th am this •.

1*ogether w1th a hit,!tory of the m111t,e.r1sts

~dll

survey of the begirm1nge of the ,l!i,pa't.fl..Y. e.nd their
t.tndiaput~d

be

rie~

prominence 1n the economic life of .Jap.!lUl"

is vi ta,l owing to the faet tha.t it is doubtful 1.f tht1

e.

to

l'his
mili"~~>

tarists could ha:ve p.r·oo$edttd on th$1.r trail of ·lterror
without the aid

~.nd

aol1<J1.tations of thEJ eco11om:l o oc::mlbineel

the Jti\J\i1tY ~.
Th$ pr1:m&ey function of this 1nvast1ss.tion will be to
-l----------1i~LW-~~~~--i.,_l,.~.e;e,"t/y-fll4i~d:-.bf>;.l-;:rr~the ee
'

two

r~u~t.ione

1

deoisive deoaibl 0 t:rom 19:31•1941.

during th

IJ:'hcrt deca.da begfm with

th$ ine:tdant at MukdEm 11 Manchuria, September l8t~ l93li*· and
snded td th the bomb 1ne; of l'e a.r<t He.;rbo :r11 lJ$ oem1b$l?

Va-rious aspects of

th~ eitu~t1on

7 ., · 1941, ·

will 'be eJtamined in o:t"d.EJ:r
e ___________;_ -,

of the militarists a.nd the

.lfl~.o~:trua•

piotul"$ o:t' Japanese fol"$1sn policy

c~.r1

ln

th1~

,.,ay the true

be seen!>

4
Som~

cibserva:rs of the world

1931, as the beginning of

rle;ht.,

It 1e

~

~fo:rld

$Cem~

Wat> II.

oi te September 18,

Perhaps they

known fact that both IUtler nt.td

i.U'$

Mtu~ao11n1

took courage for conquest when they saw Japan win in
Manchuria without serious opposit1on by the eo""os.lled Great

Power$.

At any rs.te 9 th$ "Manchurian Incident._ marked the

beginning of a.ggr$ae1on by the twentieth century mil1te.r1S"'!'
tic and totali tar1an powers, e.e;grEiuuaion tfhiob we.s to plunge
the ant ire o:l vil1 !l.e<! world into war.•

The l$g\U'ltll9.cy hist.oey of Japan says the Ernp1re wa.e

founded in 660

:a.a.

date an Imperial

Ja.pttnEHl& hi0to:r1~na aator:1be to that

RtH!C)!tipt

said to have 'beel'l

first :Emperor. Jimmu fann<h

:l.tiH~uad by

ti'le

Xn this dooum•nt occur two

(tlaasio phrases upon which thet'$ we.s built up a ma.$s of
myst:toa,l thcmght e.nd inte:rpretatioth

fbe first phrase is

Hgkg ;toh~y (literally, uAll. the world unde:r otte t-oo:r")

Which woae

int$:rp~ted

to mean the bringing

togethE'I~

of the

eomera of' the tforld under one ruler o:r th$ making of tbe

world into one fWMily.
fhe eeoond p:rineipl• of conduct was the <loet:rine o:f
~. ~· oont:r~otion

for an ancient phrase which tn$ant

li te~a.ll;v "the on.aness of the Imper1e.l Way. '*

the Naliza.t1on of
of the

Empe~or;

Itliis 12!1,.!4

1

'fb0 wa.y to

was through the b$n1sn rule

e.nd therefor>a th<a nwa.y of' the

J!~ropEn:tcU." 11

tt

the

I.W'G·~~-ne;ly wt!q 1 n was a---&Em~K~a-d------

.J--------tt---.l·

a ma::d.nl of conduct.

Hil$lt;g 'eiJJ.!l was the mornl goal; and

loyalty to the Emperor
11 .I

l'bAI."I .

l

:1 ...... '

f.

If I\ '14

wa~

the road. wh1ch led to

it~

Theae

two ideas wf!lre faabionad

b;st Japanese m111 tari.sts into a

g:roteeque distortion of their original ptn•poee.

This was

done • ,of oour-EJ$, to :rurthe :r the ends and. the goals of tbe
m111 tt:t.~ clique that ha$ dom1n(;},t.$d Japan for eo lone.;. 2

:Ill·

itl.f.l~!

B!t9ti!"

J&pan., tn!li ·ea.X>y tl"adi tion
~is :1~

tant place.,

ln th$ h1ato:ry e.nd oul ture of
ocou:pie~J

e.~d .impo~

a conl&fp1cuous

owing, to the faot that fxoom the· seventh

to th$ nineteenth e&ntury J~tpan wa~ t>uled by the sword.'

all

ma.tt~ra

In

th$ pOWf:U? o:f' the trtl9,te vaa the military power,

a,nd the l"ulins olass

tbe militaey class. .This a.ll besan

W$&

with the 'ra1kwfl. R0fo:rm of the seventh

o~ntury.

Th1s .move•

ment t<¥as the :f'il:'at P.:tep in tbe asoenda.ncr 0f tb~ m1lite..A .
,
r1ets.
Tl:le otrtata:ndl.ng fee.ture of the ~aikw(A Raform was
th$ conf1ms,t1on

1d~Ht

power

~:n

the

htU1de.

or the mili tar1fAte or

ln sff$Ct it made Japan a nation by 1ntroauo1ng

fl,!lt!!U£fid.•
the

or

of a government whiab

a aup:ra.looal authority.

an~

lrtiUil

ruled l$'Qd administered. by

.1t firmly and solidly

eatablishad th$ ol1gnren1c structure in both the political

P•

~2,

. 2Mark Gayn, J.:!ll!!a tl1f!tx {:l\T$lr Xot>k ~ 1t1 ~ Sloane, 1948),
~

:5-w.,

Macma.non l3ail 1 t.T,lQ!Jill

irJea 9.x Al,=bl,?

(New' Y~rlu

7
Japanese history beeaxHte .it brought the I!!QY£!1 hlto the

role of the moet

pO\'Ie~ft~l

agent of the government •

.IY!M~t.. The advent of the warrior olass
the decisive events of Japa:neee history.

m:tli ta.ry element. to the a-lready

I

:pattern.

't'ras one of

This added. the

~atabliahed

oligarchic

Not only did th$ '"arrio:rs domina.ta Japan• s

$Conomic and po.lj.-ttcal

syat.~ms,

they also created the oondi...

tiona tot" the acceptance ot.modern militarism in Japan,5

Ttle

~~rq•u:q,•

put an end, onoe and.

court nobility in Jape:n.,

fo~

all, to· the role of the

They pUt into a:tfeot e. system

whereby the Empat"'ot> would be the t:t tular

hea.d

of the goV((Jl:"n""

mant .. but the rains of power would be in the hm1da of the

m1litaf1•

Japan,

mili te.ri$t1o

the~efore.

reg~me

was to ba governed by a faudalt

the,t $Stabl1sbed enduring political and

ee>onornio :ra1at1onsh1pe which were to survive fo:r centuries.
The code o:t' Jape.n. hanQE)forth was to be the ood.e of· t.he
.i~ID!;!~a~ •
~.YihiSQt

'l'b$,. <l0$1~ ,2.;t. thsz .~fliUUtal.,

In exploring the

r-------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ia necessa~r

to

exam~i~.n-e~----------

lHi!Sbiflq, the etoetrlne of tna warrior.
~!a~

means lmight, do 11 way.

~yst\3.~~~

therefore, is

"the knightly way':' o:r .••tne way of the ~H-J.murai."
'
.
enough, tbG~ QB.:nll!t~~! never heta:rd of '9J:lf:?r~.

dur:tously.

1----------......__ _.........,____. ___._._._______________________________________________________________________._

--l

8
It would'be hard to find a mora amazing case of
deception pre.c.rticed by the rulers . of a nation UJ?on 1 ts.
people~

~11" tar:tsts 11

1ntant upon bending thfl masses t,o
their will~ fabricated bU!l1t,di in the l890•a. 6 They put it
The

into the acho.olbooks. knowing well that to deceive tbe
people it is neoeasa:ry to start \t1th the young.

They also

knew that to impress the Japanese with any doctrine it must
appf!>ar to have age.

Tb$y made blJsh,\_t-\q retroactiveo

Built

to order. like a false antique 11 1 t was ;pUt :fo:r'ff1ard as the

ancient philosophy of the race.

1be Japanese believed in

its longevity"'

Foreign scholars were also duped.

British and

American histories and encyclopedias gravely refer to

:tuum14i

as Japan~ s ase•old code of chivalry. 7

that the word

l:;>~sh:\,<!Q

The truth is

never appeared in any dictionary,

liJng11sh or Ja.panEH.;e, before

1900~ 8

Why was the hoax perp$trated upon the Japanese

people?

It wae simply a mea.na of holding the Japanese

eople 1n eubject1tln.

D~:rdtl~h~a.rs
foJlowing_th.ll;J-e-1oi.I-.Jp:!"e"""'n"""'""''------~-~-.
.

1ng of Japan by Command.er Perry, a :flood of European and

6~.
7 John F, Embree •. ll!§. J{\l2!QEV4! lt,at~oQ (New York t

p•a,:r:rar e.nd Rinehart • 1945 r;- p w if;;.
t---------~8--.

.

----·------·----------·-------------·-·-----·----------------·-·-------------·-----------·-

'·~·

'

9
Amet1can i<lea.s was endangering the authority of the
oligarchy.

It was felt necessary. that the eyes of

t,h~

nation.be turned away from ideas from the Western world•
back to tht<> maeter.,.and... slt.tv~ psyohology of' old Japan 11 benoe
~Yib~~-q,.

'l'he anny plao~d. the code of :gu~h~c;'iQ on a pedestal.

School lessons, magazines.

books~

dramas, Kabuki plays,

motion pictures by the hundreds, were

me,m.arat

da,ys,

tu~ad

out to glorify

Godlike virtues were pinned on the 'breaste ot'

the Japanese soldiers••honor, love, truth, courtesy,
modesty, and unpa.rallaled galla,ntryo;.""and the whole ltas

called ~uag~qa.9
The code of

:\14~l:l~92

has been one. of the most 1mpo:r...

tant weapons in the hande c>f the m111tar1ats.

It helped

them instill within the people a aUb$ilr.v1anQa and loyalty
that has been unmatched elsewhe:t"e tn the world, a subservi•
$nee a.nd loyalty so strong that the thought of queet1.on1ng
the wisdom o:f' the Empe:ro:r- or his advisors did not ooour.
Willa.rd Priee $xple,ins thin feeling vividly wben he saya:
+-----------------~~~~~·~e-on~aeter, t~ghl----------------~--

ha be a criminal or a ba.bbling idS.ot, is supreme.

For a superior officer one must if neoesea;ry
faae:r1fica :family atld friends and self.

Law must not atHU'ld in the way~ If you lie,
destX'oy or kill in the se:rvioe of your
commander, you are e:bove the la"'• It extends
~teal,

lO
to interna.tional tree.ties ~ they a:ra but scraps
of paper if they conflict !~tr1 the highat> law.
that of the Son of Heaven. ·
·
'

Through tne use of the code of bushid.o, tbe militar:tats strengthened their gz-ip on the government"'

The people

he.d. unfla.ggil'lg :faith, loyalty, and devotion to the :Empe:ror:
and the. m11:t tariets

ware

a.ble to control the Son of Heaven

and 'bend hia will to theirs.

or:t{5inal
~omina.nr;e

~*vicious

This might be described aa the

eirel$, u but it did much ·to insure the

of the m111 taey in Japanese governmental affairs.

The rasulta of the 'l'aikwa. Reform oon:tinued fol" about
five htU'ld:red. yea:rs.

when culture, art,

l)uring this period
philosophy~

th~re

wa:re years

and religion came to the

fot-e; but they '"are. ahort.;.lived.

The death knell wa.s

sounded for civil power in the yea:r- 1192 when the warrior
e;hie!', lori tomo IUna.moto. ha.v:tns crushed tha Te1.re. nobles

and captu:red the Emperor, reoei ved the title of
.1!!~4·1!1• SbQeiU,D (aubduing,barba.r1 an•e;enerali saimo) •
~qr* ~P.lli~ a

lb!, f,1rrJ;& f:fS2eiY!h

d bean granted

pre1dous1~e

The oom~ieeion of .t~9814S
Emperor in Japanese

histoey 'but only fo:r specified a.nd l1m1 ted periods of time.

In the case of Yoritomo, h01'teve:r, it was for life;

ws;s also g:re.nted the honor of ma.ming his
......

'

ttl.

O"t-nl

~nd

ha

euooessor,

....
'

r------o. .,-om_p_a__.n-y-,-.l94en' ~ dp!rls~ ,__IU;__:!JLi!B!JJ~_!-~!~!u_!"_ohn__ ~--------- -~

i

ll

thus assuring tbe Yori tomo clan the hereditary supremE*
command of' Japa.n • a fighting machine •

Under Yori to1:no the ,t\'H),!i};!S

11

beoa.m~

the warrior ohiet;

tbe administrative head, and the political leader of Japan.

This was to continue for almost
off'ioe, of eotu•se.

ful

milit~U''Y

NUH~tined

e~ven

centuries.

the

the mo:tlOpoly of the most po'W'$r-

families, except on e, few occasions not long

after the dee.th of Ioritomo, when his successors to pol>rer

appointed youthful impel:'1al princes and members of the
FuJi wa:ra family e.s puppet occupants of the office • 12
During these years, the

!~SS!Ul

was the actual ruler

of Japan and the Emperor merely a figurehead.

paid r(rveranee

and.

respect to the

Emperor~

The people

but the ehoWijl

or1gillt:!tted. the laws end edicts issued in the name of the

Emperor.

The theory of the divinity of the Emperor was

encoura,e;ed by the 'hQflL!ll beCH1Use this would inc:rea.se the
loys.lty of the people to the Emperor and at the aa,me time
enhancE~

the pow$r o:f anyone. who controlled ·the Emperor.

+-----------J,r",~,e-powe:r

of the

.~Ah9.SHU

wa,s made

even~·.w.mou_r..._,e""---"e.,_.vu.i.....d..,. e""n._. t_ _ _ _ _~--

whan Yor1tomo consolidated h1a position by

le~v:ing

th&

Emperor and his court a.t the oa:pital of Kyoto and moving the

b,a,J!f;!a (military earup) away from the luxury of the civil

12
capital to the city of Kama.kura..,

In this l'la,y the Emperor

would not be able to oounterme.nd. the policies of the ghgsun
bE'H,Hnu1e., in most cases, he woul<ln' t knc;n1 l'lha.t the G!28Yll was

The Empel"'r waned and thlil military srew, 13

doine;.

After the death of Yoritomo and down to the middle of

-1-- -

the sixteenth century, the
l<~hile

~bg£5\Ul!~!

the Emperor l'emained in a.

increased in importance

aemi~Babylonian

Capt1v1 ty.

Kncn·m aa the dark age of Je,pan, ·this period was one of'

e>lrnost continuous warfare between th$ i'eudal lords.,
them t.ras strong enough to diapoaa of the

None of

sx1sting.AalJ~k&,fi!J

•b!aS!a!h and none was strong enough to capture and control
enough of the country to become po11t:lcally dominant.

Ma:ttere W$l'a so d.isorderly and so disunif,.ed that,

ev..,ntu~

ally, the way was pa.ved fol" a strongly cent:re11 z~d govern•
tMmt..

The ei tuat1on had gotten to the point where it

ooul~:n• t

get any wo.r>$0'; .1 t Stimply ha.d to gat better.

At the end of the sixteenth century there appeared

o.n the seene contemporaneously th;t>$& ot
+------~.--~·a

Iyeyasu.

Japa.n• s {~reate at

Ncibunae;a, To~~~~sh'ir-and.-Tokug,~~;~,aw~a(:l,..----------+---

'lba$e th:ree

ut~sn

knt:Jw $ach other personally, a.nd 1t

ts doubtful i:f' the works of one could have been poeaible
'fithout the contributions and works of the other- two ..

Together they consolidated the posi t1on of the mili ta:r-y.

1--------'-----·----.. . . --------- ---------- ------- ------------- ----------------i

_j

13
~ .Ngbynft:61•

No'bun~ga.

paved th~ way for H1deyosh1

a.nd Tokugawa by blasting ·away the elements within the nation
that stood in the way of unification.

He put down revolts

and, insurrections among the rivr;tl cle.ns and succeeded in
restoring peace to the ravaged country.
.!!hSS!dlil a.nd then proceeded to tall the

not to do.

i

He'! made Yoshiaki

§h~S!.a~ wha~

anc1 what

Yoshia.ki plotted against Nobuna.ga; but Yoshiak1

lost out a.nd wa.e exiled in 1573; thus ma.rking the. and of the
A§hil:tt!i~ !b2ts9!l'!tt~ • 14
Nobuna.ga struck still another blow against the ;forces
of disunion by d.estroyine; the Buddhist temples throughout
Many of these temples bad existed :for year$, as

Je,pan.

virtual city statae ldthi.n the territorial limits of Japan.
TbeY, had. accumulated large land holdings and wealth a.nd. had

built up armies of their own.

Nobuna.ga struck h1sgreateet

blow against the monasteries in the yetu• 1571
storrrHf~d

and

near Kyoto.

ca.ptUrE~d

wh~n

he

the Buddhist stronghold on Mount Hiei

He burned the temple to the e;round and put to

r--------'~~~;v:-the-sw.a~pr~e sts. l5
people were :revolted, bu.t. this

aot~on

The Ja.pan""'-e-l:>s..._e_ _ _ _ _ _----;--_ _

elim1natE?d :from the

scene a source of grave disorder and strengthened Nobumaga•s

rule.
_j.·J

··.·e

·1 .. 1.

'.

t

·,.·•~

14
;
-

----------- -- - -

---------------------~-

14
The bu1ld•vcp of the tQ111 tary inc:rse.sed under the
reign of. Nobunaga beoatase of the v1ctor•1ee achieved under
his rule.

This first phase of unification came to an end in

1582 when Nobun.aga was asee,etd.nated.

Ffis po11o1ee, however.

were to be carried. on •
!

T-

. jg,;zotgm!.

Jj~de;zosl11·

_Hideyoshi was

¥it

lieutene.nt 1n

the army of Nobunaga and assumed command of th·e e,:rmed. forces
upon the dea.th of Nobunage..

He :was to carry forward in

aggresa,.ve.:raehion .the unification process that had been
started by his predeoes$o:r; that is, the laying of the foun·

de.tio.n for a warrior dom1ne.ted state.
Hideyosbi \ta.e unique in tht:tt he we.s virtually the
only- me:n in pre•modet'n Japan who rosa to a, position of powE:ll"

and influence :from a.mong the common people.

He soon forgot

his beginnings, however, and .became completely· absorbed 'fi th
the warrior claae.

Through his ab111 ty and foroe of zlrms,

he becuuna one of the grea,test men in Ja.pa,neae bietory.

conquered. the country and brought pea,ce to the nation

He
whic~

:Ct was Hidfityoshi who set the patte:r·n for the caste
syatem of Je.pa.nll

He issued ediota which prohibited people·

from -changing their statue.

He proh1b1 ted the changing of

employment by a person without the permission of the lorc'L,
+-------fti:r--f!lr+.t:r~.+-f>:h!~__.,...,...-tlj~-~~--J_r.-~_O__!}__~~l~'t.)_!~~~--~~_!!l_'!fll!!!L___ ____

tha.t no farmer could leave the land; and that no landlord

_ _ j __ _

15
could protect va.grante.

.ianpJra~

Tbia la,w led the way :tn placing the
upon almost hallowed srounet, 16

One or Hideyoshi • s most, \tidely known acts was the

nsword hunt" in the year

1587~ 17 He declared that all

farmers had to band in to the government any and all weapons
that they had in th$ir possession, . It is plain to aee that
by this act he 'ltrantad to eet up a

de.:f'~nite

divi<.Ung lin$

between the warrior class and the rest of the. popultltion.
The privilege and profes$1ort of

be~ring

s.:rms was to be

reserved henceforth for the members of the warrior class,

thue lltrengthening the author! ty of the warriors

W'"'.S}... V1e

the gree.t mass of the peoplE!}.
H1deyoeh:t is a.leo :rernemba:red for his attempted.
· 1nva~io11 of China and l{oraa in what lraa probably the first
stae~

of a world.

co~que~o:r complex~>

1592 and. re.pidly crver

r~n

He invad$.d. Korea in

most of that nation.

The Jape.neee

were eventually enecked when they ove:r-ex:tertded their lines

or comrnUl1ioe,t1on and eupply.

They held on for several yes.rSJ

eteri orating situation_i1LJi""-"h=a__.m.,...a"""i....n.._.t..,..,e=""'---------,---

nance of their sea commun1catione!!

The death of lU.d.eyosbi

1n 1598 gave the commanders a welcome excuse for" abandoning
the whole venture.

The arm;ee strea.med home but not before

16
~-------------

17~.

----------------------------------------------------l-

1

16
they decapitated 38,000 Korea.ns, out off the left E.Jars and

noses, pickled them 1n be.rrels of brine. and sent them back
to Ja.pe,n as a symbol of their glorious v:tcto:"tas. 18 'J.'heet;;
••souv~.mire"

I

are still kept at the large Buddhist temple in

the e1 ty of rtyotot and. the entir·e edifice is known as

th~

I

"Mound of Ee.ra~ n
H1dayoshi had perf¢cted. a syetam. which guaranteed his
uncha.llenged pos1 tion in the gover-ament of Japan so long ae

he lived, but his regime fell apart after. his passing.
1e Where the third

memb~x·

of the triumve:rate,

Thie

Tokt~g&.\<Ta
j·

Iyeyasu. comes upon the scene,
*'£2lfiHS8:~{' I;Lt},i!ae,u,~

I
I

I
I

IYE>Y€U\H.t perfected the system bee;un

by hie t<tt~o illuatrioua t>rEH~lecEH~Jsors.

The first thing he did

t~he

opposition. This wa.e done a.t the Battle of
Sekigahara in l.Goo. 19 Iyeyasu emerged from this battle as

wae to crush

the most po't'16'lrtul and dominant figU:t."e in Je,pan.

He then

went to work with the finishing sta.gea of the unification

prooe se •

He :1 aola.ted J a.pan from the reet of' the world 1. an

1eola.t on tha.t '..raa to last until Commander Far

the country.

Iyeyamu imposed a strict control of the feudal

lords and of t.he 1tnp19r1a.l throne.

He imposed. stricter

st;ra:tification of . society than he.d either of his
·*·.·1.

f'U!itt'")!f,~

17
predecessors.
of every

He placed

indivi~tH~l

num~:rous

in Japan.

restrictions upon the life

?:be system concentrated so

much po'\>rer in the hands of Iyeya.su and h:te fam.ily that they
were able to me.intain control and power over the nation for

over two and a half centuries.

The rule of Iyeyaeu d.1d ,much

to craate the poli tiofl.l and social a.tti tudes that were the
basis :fo:r the modern authoritarian state in pra•Pea.rl Harbor

Ja:p!9.n.

20

This was the period of the $iill£5BW§;

.~Q,oe;una,.te,,

the

moat powerful period of rule in Japan prior to the
Restoration.
qgl~a:emm

1ng

w:l. thin

9j

Sgospn.

t}?~

Various forces werf» ferment ....

J.a.pan during the years of the T<fkYSB.W§ Shgsgna.te.

These forces finally burst forth in active rebellion in
1567.

This followed by a few years the visit of Commander

Perry, and many historia.ns and soholara cite this visit as

the rea.eon for the overthrow of the abSSYZJ•
Jerry's visit was not alone responsible.

However,

Other factors

pla.yed an even more important role in elimj.natine; the

First• there were certain Japanese scholars led by
Motoori Norinaaa who delved into certain ancient writings
which s·tatad that the Emperor, not the
rightful ruler of the ne.tion.
-

the

~hof$!;\9 11 lt¥EMtJ

During the years of t.he

- - - - --- -- ----- -

--

----

- - - - - - - - ---

-

---

- - - - - - -

18
l~k,usa~tt{, ~l'tO.EH!PBi~$,

gotten.

the !.'tnpero:r had been virtually for•

Iori nag a and his associate e pi"fHtohed that the

Emperor, as the direct deac$nd.e.nt of the Sun Goddeas;

Ama.terasu•Omikam:t, wa.s divine,.

lt the Emperor

what right ha.d any mortal to rule in his place,.

was

divine,

They

unoo'Vered wri tinga to bolster their ideas. and they brought
to the people the doctrine ot the divine origin of the
Emperor.

This caused a great commotion throughout the

nation, and soon the people were clamoring for the return of
their divine ruler.

This Emperor revival was probably

th~.

most important factor in the downfe,ll of the S,l'.U2f$2lile<tt,. 21

Another factor

''~as:

tbe

among the peasants of .Japan.

been exploited

by

the

w1de~spraad

For hunctrede

~bSS~UI•

diseatisfa.etion

of yf;lars

they ht!Mi

They lived 1n economic con•

d1 t1ons t<tb1ch were pi t1able while at the same time they were

forced to give to the &b2/$Yil outra.geoue amounts of t'ioe an<l,

other farm crops as

e:q()eaau end

tax~tuh

They did the work 1rrh1le the

his followers rae.ped the harvest.

r-------~~~~~~T.n~~~tu~l~drT.btse~inn-+fav~~f-the

It is not na.rd

r1~e-e4-the-----------~----

In ad.di tion to these :fa.ctors, an empire such a.e had
be~n

built by tht Xyeya.eu family needed strong men to

19
continue.

During the nineteenth oentury no strong men were

to be found within the ruling
and. idleness

ha.~

Oentur1ee of luxur,v

class~

softened the once mighty ruling claas.,

This lack of leadership was crucial

a~

p:ressure of both events and men on the

a time when the
1'o~ugawa

regime lre.s

e;rowing stronger and stronger.

!11-l!L•

§&.if-~...

the

trib.~smEUl

Leading the :rebellious :torct1s we~

from the western clans or tribes of Japan.

These clans were four 1n number;

SatsQma, Ohoshu; Hizen;

and Tbsa, generally shortened to the more convenient
.llii~

....01la·l!•l$1.•

'!'be se clans wet'$ located a great distance

from the center of
be independent.

tJovernm~nt 1

Moreover~

and this encouragEJd them to

they were the strongest and most

prog:re ssive of the Je.pa.nese clans.

In developing manufac-

ture and trade as a means of boosting alan revenue.

§a,•014g·lt1•.1Q. were far ahead of

-~he

other clan$.

They

fostered not only handiorafte, porcelain manufacture, sue;ar•
refining, and textile mills, but

m~n1ng,

1~on

foundries,

+--------@~~a~~!ns, an~4~~~~&e±ll~.~2=2~------------
ln these western cla:ne the anti ... :foreign sp1ri t wa.s
intense.

For some yea.re 9 in defiance of the

~Qiin•

the

clans carried on what was practically an 1ndep$ndent war

20

against the \*Tastern Povrers and. against the newly acquired
treaty rights of 1ieetemer•s in Japtm.

They frequently

attacked foreisners, both on land and sea... Things oa.me to a
bea.d in 1863-61-t- when they tried. to expel all foreigners by

f'oroe., 2:5

In August. 186::>. 1n retal1tl.ticm for ·the murder of

a.n Ertglishmall by the ele;tstrma cla.n!i a Br1 ti sh equa.d.ron · bom•
barded the Satsuma port of !\agosh:tma.

ln September, 1864,

an a.lli(Jd fleet composed of Br1 t1eh, Dutch, F'ranoh, ancL

American ships eestroyad the Ohoshu forts at

Shimonos~k1.

fort~

had been firing on \'lastern vessels pe,ssinfti
through the narrow Shi.mo:noseld, Stra.1 te. 24
These

'l'hese d<tcieive proo:ff3 of ifestern m1l1 tary and naval
s~we .§.!~"'Cbo,.•.H1•l2.

superiorft,y

reasons for a revie"' of their

Soon. all four clans stopped their anti.. foraign

policies.

aetivi ties.

They had long seen the need of

armaments.

acquir~ng

modern

This cJ.Efltermination was no'lrt made doul;)ly strong.

Many ·other lea.ders 08.me to see that Japan could not l,teep her

d.oor shut forever and

th~t

n

her salvation lay in learning and
2
ues 5 This ould not be done.

under the rule. of the §lltOSYlf- :f'or the §!:!Q62ll$l'te repres$nted
the isolation of Japan f:rom the rest of the wo:rld."
t' p

,

'

ttr·

1

•.1

•

t>

t

.·,,llllll,

2'~·
24

In order

21
to· adopt the policies o:t'

Onoa ha.ving g:r•a.eped

disposed of.
lf.t~stern

S~~"".Qlm.'""!U.,..l'.a•
~ihie

the §hOS!.Ul ha.d t.o be

rea.li zation, the

cla.na acted. ·on 1t, boldly e.nd unhEH:\1 ta.t1ne;ly.

'Thei:r

actions paved the lftay for the overthrow- ot the shces\Ul and
the Iteetorat1.on of the Emperor!> 26
One oe.n aeo that a oomplex · a.:rray of economic, poli ti•
-:-

'

--

cal, social, e.11d

d1plome.t~.o

Tokuga:~·fa.

bsav11y on the

fs.otora \.ras pressing ever more

regime. · 'll:H'J SG!iYrY waa b$comins

ine:raaeingly helpless to solve the major problems. that
f'a,eing 1 t.

~:re

Events ware rnov:tng .:rapidly in the di:rection of

al'lother change i.n the oligarchy that had ruled Japtu; for

centuries.

The milj:barista had g:r·own tremendously d.u:ring

the shogun era.,

on

t'I7~H·~

Th$1

to .grow

~ven

the v~rge of the moat d:ramej:.ic and significant oha:nge~ in

:1. ts n1 story.

~.-

mora a.s Japa,n stood

'

l',jZ'.l!"i!'l'" .,_._ ..i

d

'

~-----· ----~----------------

. THE MEIJI RESTORATION AND REIGN
~e

$eeds of militarism were sown in feudal Japan.

During the reign of the Emperor Meiji• they grew amazingly.
Th1a entire process came about under the pretense of democracy and oonsti tut:tonal govfl:rnmEn:tt, and 1 t all began with

the Restoration of the Emperor.
As has bean eho\m earlier, the

Shqe~ngte~

in its

latter years, came und.er increased fire from both the peasants and the le:ndlords.

This brought a,bout a sharpening of

Japan• s internal conflict.

The extrao:rdina:ry thing fJ-bout

this internal conflict was thi.e.
~bosynate

The groups opposing the

ware revolutione.:ries; they rejected the existing

system and fought for a. new one,.

They sought progress for

Japan, and progress meant opening the country to Western
influence"

Yet, in their struggle with the

were all a.ga.inat the foreigner.

cult to d1scePn.

l

~b2SU%l•

they

The :reason for this is not

Th~~~ore~n-demonstratinn~a~--------------

providad a handy weapon for attacking a.nd d.iseredi tine; the
Sbo.e;yna~t.•

As ha,s baEm noted in the discussion of the

S~~""Ohq-1!1.....'-f.g cla.na, the cry to "drive out the barbariann

disa.ppeareci when ·the cla.nemen realized that the only we..y in

r-------------.-------- --------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - -"-

which progress could be a.oh1eved was through the adoption of
Western ways.

The old oliohe udon•t fight 'em, join •em"

was employed.

Join up they did.

,fj41:!~

1ng

thE~

.2.£

the

~m;Q,rq~

.iJa

inf~yanqi

~.bPS!a!t!'!!

time that the

.!!!S!

Bres,t41 6~.

:our"'

was under fi:ra internally,.

the prastie;a and aotua.l authority of the Emperor grew,

It

grew and it continued to grow during this period of trans1•
tion •. Ae ee.rly as 1858,
importance, the

~bo.aYq

reeog~1zing

the Emperor• a new

sought hi$ approval. of e;:reater

intercourse 1"1 th the West; and. in 1863 the qho&an even
obeyed an Imperial summons to Kyoto .. 2 It we.s plain to see
that th<tJ time waa app:roa.o{d.ng for the revocation of the
powe:rt!! of the

~f!l9sun

and for

thf~

reato:ra.tion of the Emperor.

tn September, 1966, tm2ei!Ul it1,TD2<'.b! d.ied..

February, 1867 11 the Emperor KomE'!i also died. 3
dee.ths p:rovided an id.ea.l opportunity for a.

In
These two

radi<H~.l

change.

In October, 1867 11 Yosh1nobu Ke1k1, the fj.fteenth 'J:okuga:t'la

gl)lgf5!Jlh reced. ved, a memorial frQm the leader of the 'rosa clan
f

Satsuma, Qhoehu, and Hizen clans later joined in this
2Ma.ry A. Nourse,

3

~* l!ll! vl~;t .Q! J.ll:l! E,m;eerQr. p.

205.

·----~~~--'---·---~--.!~---·--------------------------- ---------------------------------------------~------------__j-

4~., P• ~04 •.

24
reque~t.

Completely underm:tned, K&ik1, on November 3, 1867,

sent hie resignation to the Emperor. 5 .With. the disinteg:ra•
tion of

~fultugawa

power, the fttt?•Ctao•,B1...ls, clans were left in

complete .eontr.ol .of the court at Kyoto •. After tt-m htmdred
and fifty years, the

~gk~ea~~ ~~qs~n~t~

had fallen: and the

way wa.e OJ)enad for the restoration to full aovereian power,

in theory at lea.at, of the fourteen year old Emperor

Mutsuhito who ruled under the name of Meiji (enlightened
aovemment) from .1815'7 to 1912.

Jm.J

!~t;~d ~h~ m~li ta:r~?

the Restoration battle?
in the struggle for the

e.boli tion ot' fEH'Idalism.
destroyed the

How did the military fare in

Mili taey tl'adi t:ton we.e not absent
t~estore.t1on

of the A'mpero:r and the

The group of clever statesmen who

Sbg5gna:~m oonta1nEH1

many warriors.

Many of

the 8.ble, sttl!.tesmen who expedi. ted the mode:rnization of Japan

were soldiers.

The g:reat na.t:tonal plan of political and ,

economic developmE:mt which they adopted tor Nippon included

not only the building of railways. the cree.t1on ot bt11.nks•
r-------~~~~~~~~·~i~o~n~o*f~1~~~~arn li~~b~u~t~·------------~----

a.l'So the a.rming of the nation in the latest European

fashion, the subet1 tut1on of a ata11dine; e,rmy 1n place of et
feuds.l soldier-y, the introduction of consoription on a

na.t1ou ... w1de seale, and· the construction .of .a

.

1----------·-~-~---~~~

pm>~erful

25
navy.

6

Important also was the inculcnti.on .ot mili tar1sm in

schools and a oontlnunnce of the fanatic cod$ o:f' loyalty to
t,he ;ttmperor.

'l'b~.a

loyalty w:as. oul.tivated as a mea;ne of
>

arotH~ing

'

an intense entbuaia.sm and a.evoti.on to. the eta.te on

the pe,;rt of the humble citizenry.
Qrreqa1t1rua and

r.~.vol."Y•

reaist&noe to. the new o.rder
.N'Yolt by the. Satsumet clan,

In 1877 the last bit of armed

fl~red

up in the form of a.

lfhia seems ra.the:r surprising

beoauae the. Satsuma,, 1 t will be remembered., lad the way for

As 1 t developed~ however,

the restoration of the Enrperor.

f3a.1go

Tak~unori,

lea,der of the Satsuma, ha(l.

b(:Hl~m,e

d1ee;run""

tled with the Empex-o:r and the new ayf:'ltem b$oause they had

thwarted hie attempts to in't/e.de Korea. in the year 1874, 7
The

S~.tauma

clan; traditionally one of the most wa.:r•l1ke of

the feudatories. t'las e,lfi!!O disee,tis:fied with the. treatment

the.t the
t:t

~Aarriors

were receiving.

They saw the waX>riors as

class losing their favo:red pos1 tion ,_n Japanese society.

The a,rmy was be ins thrown

op~;m

to the mas see by the inet1 tu•

-t--------'rr:tt'H'l---n'!"-----lirn&--flfv-wMHB---f''l'F--nte~-e-e-n-a~~on~~a-illatts\4=------'-----
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The system of conacriptioi'l clema.nded

that every Japanese male wi tbout d1!ittinct1on of ;rank or

class serve, hi a country as a conscript,. three years in
autiVE;} o.uty togatber

't~i th

two years in the first reserve !!md
another two yea.re in the seoortd reserve-. 8 At first glance
1 t .would ~e$m .tb~t. t}le military signed their own dee.tn

we.rra.nt

by opening their ranks to a.dmi t the common oi tizen.

This wae not

th~

case.

Since the system of cons.cription wae

begun by the· 1Tlil1·tarit:rt.a• tnen au:rely they would not under""

. mine tl:Ha.:tr own motives,

Conscription was brought about for

a ptU:'pose; and. tbie purpose "rae to hasten the do\<mfall of

feudalism ae the economic e,nd pol1 tical et:ructu:re of the
country.

Although this wa.a accomplished, feudal psychology

remained the domtnating factor• in the establishment ·of a new

t'ot'm of government, e. government fa,sh:tonad to meet
.of the· mili te.ry.

th~

ends

The new tom of government dema.ndt1d

unque stion1ng aocspte.nce of control of authority e,e 1ts

found.ation.

The old class barriers that we:re erected during

+--------;~~nm~~~~$~~~nd-tha wn~~s-aa&s~a~--------~----

separ$.te and distinct olaes in Ja,paneee society t!liaappea.:red.
However., the whole Japanese nation became instilled with the
3ea1 a.nd ·ambition thttt .on.ce affected t)nly a very small

--------------~-
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percentage of tha people.

Univers~l m~le

conscription

<tian•t sweep a.we.y the idea of a domin~mt mil1taJ:•y ola.es.

On

the contrary, it carried this theory even farther, right to
paopla ~ . tj;ibe ep1 ri t of the m111 ...
tacy ola,es beoame the feelings of all of Je.pan., 9 . This

the \-thole of the

~ra.peJ'l(\Hl~

.feeling was to b(l) incorpo:.ra.ted into '\t.rhe..t t-ras supposed to be
. the symbol of a demoora.tic and const1 tutiorlt·l.l government.

the ConstitutJion of Je:pan 1 teel:f.

ltli.

l~~J!

QQrtl1!:!:1,tgti9Jl"

lama to fa.ce the military waa

One of the first ma.1or prob.,..
l'l0'-11

to form a conati tut1onal

government 1<¥hioh woul<l p:reee:rve the rights e.nd pow0rs of the
m:tli~ ta.xw·

·and a.t the same t!tma satisfy the grmdng demand for

representative

gov~rnment.

The solution of this n:roblem fell to l?:rinoe Hit-obum1
<.'1>

'

'

Ito, tbe leading advocate of a ooneti tut,1ona.1
with a.bsolut~ powe~s.

gov~.nmment

tn 1882 be .went abr()a.d to study

governm$nt admini etration throughout the .v1orld.

the P:r>usaia.n eyatem

th~

He found

best model .for the p:reserva.t.ion of

+---~-VHJI;lf----'\tT.hi~~-'1:':;----H{J~:-Il'r.t.'~~G.w~-S.

:Be t':lfll~n

Ito laJ.d down the principles of a sui table oor1sti tutional
document and paV$d the we.y for 1 te

~.doption.

Ito• a const1 tution was drafted in secret.
no

coru~ti tutiona.l

Thera was

oonvent:ton 11 no consul tat ion 1d th pll.rty

28
lea.ders, no poymle,r d1souaeion or d$bate~. e.nd no popular

The constitution resulted in the creation of

ratificaM.on.

a new aristoc:t'e.oy ..
Stnte •
tic

a~d

1 ts first members were young men with mili tarie,..

sympath1~ 1:1.

included.

A Oabin~t replaced.the old. Oounc:tl of

No repres$nta.ti vee of the old nobil.i ty were

Local govermnents were reorga.n1 zed in a compro...

.mise with democracy.

Tbe Privy Council, composed of members

. of the ne'" nobility and d.istinguished stl3.tesmen. was

o:rea.ted. . It \'las the duty of this Privy Council to approve.
the constitution and tt;> dra.ft

eonst~ tutional

10
amendments •.

A representative Diet composed. of two chambera was
established..

The upper oha.mber,

Ol" Hot~se

of Peers, included

members of the royal family an<! the nobility.

The lower

chamber, the House of R$pl"eeent8.t.1ves, was a body of some
· three hundred selected for f'our year terms by all adult
males who paid a specified annual ttJtx:.
right of debate and

Cabinet.

;J:t 1-ra.s

th~

The Diet hal! the

right to question members of the

never able to gain control over the pu:rae,

eror rete' ned the power to summon
dissolve the House of Repreeentat1vee, 11

a.nd

to

At first gla.noe it might e.ppEHU" that the forces of
liberalism and democracy "rere e;ain1ng the upper hand in the

•-----ooiumlH.a~tJnlversl ty ~Pri,iia ;·~
11

:tbi~.

battle for control of the e;ovti*rnment •. 1bie was not the case,
hO\<,'SV$1?.

not

t~ue.

T'tler•e

WEI!'€!

aeVare.l t'EH.~Sf)rlS

why

this

S.liHH.'Itnption WSB

First. the ministers of war and the navy had' the

:r1e;ht of iaku Josu, or d1:rect access to the Emperor.

This

practice "totae permitted by Article VII of the Imperial

Ordinance on the O:rgGmization of the

Oabin~t

of 1889 \'lh,.ch.

Wi. th the e){ce:ption of tstmk} a~Jnte6 or. of military
affairs of secrecy and s~ave mportance which, hav•
ing been reported d1:ractly to the Emperor_ may have
been submitted by the Emperor for the oonsidera.tion
of the cabinet, the ministers of state for war a.~S
the navy shall t'eport to the minister president.

Thia meant that the ttl1li tarlste could take their case
di~ctly

to the Emperor while the non•mil1tariats were

fot·oed to reeort to oorurti tutiona.l means in o:rd.ar to convey

their feelings to tbe throne.,

This was a decided advants,ge

for the m1l1 ta.ry, a.nd they did not besite.te to use 1t.
$eoond, tht:t militarists insured. the continuance of

their posi t.ion by placing the organiza,tion and standing of
the A:rmy and Navy, not in the Diet where 1 t would be subject
to OiV'ilian ju;risdiotion• but in the hands ot the Emperor.
Thie, in effecta made the Army e.nd Navy the private property

of the Emperor.

The Japanese 'believed the.t the Emperor was

divine and could do no wrong: therefore, the Army and Navy
ooul.d do no wrong, 1 3 IJ.'he posi t1on of the m1l1 ta:riste in
I

this particular facet of the problem was tremendously aided
by the principle of ~!!~

.J.suua,

or "direct access."

Third,

through the use of Article 67 of tbe coneti tution, the Diet

was prohibited from reducing the budget onoe 1 t had been
'
14
f'1xed.
In other words, the Army and Navy could always
count on a certain amount of money.

!he Diet might not

increase funds for m111 tary appropriations J but, on the
other hand, 1 t could not dec:rea63e them.

Th1 e continuous,

stea.dy source of' income helped to stabilize the position of
the military.
Probably the most important single weapon in the
hands of the mili ta,rista was a law which stipulftted that the
Minister of War could. be ohosen only :from a list of active
genera.ls.

Each Cabinet had to have a Mini mter of War before

it could function,.
-+----~~.u..,~-t.~-l!---bis

If the militarists didn't approve of the

policies,

th$.1-----Wtlu~ply

refuse to permit

a genera,l on active d.uty to accept the pos1 tion of Minister
of War..

If a general aid accept the poet again.st the wishes

of the mil1 tar1sts, he was taken off of the active list 51 the

31
.CJabinet would fall, and the potenM.a.l premier would ha.ve to
cate~

to the milita:rists in order to secur$ a Minister of

Wa.xo,

In this manner the mili ta.ry clique made· and. unmade

Cabinets

ar1d

premiers.

The oonsti tuti()n orE1a.ted a tra.mework of govet>nment.
whioh included insti tuM.ons similar in form te> tho ee found.

1n democra.t1c states bt.lt marked by features which rna.de the

development of a democratic system impossible.

The lt..'mperor

eont:rolled the budg<i!t of the Army and the Navy; yet tbe
people in no way exet•oieed control over the Emperor.

The ·

only 1nfluenoe playing e. direct role on the Emperor was .
levied by the mi11 tar;v ~~

The war• lords ware playing w1 th the

deck stacked in their :f'e;Vo:r.

The ooneti tut1on made the

military independent of civ:llie,n

cont~ol,

added nothing to

the civil arm of government, and detracted nothing ft-om the
role of the m1.l1 tary.

As one

~.uthor

has notedl

The 1889 constitution is a document embodying
Japanese pol:ttical principles under the cloak of
representative il1ati tutiona. It put the m.ili tarists
ln the drivers eeat,. They 't~Tere riding high, wide
+-------·n""...,.d~·.h. . .....
an.de.ome andl!tbere was nothi.~hair wat-tG---------~
even more power.· 5

lbi

m~t~~~rx ~ f.~82·i21~.

Beginning With the

Me1j1 Restoration, Japan wa.s expansionist in feeling and

polioy.

~he RE;Hrto~ation

Even bef'o:re

had fe,v.o!'ed terri to rial expansion* l6

mtu'ly Japanese leaders

During the years of

'

internal reform, however, they had cautiously retrained from
x:-ash adventures abroad.

A

strong movement in favor of a

punt tive exped.i tion t.o Korea ha.d developed in 187l•H373, but
the dominant ·clan bureaucrats had skillfully prevented the

outbreak of war,

They

h~d pe~itted

a Formosan expedition

in 1874 bQt had settled the resulting issues pea.cef~lly w1 th

China..

Some em all gains

Island.s

w~re

ha.~

been

m~.de,

however.

~e

Bonin

annexed in 1876 and the Ryuku Islands in 1879.

A naval demons.trat1on in 1876 secured for Japan spe,oial

treaty rights in Korea which led to more and mo.re interven...
tion in Korean affaire • 17 It, was in .Korea that the mi11 ta:cy

masters of Japan l·tere to

la.~noh

L---

thei:r first full scale

,.mperialistic ambitions.

,

~-ruan~S!~

lf.it *

~-l~~~·

had been Ut1der the eUZ$ra1nty of Oh,.na..

For centuriE: o iCol:'ee.

'···;.

Under- this arrange•

ment China gave Korea protec\ion. ae;a1nst external e.ggresaion
-+----~Uf,.\;'----l;.lJIJ-,I..;ii.-U.l~~-{-w.s~n-a-nd----aJ!proval

ruler,18

eaeh-ne-lo~---------

In 1882 anti.,.foreign riots broke out in Seoul~t the

oe.pital of Korea.

16

of

Acting in accorda.noe with her mutua.lly

Gubb1ns, SU!•

P!~·~

P• 113.

1.
•----Yorlta V!lti~g F-resa-;-lg4kl;--p-.~-35;-~-~-~-----·~---~uL___~_

18~., p. 38 •.-

recognized obligation, China

troops to assist in

reeto~

Japan; with whom Korel;l had no sucb ag;reement,

1ng order,

felt she

~ant

t~hould.

have a finger in the Korean pie and, acoor-d•

~.ne;ly• sent, troops to the soene.,

Oomplicationa arose which

led to intense feeling between China and Japan, ·and war

between the two countl:"iea wae narr<nfly averted.

Ohina and

Japan.mut~ally

ag~ed

In 1885

to withdraw their troops,

and K:orea wa.a urged to organize bar own army.

It was, more•

over,, agreed tba.t in the event of any further disorders
calling for outside intervention both China and Js.pan $hould

notify each other before d.ispatohing troops and that troops

so sent were to he withdrawn as soon a.s
attained.

t~heir

obJect was

Th1 e a,greem.tmt became known ae the Qc;mJ,e,J1:§!s.n

sa,

T!e.!Jl:~1!l• 19
Despite the

gg~vi;\Jlt1gn

.g,X

l'.&!~~@iJh

the s1 tuation was

full of pol:t tical dynamite; and only a spark was neede,d to

bring about a major explosion.

Such a. spark was furnished

in 1894 when Korea wa.s again throlm into serious confusion
+-----~~~~-H.I---~~i¥;11-----Wh-at--1-S-kno-t.m---l!LS-the .:t,p:qsQ!Jt--,e~~<e~!~~r:::~~19Dw.:to...---~-

an indigenous nat1ona.l1st1c

movem~nt~

mildly religious. but

intensely patriotic and ant1 ... foN1gn. 20

Ohina dispatched

two thousand troops to the scene and. in accordance with the
agreement of 1885, :notifled Japan .of her a.ot1on,
1-----""'------------~----------------------

Ja.pan

_ao_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :_ ________.:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
~

:tb;~.

fl

p.

57.

replied. by sending mo;-e than forty""five hundred troops and
at

th~

eatpe time rejec·t.:tng China• s long•stancUng claim to

euze:rainty by pointing out that Je,pa.n had nav.:n" recognized

Korea1 as a state tributary to Cl:lina. . The m111 tarists had
their boot in tba door, a.nd. they were intent upon forcing
I

.....

the door wide open.

i

TOe Japanese eomma.nder eerved notioe upon China that
Jap~1n

intended to undertalte single•handed the task of reor...

gani~ing

the government of Korea.

21

The first move 1.n thi a

dil:'eotion by Japan was the dema.nd that the King of Korea

declare his country an independent ata.te no longar under the
suzerainty of China.

vl.h1la these negotiations were beine;

carried on, Ohina. mr;mae;ed to increase her forces to a.pprox•.

imately three thousand men while the war""lords of Japan
pou%"$d over eighteen thousand troops into. tbe "land of the
J n22
early morn 1 ng ca.m.

On July 21, 1894, Japanese troops entered Seoul and
quickly t:md quietly proceed.ed to taka ove:r· the palace.
, the oity gates, and Korean military

. . . 2lr. A. MoKenz1e 1 ~ r.f~a~se9-.l. 2!, Korea (New York:
The Macm.1llan Company, J.9l7T. p. 59.
22 ;tb1!1. t ·p~ 62.
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brought a.bout heea.uee Ko:res,n sold.iers had fired upon
Japanea(') troops.

The Japanese pl.a.ced. the young regent upon

the crown and forced him into demanding the expulsion of all
Chinese t:roops from ltore8.• 2 3 \far seemed imminent and 1 t

was.
The confliot which ensued" , lmown aJ; the S:ln9""Japanese

Wa.:t- 1 was of short duration.
Ja:pa.neee torpedoed the

Hoetili ties eommetlced when the

}iQ;t.{,Ef:tl~!.h

tt\telve hundred men aboard.

a Chinese transport '\Tith

The

~a.pa.ne~e

forces then etruok

one blo'lfr after another in rapid. sucoeseionlt throwing into
confusion the ill... prepa:rea and sadly over-..confidlin'lt Chinese ·
army which was outnumbered and finally almost annihilated at

24

Pingya:ng,

Than followed. the destruction of the Chinese

fle$t in the Battle of Ye.lu, the capture of Port Arthur with
1 ta ho:rr1 ble maeeaore, 25 tha invasion of the Lia.otuns

Peninsula, and. the capture of We1}la.1\1&1 in Northern
Shantung"

Orushed. and J:lumiliated Ohina was forced• by the

Treaty of Sh1monoseki 11 to accept the following terms&

the ceding to Je.pan of the Lia.otung

23
Will1ams,

24

McKenz1e 11

2

•

~·
5nl·

P~ninsula,

the ieland of

~-· P• 67.
q~!r·.
-

---

---

P• 73.
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Formosa, and the Pesca.dorea; and payment to Japa.n of au
indemni'ty of A'iPlSO,OOO,OOO. 26
The war-lords t1ere

jubilant~

Their first full scale

effort had met with tremendous success.

enthusiasm \'las short•JJ.ved..

Uot-tever. the

The terms of the Treaty of

Sh1monosek1 were not at all to the liking of three powerful
\fastern nations#

Germany, France, a.nd Russia.

All three

had their own very definite ideas as to the future exploi•
ta.tion of the Chinese Empire, and. they ha.d no intention of

pcal"mi tting a Japan the;t ha.d just emerged from a state of
sem1... ba.rba.rism to disrupt their plans.

signing of the Shimonoseki

T~aty,

A few d.a.ye after the

. Ja.pan :received from these

three r1atione a firm but loftily wo:t·ded protest. concerning

her p:ropoeed a.aquisi tion of the vastly $tre,teg1c L1a.otung
Peninaula.

Such an arrangement would• this proteet pointed

out. constitute a. dire menace to China's capital at Peking
and would render purely illusory the newly declared inda~
pendence of Korea.. 27 What could Japan do in the face of

difficulty the armed forces of her ba.ckward neighbor; but to
fa.oe t.he armed. forces of three of tha world 1 a leading powers
would. be an entirely different ma.tter.

26

1------------~ -~~~ ~..__ __

27

Ibid., P• 197.

There was nothing to

do but accept the "reoommandat1onen of the Tripe.rti te

Powers.
Even this set-back strengthened the mili tar1sts.
They used 1 t to discretli t the F'ore1gn Office of the government.
I

'

f_

They pointed out how the armed forces of Japa.n had

won e. glorious victory only to be deprived. of 1 t by the
ineptness of the civ111a.n branch of the government.

A

double victory was, therefore, gained by the militarists.

The nTriparti te In·tervention, '' as the milite.riste
called 1 t. rankled. Japanese hearts.

Salt was rubbed in to

the wound only a year after the signing of the Treaty of
Shimonosek1 and the Tripartite Intervention.

y ... tgbanov
Ohinese diplomat

Tt!a!x ..
I.~i

18,2!?. In March. 1896; the famous

Hung-chang was appointed by the Empress

Dowager Teu Hsi to journey to St, Petersburg, osteneil,ly for
the purpose of rapre ee.nti.ng Chirul at the coronation of
Russia's 11ew Czar, Nicholas II.

There was, however 11 another

purpose for his visit and a vary important commission which
+-------~~~~~~~~~-=~~~~~~~~~~e~a~r~a~~----~----------~-----

at.

Petersburs in all the :r•egalia of hie office and attended

by an impressive retinue; and in June, 1896, ha negotiated
·with Russia a secret treaty of allie.nce specifically aimed
at Japa.n.

It wa.e a.g:read that if the le.tter should pursue an

tracting parties would assist one another on land e,na sea.

At the ·time 11 the Russian representative, Loba.nov • who

actually negoM.e.ted the

with Li Hung-chang succeeded

treat~

in persua.ding 1;1 tha.t the safety of China d.epend$d upon the
construction of a transcontinental railway across Northern
Manchuria to.Vladiyostok; thie right was embodied in the
tree.ty.

This treaty marked the start of the fortification
a~d

of the Lia.otung Peninsula.

the building of the Dairen•

Ha:rb1n railroad by the Russiant.h

ing on the wall, a.nd the

28

~111 ta.ry

J$U§§O•.rapanegl W1r:

Japan saw the handwri t ...
decided to erase 1 t.

1204-.Q!i.

liebed herself on the Liaotung

Having firmly estab·

Peninsula~

Russia lost no

time 1n extending her influence to the north; and by the
beginning of the year 19?2, J:tussian forces were tn
undisputed mili ta.ry possession o:f' Ohina' s three eastern
provinces, the terri tory better known tHI ~1anchuria. 29 Such

a dominant Rueeia.n

po~i t~.on

was full of danger, to all other

foreign interests in the F'ar Ea.st as well as to tboee of
, China.

It was to Japan, however, tha.t the situatlon

~------~~HH~~~~enac~~~,~a*r~1s~t~s~------------

of Japan who deoided the.t they ware sufficiently prepared to
challenge Rueeia! a e.lleged rights.

28Webb, .fm• &• $
29
( i()ndon t
p. 153.

p,. 89.

One of the sources of

oon:f'idenoe :f'or the Je.paneee was the Anglo•Je.panese Alliance
of 1902 by wh1oh each would so to the defense of the other
if ei the:r were attacked by more

t:ree.ty \i'as

USEH'J'

tb~;n1

one nation.

This

b;y the :British as a means of curtailing

Russian expansionist tendencies in the Far East. but e.t the

same time 1 t gave the war-lords of Japan a free hand. in the

Orient. 30
Early in 1903 the e:ttuatlon began to assume a serious

aspect, and once again
East,

'!Ita~

clouds began to gather in the Far

Throughout the year Russia al'}d •Je,pan were engaged in

more or lees wearisome negotiations, which arrived at no

definite conclusions.

In Japan the mil1 tariste

ing the divinity of' the Emperor. the code of

\>~ere

~Q!lhidq,

stressthe

concept of ha:Jsk2 1gh1y (bringing the corners ot' the world
und.er one, roof), and the belief !.n kQ,do (the way of th'iJ

Emperor) to stir the people into a frenzy.
in

do~.ng

this to

suo~ B.

They succeeded

degree that public opinion soon

demanded tha,t Russian penetration and inf1l tra.tion in

+-------~~Hw.~~ale~s~t~offpmp,~.3l

This~a-ene-tim~~&-t~~~---------------

rista were more than willing to stibmit to the will of the
people.

;o.llUs!·,
1

p.. 158.

40
In the negotiations bet.ween the x-ap:resente,tives, of

, Russia· and. Ja,pan, the Ruaeiana dilly-dallied
and· a.ppea:red to
' '
)

.,

be in no g:rea:t. hurry to come to a settlement.
:

\

'

•

t

Ja,pan, on the

other hand, feeling herself competent, would brook no

On February 6, 1904, Japan aeve:re,d diplo ..

:further delay.
i

matic relatione with

Rus~ia..

Two days le.te:r the Imperial

'

Ja,panese Navy under the oommtn'ld of ,.Admiral Togo a:ttaoked the

Fo:rme.l declaration of war

Russian fleet off Port Arthur.,
did not come until the lOth.

Host1l1 ties lasted nea,rly two

,Although Russia wae badly beaten, the Je.panese them•

jf'EHu·a.

selves were on the verge of collapse

beo~,uee

of the pro•

longed atra.1n of t.be war on men. auppliea, and raw m,.,_teria.ls.
Both sides. we:re rea.d.y :ror
T~J~~l

p~Ht()e.

st. fo.rt~~~::=tbt

~·,

Under the sponsorship

of Theodore Roosevelt, Russia and Japan til.gread to the
follo1't:lng peace terms as set up at the Trae:ty of Po;rtsmouth a

(l) Both

pol<~ers

agreed to evr1.ouate M.anoburta which we.GJ to be

restored to the exclusive administration of China with the
+----------"'hl\.\o.~~VJ.-&-v--.-~.,.__.""",i"""'a""o,l-'t....t""m~s~P,_.,e4rinw.1..«-nauJ. a,

the J as ee of wh.i..o.h-w....
a . ._s------'----~

to be tx•ansferred to Japan; (2) Ja.pan• s para.mount poli M.oal,

mil1 tary, and economic 1nte:rasts in Korea were reoogni zed;
( '3) Russia. ceded to Japan the railway from Port Arthur to
Ohangoht:m, retaining the railway north of the,t point; and

41
Japan ancl sra.nted 1mporta.rrll fishing rights in northern

· Pao1fic waters ·to Ja.pa.neae · intrn·$.sta. 32
Japa:n ha.d taken on the ncolosaus of. t.he not>tht' a.nd,
much to the su:rpr:tse of

everyor.u~f ha.d.emet"ged.

vi.oto:r•ioue.

The mil1 ta.:r:t eta were praised throughout Japan.

their prestige glo1rr eo b:rie;htly,
t.he Yamato race..

Never did

They "'ere the saviors of

It aQlemed that the policy of

!J~l;IF.sl a_c14~Y.

was to succeed.
On July

30~

1912 11 the Emperor Meij1 died.

d.ea.th .an era. came to e.n end.
constitutional m111ta.:riam.

\'fitb his

Feuda.lism had been repls,ced by
'1\>ro great tfa.:rs hadbeen ;Pought·

Jap$.11 "'as r$cogn1 zed as one of the wc>:rld' e gr~a,t

e.nd won.

powers, ot1ing pr,.ma:r:tly to the policy of the m1l,.tar1sts,

Two years later
exparu~'-on

b I ;lj:

anothe.~

period of still more amb1 tious

and growth waa ushered in by Worl.d

I

. ,II

-------------

~ie.r

-

I.

I

- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -

JAPANESE MILITARISM AND lvORL:O \vAR I

World War I gave Japan a great oppor·tuni ty for

expansion and srowthp and her military leadare \<tere quick to
seize

,.t,

The conditions created by

made to order for Japan.

\~lorld

War I ha<.'l peen

They brought all her str·ategio

a.dvantases into play and were ideally e.dapted to meet her

eaonomio •. politioal, and

tt~ilita.:ry

neoeesities.

The pred1o-

t:ton. of Viscount Tani upon his return from the 1'1est in 1888
eaeme4 about ready

to

coma true;

Make our country secure by military preparation •
• ·• • Encourage and protect the people at home, and

tbe!l wait for the time of th$ confusion o:f' Europe

which must oom$ eventually eooner·or later • • •

Such an event will. agitate the nations of the Orient

ae well• anf we Will then become the chief na.tion of
the Orient.
.
Q!Jt'l?tt!i~

a! l'1oz;-l4 .\f.t,:r .1: loW• Atte:r the

outb:tteak

of hoatili ti~s, Japan. acting she claimed in consonance with
the terms of the Anglo.o.Ja.pe:nese Alliance, .offered to come to
-+---------,------'Gne---nhlba-----fH:.-\:l!'£'e-lau--.!1H~a-in..

tha"t Ja,pa,n

In

~~rea

if

~~~-'l.b--------

oon:f'~ne

he:r• f1,ght1ng to the sea; that is, attacks
2
upon armed G:erma.n me~hantmen in Pacific wa.tera.
Japan,

------------------------- ------------------------c----~------------------New Yorlu
1942) • p. 4~

--2---·--------~.

:m.

T. W~.lliaxllat ~. }:'e@t~tdf!:X ~ '11$2d!!J£

Viking Preas 9

bo'l.;l'eV<H'I refused to so :restr1,ct.

h~r

opera;t1Qns if she

'G.l'ltered the. war ~t all; f:or the eyes. of the ·Japanese mil1ta•

riti'ts were upon Tsingtao •. '~ea.lthy city .a!)d s·trt=t,tegio. for-..
tress on the Ohinese mainland, togeth$1" wi,th Kie,oehow. a.
terri tol,"y of one hundred ana ninety-. three square miles and
i

-[
i
I

. an impo:rtan·t center of trade sa. wall as the gateway to
historic Bhanttme; Province, one, of the richest f;ltates in

Ohlne.• 3

1\lese wero the terri tori as that had been lea.sed by

the Germans during the heo.tic years when ChirHl was oonaid,..

ered a plum tor Well!tern iqlperis.l:tsnh
Great 13:ri tain was in a dilemma.

AQcording to the

terms of the Anglo-Japanese Pa.ot~ o.f 1902, which had 'been
reaffirmed in 1911,

e:l'the1~

of tha countries wa.s supposed to

ootnEl to the aid of the other in case· of an attack 'by more
than one po'lrrer,

D:rita:tu. bad been attaclted by. more than one

pcrwer and now Japan

not for

th~

-rt~e,$

offel:'ing to come to her·tM':lSiats,noe;•

pU:rpOSt;) Of living Up to the tertna of. tbe treaty;

but for furthering her own mil:t te.ristic ar1d impe:r;te.listio
+------!(l~Ha-..--~~~n.fiJ--'c~,~,U*"d
..~.--1n;.&\o~t.._·-¥t>~ran~at.l-i.n.....t'b.e-'t>;ar bu-t,~d..1u.d~nu.o~.J.-·.u-t- - - - - - - - -

know how to keep her out•

'~···
4
s

:o:r~

p. 498.

l~

Stanley Ho. rnbeek, 9Ql;l~~J9:QQJ7$-X:l ?;g*i ~!~s 111· £he
(New York~ D. Appleton""O$ntu:ry Company, 928T,

ln th$ fine,l analya1e, Ja.pan decided to e.ct upon her
own aocotmt; and on August" ·15, 1914, abe issued an ults.matum
to

Germ~my

df!mamUng comP,lete wi thdrawa.l by Germa.ny from her

poesaasions in the l?acif1e.5 .Rece1 "'~ng no reply Japan
declared wa.r againf!lt C}ermany on August 23 and immediately
oommenoed operaM.one e.gainet the Germany. lea.eed territory of
[iaochow a.nd against the surround1.ng

Ch~.nese

terri tory.

the m111 t.e.riets were t:t:"eading upon d.e:ngeroue ground..

He~

!hey

wanted to move ahead rapidly and felt tbe.t they had a good
ohe:noe in suocEHld,.ng in their objectives
the,t the

reH~t

beca~ee

of the fact

of the ,.,orld was embroiled in the eonflagra;..

t.ion in Europe.

Yet, there was a. need for basi tanoy :;md

caution lest the

ent~.re

Je.pa.neae scheme· for the ultimate

control of China be reeogn1zed.
In her
demtmded tha.t
•*llliqll1

~1 t:lmatum

to Garmany on

A\.1gu st

1.5, Japan had

Germany deli Vet' to her the lEH'),sed. terl:-1 tor'Y .

t ..

S~e:re is quite a difference of opinion on this
matter. Dr .. Gilbert Reid
his
C~~tv~ 9.£
ree (Ntlw Yor~ees 11 ~
. ..
· . .·
U---t.O--s.Ome·-------~
pa.i.na in a.n effort to show that Jape.n entered the war at the
request of Grea,t Britain quoting as authority for hi.s
statements a. rather formlae.ble array of taetlmony almost
ent1.raly Ja.panese in origin., ProftH.iH~or E. 1\ Williams. on
the other hand,· in hie q~1na ~eeter~e.z ina :Codfl¥ 11 p., 498,
s&ye that Je.pan offe:rad . o come to the aseit!!t~lnce ot G:reat
Bri tai:n, but that' th~ 'la.tter declined the offer, whereupon
Ja.pan undertook to e.ot ind.epen.dently. Dr. St~1nley Hornbeck•
ont m orar J!.gl'~*oelJl ~!Jea ~. Ea t, P• 286. a:nd J>a.ul s.
.
·. .
.
.
.
•
5 CO!lCUl" With
r----~t=h-=e~~v~1~e~so:f rofeaaor 1 liama.
e ~te-.te~m~ant.-a--o-f ------------~
Professor Williams and Dr. Hornbeck are based upon incon...
trovertible evidence an<1 bava never been :repudiated.

in

vl;u::.: ii!tl,

I

1'
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of K1aoohow nwi th a view to the eventual restoration of the
same to Obina"; and on the da.;v tha.t this ultimatum was
delivered.- Count Iltuma, Premier of Japan, in s, telegro,m to
the American press had said:
Japan's proximity to Ohine, breeds many absurd
rumors; but I declare that Japan acts w1 th a. clear
conscience in conformity with justice, and in perfect
accord w1 th her ally. Japan has no territorial
ambitions and hopee ~o stand a.s the protector of the
peace in the Orient. -

·
Thus spoke the Premier of Japan, the spokesman of the
.. ·'
"

-,

militarists.

Later, in a message sent to the New

,

'

Y,grt

i

Independent, l?rem1er Ikuma declared:
It :te my desire to convince your people of the
sincerity of m;r government and of my people in all
their utterances and a.aeura.nces • • • • This Far
Eastern ei tuation 1e not of' our seeking. • • • I
have ree.d w:l th adm1re,tion the lofty message of
President Wilson to his people on the subject of
neutra.li ty. • • • As Prem1eJ:- of Japan I have
stated, and I now again state, to the people of
America and of the world, that Japan has no
ulterior motive, no desire to eeoure more terri•
tory~ no thought of d.epriv1ng China or any other
peoples of anything which they no\>t possess • • •
My government and my people have given their word and
their• pledge • which will be as honorably kept as

Japan always keeps prom1ses.7

The whole thing now seems grimly humorous in the
light of Japan • s sublequent depredations. but it. served the
purpose of

th~

militarist clique by lulling the nations of

7 Quoted in Close, SU'l• .s.J:! .. 9 pp. 10:3... 104.
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the West into. a false sensa of security while the secret
plans of th$ \'l'ar-lords were put into effect,.
Weaks passed. Tej.ngtao had been ta,ken; German control
had been wholJy eliminated from the leasehold a.nd the rail•

way.

China waited, expecting that Japan would at least

eva,ouate the parte of

Sha.ntung which she had occupied out•

side of the German area; but Japan save no indication of any
move in that direction.

F'inally, on Januray 7 • 1915 1 almost

two months after Tsingtao had fallen, the Chinese. Government
off'ic1a1.1y notified Japan, that, inasmuch as the mili ta:ry

neoeesity no longer existed, the zone of belligerency in
.
.
Shantung waa abolished; and she requested tha.t all J'apa.nese
troops be w:t thclra,wn into the Kia.ochow area.. 8

stigmatized as an unfriendly act.

Not under

this Jape;n
~ny

circum•

stance, she declared w1 th \-Tell-affected umb:re,ge, would she

acquiesce in euob a request.
d$f1antly 11 would

to:ry.,9

oon~lnue

Japanese troops- she asserted

to move freely in Chinese terri•

It must 'be remembered t.bat thiS he.ppenad lese than

~------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~e lor~~Y------~--~

statements pledging Ja:pan to honor e.nd uphold the 1nteg:r1 ty
and sovereignty of China; a pledge which we,s to be
*'honox-ably ltept a.s Japa.n always keeps promisee. u

1----'--------- ----- ---- ---· -
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k
the

braz~n

~ntz-~ .~m~Hl~f!t

l~,l~.

Immediately follo1dng

affront to Oh1na 1 s' sovereign rights described

above came Ja,pan • e notorious

Tt>~enty .... one

Peme,nd:l! for oert,e,1n

privileges which, if granted, t-toulc1 have r·educad Obina to
i
I

the poei tion of an economic and adm:tnietra ti v·e protectorate

of Japan.

1besa demand$ comprised a most astounding d1plo ....

ma.tic communication and have been characterized by more than
one eminent poli tioe,l wri tar as a more vicious assault upon
Chinese sovereignty than was Austria's ultimatum in 1914
t~pon the. sovereignty of Serb1a. 10 Astonishing also was the

fact that, contrary to esta,blishad diplomatic usage. these
deme;nds were presented not to the Minister of F'oreign
Affairs but directly to 'the Presid<!mt of China by the
Ja.p(Ules~

Minister Hioki, who enjoined upon him the utmost
aeereoy • 11 Their prer:.n~nt~1,ti'm waa aceompa.nied by verbal

demands for prompt acoepta,noe and by threats of dire oonae,..

quenoes to President Yua.n 5bih•ka1, the governmentp and. the
na.t:lon' should the matter become lmm·m to the world. 12
-r------.t."-t::J-M:.ne'-'f'mA-t'1~---'ITr'~-----'tt1~l'l~t wrltt~Hl

Japanese Foreign Office but upon

on the stationary of th-e-----'----

J'~a,pa.nese

t-lar Office. paper"

10
L. A. Lyall, 2b~.n~ (New Yorks The Macmillan
Oompe.ny • 193$) 1 p. 21;.

ll~b~~-
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we.termarked with machine guns and be.ttleehipe, a bit of
Jingaiam that the Japanese war-lords have never bothered to

~xple.1n. 1 ~
1"he Twenty ... one
-,
j

~roa:nde

were divided. into five groupth

The first group, consisting of four articles, covered
Japa.n' e position in the Shantung Peninsula. and in effect
would ha.ve converted that Chinese area into a Japanese bold•
The seven a.rticlee of the second group would h8.ve

ing.

given ll1anchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
Japanese preserves.

~he

status of

Japa.neee sub.1ects would have been given

special rights in these a.reas 11 and Oh:l.na would ha.ve been

forced to consult Japan in the event tba:t other governments
requeet.ed. :rail'ttTay or fina.noial privileges in these areas.
The two at•ticlee of group three covered

mining holdings 1.n China.

cert~ain

Japanese

Group four, a eingle article, was

del\31gned ''with object of. effectively preeerv1ng the terri torial integrity of China."

China was to agree not to cede or

lease to any other power any harbors or any 1 eland a e.long

.. e d.eaigned .to prevent any
o t.her t'l9.tion from challenging Ja.pe.nt s paramount poei t1on in
Ohim.a. 14

The f'ifth and final group. of seven articles 'ITould

l31W· P •
14·
--• '·-·
York: Century
If

··-·-

-

-·

(New

---·

'"

--.

'

·--
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have placed influential Japanese in the Chinese government
'

'

as po:t.1 tical, financial, and m.il1 tary adv:ts@ra,; given
Japanese hospi ts.la, temples, and s.ohool.a thEf right to own
land in the inta;rio.r of

Chin~;

placed

~Tapanaee

in• v1:rttual

'control of the Chinese police system; given Japan a.ont:rol
ove:r Chinese arme,ments; granted Japan the :right to construct
certain rail1trays :ln Ohina; placed Japan in a position to

veto the pa.rt1o1pat1.on of foreign cap1 tal in the development
of Fukietl province; and given Japaneae the

in China.,

:ri~-:;ht

to preach·

The last a.:rtieles were so bare•faoecl in their

1.nfringement on Ohi.nese sovereignty that the Japanese
evantua.lly. att~mptad to deny· tha.t they repreaftHlted anything
mora than ,rapanese ttwi ehe a. nl5
Contrary to Japa.nese 1natructions, the news
demands vrae not kept secret.

or

these

Information lealted out, and

world opinion was so greatly aroused that the Japanese
m1l1 tariets were forced to baek down on their claims.
Although the war-lords did retreat, they d:td not give up
$.

China in two treaties:

Some, in

fact~

were eg:raed to by

that of May 1915, :respectins

Sha.ntung, and another signed concurrently respecting
Ja.panese rights in South

.M:anaht~ria.

Under the first treaty

China agreed to 8.b1da by e,ny agreement made by
---"1"·- - - - - · ..........._ _,,....
.. 1....
1 ~-·-···

J~pan

and

;o
Germany regardin6 Shantung.
stl'bJ$ats <'Hill"ta..in rights.

ones in Inner Mongol:ta.
tre.!tties,

th~

~.n

The second treaty gave Japatlase
Sou.th Manchuria and more limited

In notes accompanying the a.bove

Chinese governm$nt as:reed to give preference to

Je;pe,nese subjects •in the employment of advisers, to. consult
. with the Japanese government Lf' :tt proposed to negotiate·
certain loe;ns involving South Ma.nchux-1a. and. Irmet-

Mongol~.a.,

and to keep foreigners and foreign cap1 tal· out of Fuld.en ·
Prov~.nee.

!n return!) Japan e.greed· to turn back to China the

Kiaoohm·I l..eased Territory provided that the Chinese. govern•

ment. msJm epecia.l ooncesslons :regarding 1 t.
Although the m111 te.riets were foiled :l.n their attempt
tt., take ove:r ChixlD. completely, progress had been made which
enht:moed t.hair. already eoti\,r:l.ne; prestige..

to

They could afford

'ti"t:~.1 t.

The end of i.'lorld 'V'lar I 11aw Japan recognized as one of
the five Great Power.$,.

During the wa.r ehe had tremendously

expa.nded her possessions 1-tith small loss o:f' life.

Secret

es drawn up cltl:ring the war ·1.d tb the. A,llj ad nat.ione

allowed heX' to keep her· newly eatabliehed poai tion in
Sha,ntung province

South Mant,huria.

a~

well ae the extension of her rights in

These p:rov1s1.ons were wr1 tten into the
Treaty ofVersaillee. 16 In addition to this. the German
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i sla.nds north of t.he eque.tor were aWtll"d.ad to J a.pan as ·a

Class C ma.nd.ate .under the Lee,gue of Nations.,

This was the

type of manda.te that bordered qpon being outright annex-

at1.on, and t,he 1n:tli ta.rists

m~.o.e

good use of this clasAifica....

.tion.
Peace saw Japa.n and her ml11 ta:riate reigning supreme

over Asia.
in the

south~

tmi
end oi'

From Mongolia in the north to tho tropical

tha blazins sun of the F41kado waved over all.

~

~1orld

isl~a

!a ~! ls V,l:r;;

l2.~~~;t;t~l.

Soon ~lfter the

"TaJ:• !, tb~ Japane-se m1litar3.sts found thetr

preat1.ge declining.

The main reason for th1.s lo\-re:rine; of the

prestige of the Army "'a.s the univeraal movement fo;t> pea.cll:l, a
movement that seems to occur at the end of all grea.t con•
flicts,

l?eople the world over we:re engaged in 1JT1shful

thinking tqhioh waa ao

'~ell

expressed in the slogan nwar to

en d wars. tt Even the people of
pee.ce.

~re:pan

ha>1led the doctrines o:t

The mili tar1.nta '\<iere a.t. a loss ae to holit to combat

the srow1ng sense of :raslstanee 1;o force a.e a means of·
+------...,__.,.'-"-"'~e-----c.......S.._P"""p!!"'t-+-~t....a"-"'s.,_,
.•.___.,..The-war-J Ol;'<l,s

feelings, however.

Th~y

d' d not

chane~,.._e_;l,....r..,._l_t""'h""'e.._..~....r.__ _ _ _ _ __

referred to this period as one of

"deoad.ent sentiment nurtured by the pr.ospel."i ty o:f' war,

fusing td tb liberal thought. nl7

Du:r:tng this period,

th~

autt·e~

m111.tarie,te bee;e.n to

. the:tr firet r.eversa,ls since their moder¥1 inception during
Restoration~

the Me1.1i

Sibert an
i

First, the:re wa.s the fJ;l.ilura

or

the

Intervention in "rh1ch Ja.pan was repul t'!Erd ln 1 te ·

e.ttempt to ta.ke over a portion of Rueaian

Siberia~.

Then

there 'tf1aa the \•lashing ton l?eaee Conference of 1921'""1922.

The

Conference mat to solve those problema in the F'e,r East that
mignt, lead to wo.r.

The Japanese dalega.t1<:H! to the Conference

accepted, a. 5...5 ... ~ nava.l ratio wh:toh gave G·reat Britain a11d

the IJn:l ted Ste.tes a na:va.l atrenesth o:f 5 t.o :3 for Japan..

m111 tarists were vehamtant 1.11

ty, 'but i.t was approved

ova~\

the:tt~

The

denunciation of the trea.;,

their protests.

In addition,

Je,pan pledged to ret.urn to Oh,.na the province of Shantung,

which had bean taken f:rom Ge:rrne.ny after 'vo:rld tlar. I.;
1

18

This

eegmemt of the pact in:f'uriated the mili ta.:r:tets, but the wish

for peace '"as eo st:t"ong throughout the 'tiTOrld that the we.rlorde were fot'ced ·to aaced.a ~·

In 1928 Jape.n signed the KErllog·<Brinnd PeacE! Pa.ct,
outJ awed

~ta.r

as a means of nationa.l nol:tcy,.

Aga.:tn ·.

her ~:tplomatn aroused the ire of the mil:t tnr:tsta but to no
a:vail.,

The clique fE:llt the.t Japan should have insisted upon

the same right as that given to Great Br:t ta.il1t

th~t

is,

Japan should h~lve dama.nded apeci:fied freedom of action in
~·-")f.4if4WJ".-1j1

~-,.

w:w.

~w·~·-

IIi

lfo.11•

~

·~"-------------

--------------------------

· her aphe!'ftls o:f inflttenoe,

However, the diplomats did ·not

feel thfit this wao neoeese.r; to. the future of Japan. l9
While the Japanese diplomate had Signed these ve,rious

treaties and ag:reemente which would have done

mt~ch

to ineu1"6

the peace of the "'orld if they had been observao.• the

Je..panese war cltque continued to speculate on the· doctrine
of hakto,,

l!J,Q~ta

and. to ma.ke plans for 1 te aocomplishmer.rt),

.one of these plane oe.me to the fore

du:ri11g the one period of

dominat,1on that the mill ta.riste had in governmenta.l aff&;ire

during the 1920 t s.

This avant occurred during the

pr$m~.er•

ship of Baron Iohiro Tana.ka and i e known as the Tanaka
Memor1a.1,.
~i I!r!!'!Ul

M!mqr.ttl ; l2.tt·

Toda.y, the Tanaka

Memoria.l. 1$ rege"tl"ded as the bluept>1nt followed by the
t1apaneae in thei:r attempt to bring the eight oornare of the
world under one roof.

At the time of 1 ts publicatie>n, how•

evar 11 very :tev1 people placed any eredenoe in 1 ts sta.tements.

It we.fl! not until the chance disclosure s.nd publica"'
+---------'l'o'l:-ffl'l-11"l-'F-----'¥Tl"ltie"~-.--'lff'-1.BHI.Il'lflf'OH:UHii!~c-.-NJM&merie.l

wh i oh

B~n-'P.Maka

pre.sen-t&d--t,e·-------

the Emperor tha.t the attention of the world was drawn to
Jrrpan' s grano1.oae dreams.

Baron Tanaka, who had become

premier as the leader of the a.e;gres.eive Se:l.yukai Pa.rty, aent
his Memorial to the Emperor on July 25, 1927.

It he,d been

prepared following a confet'ence in Mukden which was attended

by all the civil and military officials of Manchuria and
Mongolie..

Fo:r eleven

d~;~.y"s.:.

the conference discussed Jape.nese

policies in these two ooun·triee•

Some months

later the

Memorial was published by Chinese publicists with the explanation the.t a copy had oome into their ha:.nds.

Though 1 ta

contents caused a grea.t deal of surprise to those who were
Unfamiliar w1 th the history of the Far East, 1 t did not
contain anything not advooa.ted. by the m111 tariste for
yEHtrs. 20

The ple.n laid down 1n the Ta.naka. Memorial by which
Japan would first conquer Manchuria, then China, then the
Philippines and Southaa.st Asia and aP.Joining terri to~y ira
well known e.nd need not be discueeed in d.etail here"

What

is important. however, is the Je.paneee frame of mind ths,t
would permit the militarists to embark upon a course of con•
quest which had been laid bare before the eyes of the

world.

The

rele~se

of the

Memo~ial

+---------~~~~~~~-Japan-talkad-peaoe

20

the

enti~

showed that while the
l~~orce prepar=e~d~f~o~r~--------~---

ea.:rl orot"• 4,'maan~~ ~ea,~l.Q!. V(qrlS}~nrs~re; J~~
'J;'&ne.k~ Mqms~:~a; (New York: Harpt!!r and :Brothers, i94l • P• 18.
The a.uthot- soae into detail to show how the Tanaka Memorial
was s1mpl:y a restatement of many of the beliefs of prominent
..
.
.•
.
ple te tienct
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'l'he Tanaka t•1emol:'1al w·as the sole exception to the

steady decrease in p:t<est:tge of Jape.n' s mill ta.ry clique during the 1920' e.

Army influence continued at

during most of this period.

~- lo\\r

ebb
I

Other !oroea were cbeok1ng,

temporarily, the tra.di t1.onal potrer of the army.

The old

powE:iil:'ful ola:n lea.dere of the Oamp t'lho aa.rliel." he.d moulded

govemment policies ''lere e:l. thar dead o:r talt1ng a lese aetive
role in domestic and foreign fJlff'aii"s.
Aa has been mentioned b:t"1e:f'ly 11 Jape.n W'ae swept by the

post... war surge of democracy and. peace..

'l'hi s waa made doubly
th~

evident in 1918 when Ta.lta.sh:t Ha.ra 11 p:raaldent of

Se1yuke.1

Party; eeta.blished thE3 first true uni ... pa:rty Oab:!n.et in
Ja.pan•a recent histo:ry.

True, there were many

CabinetA~H

none ruled accord.ing to the Englieh principle of
biltty to the :Pa-rliament.

During the

ao• s

six one~party Cabinets in aucceaa1on. 21

but

:r.aspon~d...

the:t'e were to be

To many, the nation

appeared on the verge of. e.n era of responsible government, a
government in whloh the milittary would occupy a proportion•
fluent1al poai"-"'t"""i,.,_on
...._·_.__.2_2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __:___

21F • R. Dulles, f,q:t:t:l Ylat*1 £lt 4ttHS!i;\<H&11·~a.~fl:qes&
!li.~l;\~a:Qt)! (Boston* Houghton""M1 flin Company 11 19~i~, p. 184.

2 2~. • p;t · 181. The author goea to some length to
ehow the r!"Bi of the demoore,tio spirit within Japanese
polities fll.tld how this spirit r.aad.e itself felt 1n govern~
for 1.ts
. i ' l - - .- - - - - - - - - - - -•- - - - - - - - - - -_------------------------ --------- one
------------ - - - - --------- - - - - - - - f S.i.J.Ul:'eS.
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'J.'ll~

f:11.neEri to Oa.oinej ,2!.12i2: Mos1i

JS.]illl!Je~~. f'l~,~~Prl•

f.!£er~l

.2Jl

In 1929 the Mi.naei to O~binet ·took office.

This we.e the strongest. and moat ·liberal pa,rty government to
'hold offio$. in Japanese h1!11tory. . It ea.me. the nee.reet to

es:tab:i.ishing.demooraey in. Nippon • . It also.had to meet the
first onslaught of the military forces.

,1

In the story of

Japan r e poli tiee,l d.eveloJ?ment, 1 t thus rep:r<esents a. eri tical
turning point of unusual signifioa.noe. :23
The Minsei to Cabinet
radioa.l~

''~as

liberal but by no means

It was, 11';1 rea.li ty • a government of big business.

Its liberalism stood out mainly .in 1 ts modera,te foreign
'

ptilioy, whieh contrasted sharply with BfA,ron Tanaka.' e

••posi tive policy...

is

A d.1.ecussion of the Cabinet's liberalism

included ln the aeot:ton of this pa.p$r devoted t9 the

la&b~~SUh

and 1 t takes away some of the luster of the moder-

ate policy.

'l'here .is. no doubt, however, that the M1nseito
.
.

Cabinet we.s opposed to war unless all other means failed.

The M1nseito Cabinet was made up of distinguished
-+------------,l-e-a-4ers .•

Amons them mare H$.maguohi, the l?rem1En:• ;--Sb11iaha-ra-,__·. ---~-

the Foreign Minister; e.nd :rnouyell tbe Minister of Fina.noe.

The Oa.binet labored. bo\..rever; under a. fe.tal handicap,
f:}imilB.r to the.t which

oonfron~ed

President Hoover in our own
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country; f'or it er.ttered ottioe in July • 1929 1 at the height
of the post... 11rar boom.

The Wa,ll Street crash and. the $pread....

ing world depression followed immediately.
in eoorJomic co11di ti ons during l t.s p~n:·iod

The sctlfift change

in

office had. much

to dn .wi tb the final overthrow of tht& Minse1 to Cabinet.

Hamaguoh1 and his Cabinet aides began with a

g~eat

victory on the issue of the tQndon Naval Treaty of 1930.
This treaty $Xtended limitations to oruiaers and destroyers
a.s well as to oe,pi tal ships •

The Army and Navy lee.de:r!\1

opposed it e.nd opposed. 1 t bitterly.

'!'he people and the press

supported the Cabinet • s fight for 1 t.
the Privy Council ra.tified the t:reaty.
paoplE)i! it aeetnE1d, had

On October l, · 19;30,
The Cabinet and the

wo11.;

:It a.ppea.:red that the Army and Navy were finally under

eontt>ol. . This was, 1 t transpires, just an illusion.

The

wax--lords kept to their suns e.nd preached tbe ooot:rines that
had he.unted Ja.pa.n for yee.ra l

and the mi sa1.on of' Japan to rule the world
+-------wa!.l3--±n---+.-l~.-----aw.!ne;,

l)1u!Q19.Q, k,gdq•

h~}qjo 1Qij•t&•
(I

The depression

anG-----the-----l.-!-b~O-lio-1--e--B--O:f-th~l!«ins,...
a.1t-'*'oiJ--'----~-

Gabinet were not 1noreae1ns tra.de or shortening the

lines.

ric~

The m111tatoy pointed to th0i:r periods of control and

bos.sted with pride of' the booming facto:r·iaa, increased
exports, h1ghe:r starHlard of living, and better economy that

In. 19'30 Pr.9mier Hamaguohi wa.s s};lot
wa.e apona'?red. by the, milita,cy *
sovernmsnt 1.n Japan.

inatea.

an assassin who

d~.ed

"~:fay

or

opposed tb~m would be elim•

Damooraoy in Japan was dead; &nd th$

danQed their dana$ of death ovsr the
rep~eaentattve

trolled .Japan.

demooratio

The wa.l'\-lords had sqrved notice that

anyone who stood 1n thai r
i

W:t th him

by,

gove:rmnant.

p~oatrate

war-lord~

:t•orm ot

1J!he mili tariets once age.1n

~on•

Now they would set out to control the t-To:rld.,

'
'
'

~--

OHAPTER V

THE-ZAIBATSU
The word J!ib(?.jf!lr! means nmoneyed sroup, n

It gener-

ally raters to the :Sig Four f'ina.noial combil1tHl of Ja.patH

Mi tsu1. M1 tsubishi, Sum1tomo, e:.nd. Yasuda.
also used to include. the other·

la.rs~

Howe'\fer, it is

trusts and combines in

Ja.pe,n e.e \fell,.·

In Japan the

~~~b~!sy

represented a

conoent~ation

of

financia-l and economic power which wa.tll unpare..lleled anywhere
else . in the world. 1 '.l.'h.e relative pos1 tion of the l'U. tsui and

M1 ts~H>ishi concerns in the life of Japan was so important
that.,

-Qomp~1::r·eH1

to them. the role pls.yeQ. by organizations
.

like du Pont e.no. Standard 011 seem

Q
small,~

These vast,

monopolistic enterprises dominated the financial, indus•
trial, ancl ~ommarc1al.lif'e o:f Japan. 3 Most experts agree
that the B1g Four controlled more than one third of the

total deposits 1n priva.ta 'be:nks- seventy per cent of tb$
+-------Q~~Hi!--a..-\i{-]i----l.n-~.!.---=iLH;!\~i--CJ:.omYa:n.;iJAe;}t·all._,.---and-o-nELt~~~----------,--

fore1gn trade of Japarlt

'l'heae mammoth oombinea also
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dominated the stra.tee;io sections of . ind~et~ 11 with control•
ling amount a of ca.pi. tal :tnVf:HJted in. ah3:pp:t~s. shipbuilding,

aviation, engineering• mining, metal
l3tDoatH~e

othera.

wanufaQtur~,

~nd

of their int.er... +oc:lking. ootrtro:t over bank·

1ng 11 industry, and commerce, the

~~~~s.~SM

were able to

exEu•oie$ indirect control over many smaller banks 0 indUS•

and trading enterprises in addition to those which
.
4
they operated directly. . Beee.uee of the financial pressure .

tries~

they were a.ble to exert on the government, they were in a
pos1 t1on; not only tQ
.polie1~.u;t 1

infll~enoe

the government • s industrial

but a.lso to· secure subata.ntial subs:td:tes 11 fiscal

protection. and . profitable war oontl:'acts •...How did the

..it&'tua:trua

ms.ne,ge to gain anQ. oonsolidate such a. grip on the

·. eoonomy of Japan, and to what extent did they collaborate

with or oppose t.he militarists in their aims?
§!~tsra:

.Q.t !h,e

la~f>~l':I!?H•

Japan's mod.$:rn business

ord.er matured under historioal ciroumstanoas giving it a.

special oharactel:', different in many respects from l!featern
in the faot that J:a

an

4Thottuas A. Bisson 11 ~pan•.~ War foongm¥ (New· Yol'kl
Illt(u•na.tional Sacl~ate,rit:tt, ~iist1 tute o Pacific Relations,.
194$), p. 35. M~. J:Ueaon is recognized as one of the fora~
moat· authorities on Japanese economy, particularly the
_
_ •
·
e of hie.

mater a e-botfi--Tn-tllla wor-J.t--ana--fftner-works--wnioh-wilt--belistad in la\ter footnot$s.
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wh$%-eas · the West. has experhHl(Hr;;<t the long atru(t:gle o:t' ·a

e;row1ng middle class, first to throw off government· fetters

on· its freedom of economic action ttnd tht'm to
go·vernmEnl·t a.nd remol·d 1 t in a

ta.k~.

over

d~mooratic fra!ll$'tTOl"k.

What

'bulks· so large in the 'vest ill missing or et1re.ne;ely d.lstorted
in Japa11.5

Japanese oa1)1 ts.li~m wae a lata product, t:ttnergintJ
d.ir~ctl;r

from a faudal. society tha.t suffered dissolUtion

only 1n the 1870's.

It had 1 ts rocrts in feudalism and was

formed while the influence o:t' tha feudal society i:rae etill
strong •. It rested, moreover, on a relatively weak t:md

vulnerable· eoonom.1o foundation of' natione,l resources, tech•
nioa.l dev~lopment, and. world markets.

business life, as represented by the

Japan • s mod.$.:rn
,l§,b,~~!Y

system, was

therefore adjusted to a special background, in which feudal
customs SJtill pr$V$.1led. .In these co:ndi tiona, new forms and

pt•aot:tces t-1e-ra appropriatEsdJ indiVidualism least of 8,11.,

The

reascn':le.ble~ese

of pr1 vi,l¢ged status t\Ta.s no less implioi t

ec(iss;tty for autoot'at1o power.

It was natural

tha:t. the .I!~Bfl;j!~ cottibi.nE'Hlt a:J.ong witll ..Japan's newly
adopted il'lt!lti tutional oha,ngaa in geners.1. should display

both :features.
____
. ~- ----~------ •
t-----c---

. ..

. .·

.

.
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We a.ra all famil:tar wi ·th ·the development of industry

in .IL"u1~pe

a:t the beginning o.f' the Gignteerrtb century.

comparison, Je.pan as recently a$ the

e~rly

By

nineteenth can•

tul:'y remained in a stage of eoonom:lo development hr.1.rdly more
adve.nced than tha.t of lfaete:rn Europe in the

l~~.te

Midd.le

Of b$l" ·t.wenty..-eiglrt t~ thirty million people, the

Agell. 6

overwhelming tt'J$;j<:.a•i ty were unfree, poverty .... stricken pea.s•

a.nta.

They lived mot:rtly in sal:r..-aufficient rural Villages •

.1-?he foundation o:r the economy and chief aouroe of wealth was
the <rt.1lt1'vation of rio$, oarried (Jn by primitive methods

little change<l over the oo.nturies.

This ag:r>$.rian base supported
hiera~ehy

of some 270 territorial

·wa:r•;r1o:r ola~a or L~!4Pit&.

aristocratic <ruling

S.ll

lord~

ot\

p.a~l!J~9.

and the

The fo:t'trle:r had l.ong held feudal

away 1n their territorial fiefs, while acknowledging nominal

alleg1anoe to the Emperor in lf:yoto.
they had. been actually und.er the
s~eat

military families. the

+-------Gi~~~~..

Some forty

p(-:;r

Si11oe 1603, however,

dom1ntUlC.Hi~

~okugawa

of one of

th~

elan at Edo, now

cent o;r more of the peasants'

produce waa annually appropriated by the

~~!~~Q.

and the

!hru:ma

for tbe auppo.:rt of themselves and e. vast army .of

~assals

and :retainers numbering upward$ of two million,

.

+-----------

7

'!'he remainder barely su:f't'ieed.. to sustai:n the population at
1 ts existing level. . .An ea.:rl.ier growth in :numbers a.:Msocd.&,ted
'd th an ex};)ansion of' the oul tive.ted. area. in the

a~V$:nteenth

ceritu:ey had. been ar:rentad despite the pera1stenct9 of
'
8

fert111 ty pa.tterne.

.
between population
fami.ne,

disease~

Therea.fter a.

a.n(l. food supply

abort5~on,

preoe,r.1ot~s

h~.gb

eQ.U111br1 um

~tla.s mainta~ned on~y

1nfe.nM.eid.e,. 1.-e!l', by

Qs~

by

of all

the Malthusian checks save wa:r: and th1s was :resorted to
before too long.
Aooompe.nying

t~he.

growth of ci ti.es in the seventeenth

and. eighteenth aentUrifi:le fU'ld toetered by the pea.oe and. unity

of Tokttgfl\'ttl rule, was a. oonoiderable r.teveloptrHiH1t of manufac...:
tt~ring.

m:tning, o.nd

lnterr~glonal

tra.de.

The .home industry

of farn households came· to be eupplementaa by twrkshop

productton organi. zed und.er clan. monopolies or craft gu:tlds.
But 1nduetr1.e.1 out•.put, continued to be essentially

h~.nd1c~aft

in oba.racte:r 11 and the artisans and. trs.d.esmen remained an

interior class wi thot1t :poli tioA.l r1e;hte or social sta,tus.
Manufactur:tn , waa dis ersEh'i throu h rural v,.lla $S or con• ·
oent.rated in aa.stle tmms and centers like Edo and Osaka
where the wants of t.he aristocrats were met.

Trade was

predominantly a movement o:f rioe from country to city,.

moetly in payment of feudal
.'1:1··

.r:

.1-..~·

dues~

There was only limited
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exchange of industrial products.
i terns.

Mainly these were luxury

Commerce remained crippled by complete bane on

toreisn intercourse that was one of the trademarks of the
f'gkusawg.

S!los~!l~~~·

Through strict control over travel and

tre.de as '\vall as over freedom of oocupa.tion and ente:rprise 11
the Tokugawe. regime sought to suppress the

gro~rth

of any new

foroes which might threa.ten the f'eudal•agra.rian foundations
of the state.
"This late feuda.lism, •• wri.tes E. Harbert Norman,
-

":represents one of the momt conscious attempts in history to
freeze aooiety in a rigid h1erarchioe,l mold. n9

oantly,

neverthel~HIS;

1t

se~ed.

11gnif1·

only to stunt and not to

stifle the advances in technology arid commerce which had
received their first sharp impulse in the turbulent
f'itteenth and sixteenth centuries.

All"$ady 11 by 1750 and

even ea,rlier, the institutions of agrario,n feudalism had
been hea:v:tly qualified.,

The economic d.ieorder of the next

one hundred years 1 teelf testifies to this fa,et.
e diffi oulty oa,n

Much of

be----a.~-te-d-&!mply'---t-Q-th~~tne~s.s--toHf.----·---~-

an archaic military dictatorship in dealing with the result ...
ing problema of population growth, currency. debt, and

taxation.

Only when Japan•s industrialization in the
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twentieth century is seen as a projection of these.earlier
· .tX>e.nds, now aoeeileratet;l. by .the. opening of the ~ountry to

Western influence, can its speed and its technical. aoh.ievemente be understood •

. ',fher,

g~ca,~

.21

after 1868 has been

:t;eyde.*3e~W•
11k~med

The modernization of Japan

to the bursting of a. dam.

It

was the more violent because 1 t brought the relea,se of long

pent•up forces.
In part tt\ese p:t,'eeeuree

we~e

economic in ohe.ra.oter.

The latter half of the Tokuga.wa. period, fro-q1 the ea.rly
eighteenth

o~ntury onw~,:rd,

:resembled 1n certain respects the

situation which has reeurred periodically in the long history of Japan and other Oriental countries •
requirements expanded beyond the

1n~laet1c

Consumption

limite, of a back•

ward and exp+o:l. ta.tive a.e;rarian socie·ty as a reE!ul t of
population growth and the insatiable demands of a pa:ra.ei tic

rt:tling cla.ee. 10 ~roduetion and distribution within the
tradi tiona.l framework also became subject t<;> violent
+---------~~~~nGaa~~ux~xrnm~~~~~~ruru~~~p~u=b~l1~o~------------~---
f1r.t~.anoe

From 1750 on» the §)lQS!dDt\t wa.s in almoat constant

•

finaneia.l difficulty,

It eought escape by hea.vier te.xee,

b,or)X)\dng, and disorderly deba.eements of the currency .11

10

•• •
•P
-ro-.xrorru-Tffe-Ola:renaon
ll

~·~ p.

a:; .

in

lesser degree this was true of many qa,±m~s who tr-ied in

tu:rn to solve their pt'Oblems a.t the expense of the

and pea.aantlzy'.

1'h1 s time, bowevert- new and revolutionary

forces were at work within the cotmtry.
1net1 tuti.ons
mined

~t.

~f

;amY£~4

The tradi ti.ona.l

Japanese feu. o.aliam were proe;resaively ttnae:r-

the foundations by the slow

s~owth

of commercial

economy and. the rise o:f a new and ambitious class of
tnet'ohants and townspeople.

This new class was to form th$

nucleus of the ''*~~tiM•

As in Europe, the old e0lf•oonta.ined. barter economy
and the rigid patterns of· the class relations associated

w1 th 1 t gt'adue.ll;y ox-umbled. under these meroe.nt:tle in:f'luences.
The f!illlU~~~~ a. :rentier ctulta g became progressively impo'\Te:r""'

1shed and in<:1ebted. to the merchants or

.

S!bnn~n

as t,hei:r rio$

srtipenas p:roved 1nadeq\la.te to meet 1ncrea.sins money require.-

rnents.

Attempts to extract

l~1rger

revenues from peasants

only intensified the d.ifficult1es of the latter, who like...

wise found themselves exposed, to the 1neeou:ri ty of a growine;
ey economy..

Ou:rr$ncy-4~me.:n-t-fmd.-cr-Qp--'V~a-UOO~a------·-",-:- -

brougllt wide fluctuations in

th~

price of rice 11 the one crop

that was. the preoar1ous be,ae of the economy.

'l'o these

unoe:rtaintiea t.he manipulations of merchant speculators

- - - - c - - - · · - · - - - - - - · - - - - - · · - - - - --···· -------·---··-- ---·----·---·--·- - -·-·- ------ - ·------·--··------·-·-·--·-----·-- - - - - ·
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further contributed, nol'r 1n.1ur!ng the fa.rme:r and no"r tbe
city conauzner•.12
~he

c,nssig,i

though expandi-ng their wealth and 1nflu•

enea at the expense of the

~t.}fP.,lU:~L•·

chafed under mul t1fa.:r-

1oue feudal reet;t-ictions· ()n in1tiativG and opportunity.
These included restrictions on the. transfer of' land,. on
foreign trade, on impflovemente in internal tra.nsport. s.nd on
the manufacture of C(3rtain goods+

Most irksome was the

eubordimite social status to which they \'lere' ccmfined by ·&n

a.:rroga.nt military aristocracy.

Prog:rEHHd.ve alene also sought

to expand their revenues through promotion of new ma.nufac•

turas and. of trade.

Here dtveloped a new breading ground

for me:rcanM.lj.st ambition.

The energetic young

J!.~m!araj

buree,ucr$-ts who pioneered this development began to display

a new spirit of capitalistic

ente~~rise

which could only

f1nd full expression through a complete and definite break
with the old regime.
To the.se d1ff1ou1 ties and diaoontents were added· a
+---------~~~-h~HM~~~atu~a~dieaete~~r;t~h~e-±l&.&trrt~e~r~~---------------

Tokuga.wa

years~~

The misery of the peasants in certain areas

d.rove inct"'easing numbers .off tbEJ land in flight to the
cities.

After 1750 the $train on the t:raditionfl,l structure
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was reflected at the base 1n a ~eries of peasant rebel'""
;11ons. 13 At the top th$re wa.$ a. stead.y deolir.te of the pcrwer
of the

~bOS!if!ltal!

and increasing defiance of 1 ts. author! ty by

the more independEnlt clans,.·

The whole process ctxlminated in

a crisis of public fina.noe in the nineteenth century.
Economic di soon tent wa.s reinforced in turn by other

i

i'

Ij
"

I

I
I.I
J

factors in the last decades of the Tokugawas.
literary e.nd religious in character,.
a.issanoe led to a rediscovery of

Soma were

An intellectual ren-.

nat~ona.l

trad.i tiona and a

:revival of Shintoism, w1 tb 1 ts glorification of the }l;mperor

whose traditional prerosa.tives had been usurped by the
Qh2S!Ul~

It will be :remembered. that this same

an :tmpo:rtant pa.rt :tn

th~

featurE!~

played

rise to dominance o:f the military.

Effective power within the feudal clans now passed
largely from thee control of the effete s~t!.!:'£R, tta1mleee
nobodiEHi!u as

w.

E,. Griffia_oa.lls therp, into the hands of
ablet .young ~m!!Yl7til.' of inferior rank. 14 By various mee.ns
the ee men he,d steadily

~cqu1red.

a growl ng knm'lledge of

practical arts, and history.

Through theme new learnings, coupled with expanding intercourse with the Weat, the more fareishted individqals saw

f'reah possibilities tor a national rejuvenat.ion under the
aegis of the Emperor aa t<tell a.s new scope for pa:rso11al
entef'prise and

po,~er~

!~ora

and mora 1 t seemed tha.t only

th¥>ough such a course of a.ction waa nationa,l survival

possible.

The obstacle was the

:t tself caught

!lb!?.S!.U)!}~t,),.

which nol'r .found

bet-vrean the insistent dema.nds of the foreign

pol'tera and the grmdng assertiveness of rebellious clans

grouped around the throne.

Unable to withstand the pressure

1 t fell .•
Po§~ ~~~tqrJ:...\121·•

A0 ha.s been noted, in the 'l'okuga'llra

era a Japanese third estate was developing strength within
the feudal society and after a fashion asserting 1 tael:f.
had some leverage o:f ita own,.

on occasion the

17~m~ra1

It

re•

ta1nere or even their feudal lords might tremble before the
economic power of this rising merchant el.a.sa. . Its leading '·
rep'rea~mtativea,

nevertheless, became eubor<'lina.te t:tsoal

agents of· the .fdJl9iJAU~~t' not a rival center of pO't'{er setting

itself counter to feudal absolutism, 15
atments of the Restoration

this

pos1 tion was perpetuated with virtually no b:reak and an

extre.ordina:cy smoothness of traJ:u.d. t1on. 10

-- -.1611?~~-;--··-------·---··-·---·---··----· --------··-

P'or example, :tn

--- -·--·-··-·-----·--

-· ·-- -- --- -------- -----
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August,

1867~

the Mi teui hrjuse a.cted as agent of the

SQQS_!antt'!(.! in the di atribution of .a new cu:r:rency issue; in
October 1 t beca:me the chief quartermaster for t.be a.nti•
~h~H?iU!J~t.e

'l'oltuga.i>~a.

:forces.

merchant families, the ee,me than

aa at the time of the Manehtu•ian »zncident, •• joined by new
~~.rggr~3; elem~nte

tu:rrJed bualnesemen, clasped hands w1 th a
'

modernized dynastic a tate in 'tfhiob they pla,yed nn important
but et1.11 subordinate role.

Feudal ta.riff ba,:rrj.ars went

down, le.nds became alienable, taxes were oentrali zed, :freedom' of qccupe:tion

~md

codes i.ntr<)duced.

In short, all the basic requirements of a

oe.pi talist order were
is,

exe~pt

equeJJ. ty

Although the

~.n

movement established, e,nd mod$rn

m~t.

All of the requirements, th$.t

governmental me.tters.

1§!~1~~~

leaders toQk second place

poli t1eally in the ao.rly Meiji period, their links with hie;h.

gove!'nment officials, ae il:l Inouye Kaoru• a patronage of the

i
'-----

Mitsui house or Okuma Sh1e;enobu ~ s of Mi t~n.l1)1 ehi, were
tightly

forged~~

17

I

Through such intarple.y, the gro\<r1ng

t---------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_part,
~ant

even if not.the domi-

part, of the Japanese oligarchy and derived great

advantages from the position so occupied.

Government might

Elj(tort loans from M1 taui, but 1 t could also vest M1 tsui

I

J
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with exchequer :tunctione in the collection a.nd ha.ndling of
national mnd loov,l tax· mon¢ys. for r.u~ar•ly two decades. 18 · It
.could. confer other betlefi 1~s on th~ .oomb1nea but none so
g:reat e.e this extraordinfu•y privilege of accens to cnpi tal
11;'1 (An ere. of'

expansion,

bu~inese

rhe government developed

1

new factories or B(HlUired merchant vessels with state funds

and then turned th$m over to the

l!~;ba~e!a

concerns along

with some of Jt;tpan• s ri.ch~st mines, all at lo'!.>1 prices a.nd on
'
'
19 F'rom early Meiji
easy tel:'ms~
if' not. as outright gift,s.
times. subsidies

~.nd

st;ea,dil;Y continued,

other preference a were common; and they
~nate

power was being ttsed. in this way

to make up for Ja.pan • a economic v:reaknese, end. the combine a
from t,he outset held a poe1 tion that enabled them to banef'i t

from the

~wts

of the go·ve:rnmant.

1-'he benefits derived by

the ~~~e~vfrl~ grew to such extl."emes tha,t .within fifty years
from the l1:es~o:ration it was almost impossible to tell
whe~her

the

government

binee or the combines

was granting subsidies to the
war(~

gr~nting

~ &n~·.~!ll BEf.S:l,Iaff,. ~ ll,fl;Ll\1

and 1919

e. marked.

:tmp~tus 111

com•

subsidies to the

~-~..

Between 189-,

industrial expt::msion was
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afforded by two ware and

prepa~ation

for a third.

The two

wars that had been fought were brought to suooeaaful con•
Both ware begun by the militarists with the

elusions.

blessings and sanctions of the Z§:tbS;tey. 20
The conflict with China ( 1894·-95) produced an infla010

tionary boom in Japanese \ctar industries, which oG.rried over
into the latero years under the stimulus of oontin.uing arms

expendi tura s.
powe~

It also gave the nation and t)'le Je:il?P:tl!a the

and prestige to resain Japan's tariff independence and

won her an indemnity from China which went, almost in its
entirety, to the 'a&bat~u for further expansion. 21 Customs
autonomy made possible more effective protection of new
industries, a.nd the Ohinese ind.emni ty provided her with a

gold and sterling reserve with which she adopted the sold
standard in 1897.

Her public eredi t now solid1y estab-

lished, Japan pt>ooeeded to borrow hea..vily abroad to finance
the purchase of arms, industrial equipment, and ma.terials

for further induat,ria.l and military expansion.
+-------------:lllil--'£rls-F---&H:e----.RruuHs3-Eefao-J--a;panua-\fa-H-l9~pa.ne-st'J----------,---

industry bee;a,n to assume the basic pattern which was to

characterize it for the next several decades.

One branob

comprised the metallurgical, engineering, and other
20
-~~'---------------------

These

'l>~ere

the industries essential. to mili taey

strength; yet they

war~

especially difficult to esta.bl:tsh i:n

industries.

Japan baoauea of their hee;Vy capital X'equiraments and
advanced technology. 22

We see here the beginnings of the evil e.llianoe

b$tween the

~a,!ba.~~!!

and tho mili t~lry •. The military went

into tbe:tr imperia.l:t stio wars w:t th China and Russia in order
to promote their doctrine of bm:lfJ.tq, !Rh~!a·

The ~~~l:>a!iE!W

$noou:ragad them in these ventures in ord.er to build up their
monopoly ill industry 11 trade, and finanace.

The two worked

together.; and 1 t is doubtful 1f ai thar t-muld hay a been able

to attempt the expansion or Japan, militarily or eoonomi•

oa.lly. tdthout the other.
World War I saw a strengthening of .the al11a.noe

betllreen the
ing to both,.

mll1_t~u·•y

and the 2aibatsu.

It came a.e· a bleae-

Through the deaad.a prior to V'lorld War It

armament. and. 'ti-rar e:x:p,endi tut'es imposed a heA.Vy st:rain on
Js.pan' s :t'1ne:no!a.l <H.tpaa:t ty.

La:rge ... eca.le fore.1gn borrowing

i 11 t.e.ry and industrial de'Velopment; but it also

burdened. the country with increasing debt obl:S.gations

abrcHtd* which brought growing diffioul ties 1.n balancing
1nterna.tional accounts.

23 .

- i
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J.~st

~apah

.as

seemed. headed, for .a $$:r'lous financial

o:r1s1s. war broke out in Europe •.

Almo~t ~~tun.ediat&ly

a

11m1 tlees opportunity developed for exports of Japanese

~-----

'

a~d

opportun1 ty.

\far ordere; poured in.

the

~a~~~~~y

were quick to grasp the

manufactures,

Europee.n eompet1 tors

d1$appeared from Far Eastern markets, and the merchant

marine 1nher1 ted a large share of the world • s oar:rying
t:ra<t~h

Exports built up large foreign credit balanQes.

\fhich ·we:ra used to sustain a rapid 1nfle.t1on of ered.i t and

pr;ces at home.
period of

Japanese

unpreoed~rrted

manuf~.oturing

thus. erobe.r;ked on a

prosperity, and the

J~aJla.te.Y

thrived.

IYU

m§.t;n;it~.

.k. ~~o!t&ua

··~-4~?l!'•.

.!S!~Q-~·

The la,ilt,Pt~liQ ruled supreme in Japan d.uring the 1920' s•

The

enormous prof1 ts tba.t had accrued to the combines enabled

them to buy
desired.

th~ir

way into any

pos1~ion

of government they

! --,

By 1925 tbe industrie,U.ets or their repreeenta•

tiveG held ma.ny, of the. lee..d1ng offices which the clansmen
+---------~~~~HF~~Qe-th~~

held tha_prAs~1~d~e~n~oy~r~,f~--------~----

the Privy Oounc1l and. the key posts .in the. Impe:rie,l House•

hold Ministry.

They were influential in the House of ~aera;

1n the bUX'$a.uoracy, and even in the

~rmy

and Navy.

24

Qiane:rals and ad.m1rale could e.ctua.lly be found to support the
t------------~-·--...,.,....,...,..,...."'*4-"-.~i~;l&!ifo...,u:;-u,.•·
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policies of pa.rty gove:rnment.

All.. the Elder Statesmen ·

except Prince Saionj1 11 the last ·of' the GenX'0 11 bad d1edJ and
even he. being rela.ted to the sumitomo be.nk1ng house, was in
sympathy with the oapi taiiatio outlook. · As Prince Saionji
i
I

'ttas the Emperor's chief adviser on ·the choice of a new

!

Premier, he occupied the most strategic position in the

..

state B and. he made 1 t e. point to reoommt:md those men who

were friendly to the interests of the
$peaking* the Emperor could be
if!t'b~:~;ia

ll&~e,.ts.,g.

cla~tts.ified

a.e

Techrd.oally

tit mtfmiber

of the

since ·he poese.ssed ne·arly half a billion yen in

stocks and bonds, nearly as much as the

Zalt>,!~~~

fe.m1l1es.

Me would, therefore, be sympathat1.o to the intaraets of the

,!~ib,a,t~q

beca,uee their

inte:r~urte would. be the eame

. We see here tbat thEJ

1&1me114£U!

moat trusted advisor on their

si.de~

e.s his } 15

bad the Etttpero:r and hia

\'that other .fe.ctors were

in their
favor that ene,bled. 'them to .gain so complete control
.
of governmental machinery during this pe:r•iod?

Firet, there \fer'$ close :personal ties
··e of the combines and
gov$rnment.

b~tJtween

th.e

1nf'luen-t-1~~-e-ln--th.s.-------_j__ _

While employees of different combines refused

to mix eooially • not Erven pe.t:roni zing the same restaurants
or entertainment houeee. no such inhibi tiona existed among
0

the top combine families.

A good example ia offerEJd b;r

he~td.

Baron Iwasaki H:tsaye.,
trolled the Mitsubishi

of the Iwe,eaki family. that

eon~

His second son married the

combine~

do.ughter of Ilteda Seihin, a leading M:ttsu:t executive.

Ikeda

bald such poei tions as che.1rman of the board o:f' M:t t$ui Gomei
wb:toh was the predeoelt!so:r of M1 taui Honme,h, top holding

company of the ,M:ttsu.1 combine.

He we.e

also

mana.ging di:r.."H~•

tor of tha M:t tsui Bank, Minister of Finance in the govern•

ment. governor of the Bank of #a:pa.n, a.nd a member of the

Pri.vy Oouno1l and the Houee of Peers..

Baron l't·.ra.aaki t a

sister married Sh:idebara Kijuro who s«:lrved a$ Premier of th$
'

·.j

Baron Iwasa'l:t:t • s niece m~u:·ried V:t aoou:ot Sh1 busawa

country •

Ke1 zo, bea.d of another

l"~~~'lt!!Y

house e.nd Miniete:t• of
26
. F1ne,noe in . the Cabinet of Shid.enara,.,
This mEllthod of close
t1aa bet,,.vean the
1nsu~d.

.

i,~~b.~t,~ta

Ztt~b.~'tf!H

the

and o:ff1c:l.als of the govarnm$nt

that thtay ;;..rould, .ha:va the inside t:rs.ck

on a.n:- benefi ta to be der:tveCI. f:rom the government.
Another method used by the
government

t'll'EU~

l!~b!?i1UlY

to coerce the

through their control of the m.oney and ba,nk•

· .n1.zaMons of the

nati.on.-AS-i~_.,.a';j:Jp...,a.n...___ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

imported t\1eatern financie.l maoh1nary & a oantra.l

bt~tt'lk.

commercial banks, trust. companies • stoalt exchanges, gold
re{l!Je:rves~

All

oam~

however, mislee.d.ing.
.

,.

~.J

:n

J(. • ,."

r

'1" .. \'.1.

·w

over the sea intact..

these names are,

'nley a):'e misleading beca.use in Japan

t-----------------------. _______ ------------------ _
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th$re is not a group of. indu.str,1,a11st.s and another gt"o\.lp of

bankers. each doj.ne; bl:'siness and each jook.eying with the
!n Japan the in'J.uat:r·ie,liats apd the banltere are the
se.me people • 27 'rpe gl"ea.t indu$trial interests a.ptua.lly

other,

owned the great private.
Japa:neae to the lUg

~ix

banlu~.

Referenc~

was often made by

Japanese banks which

cot~trolled.

nearly half o·f the nat1.on• B private ba.nlt deposi te.

The

first four of the lUg Six :aa..nlts were M1 tsui, Mi teub1sl11.

taeud.a:, and. Sum1tono••the same Big Four of the

i~A£a~fUl

combirn~~. 28
lt a.ll boils down to thitn

Since the

f!1bi~S,U,

eon-,

trolled most of the .industry of Japan and at the same timo
most Qf the banking-

~apaneae

capital was ha.rdly mora than a.

l"EtVol,,ing fund among the big combines.

It. was· like. taking

money fl?om· on$ pocket and putting it into another.

pooltets w.era on tb.a same pair .of pants, and the

war$

~~aring

Doth

.la.~&f!~IU!

them.

As had been

noiHi~d,

part,y S.nfluence

+----~~~.J---l'J~---J;tH,.1 a t1me-..----------aow$V~:t\,

thro\:lsh

''~as

growing in

tha-!-~h-th>Be--------i--

governrnent and through the it tmmense wealth, the

~!l.BS.~!:iU.

were a.ble t.o take over the majo:r political pa:rM.es 1n Jape.n;
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and thte they did.

Miteubiah1 interests were 1.1nlted with

the lUn~ei to Party and. Mitsui \V'i th the Seiyt~kai. 29
. ll$1 1925 manhood euff:re.e;e was adopted.

Instea.d of

lessening the influence of the &!!ibat&\h thia aot strength•
.ened it because 1 t meant that. the members of the Diet wer0

forced to spend mora money on aleetioneering; and the onl;r
people that had enough money we:re the

,Za,~'bateta•

During this

period. 1 t wa.a almost 1rapoeeH>le to be elected to the Diet
without the support of the

la.1R~~€*ll•

They·had the money and

money won elections.
The

poet't~Tar

1noraaae in

~e,.!.pf1.t~t.a

political influence

is best indicated by tho Kato government o.f 1924•25, ltnown
in Japan as the "M1:tS'Ub1sh1 Gang •. '•
i'O:r$1gn Minister Shideharn

W$l"a

Both Premier Kato and

related by marriage to the

:Iwe.sa1d family which controlle>d the Miteub1eh1 in.tereeta.
Two other members of the Ks.to government were d:l::r:•ectly.
associated \id.th Mitsubish1 while the remainder of the

Cabinet was 1nd1:reatly linked \d th thfi f1nanc1 al and indus•

+------~~i.----f.:lhtd''thlJ~~h!.-.-l:Ho.~~It can be saf'$-.~.l~Y-'-s~a.:lil1!.(;dl;-------,--
that Ml t,sub,.ebi th:rtved d.uring this government• e tenure.

1-----------
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Wha.t waa the foreign policy of tbe Mineei to and
Seiyt~ka.i

parties during the rzo• s?

tvere they pac1.f1st1c or

m11i ta:ristio in their goala or did they have (lif:tarent

so ala?
Both the
~inal

~U:nea:t to

and. Seiyuka:t parties

t~ogreed. otl.

tho

goal of their policies, but they differed in how the

fit1e.l goal was to be

r,ea.ch~d..

The Minaei to party believed

that te:r:r1to:rial ·expansion and gains mhould be t:lchieved by

using all. means short Qf foree.
their 't..reapon.

Of course.

Economic

penet~a.tion

was

1j~·

eoor10m1c penetration failed.,
.them force would be the only a.lterno.tive. 31

The Saiyuka1 party, on the other hand, b¢lieved in
the use of force t'irst •. a "positive policy. n

Dominated as

they were by the Mitsui combine, they saw their f'uture in

the taking over of China first ancl eventL1a.1ly e.ll of Asia.
Their policies were directed prime.:rily e.gainst China and
Russia~

but their lone ra.nge goal was the financial and

industrial control of' the world* ~ 2
-+------'-------'ttf:~e---aemE!:-£-H.-&'b-Fa-&3:-sH----.)Oa-:fl:------c'Ba-Jm~:aa.ka,

Seiyukai Cabinet.

u~

laid dotm the

This waa made 0Vident in

Who wae the
plt:WS

h~-e-1r:-_,a.ill---------

tor the achierve-

ment o:f' th$ goa.ls of the Mitsui ol9Jl.33 His theory of a.

3ll!?.!i• 1 P• 76.

32

- -*- ----- ------------------- ------- -------- -

-- - i
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"pos1 t1.V$ policytt should have warned t.he "mr1Jl of the

intention of the

·~*R~ftSJ:l

a.nd the tl)ilitari, f'?t,g• but 1 t went

unheeded.

Both parties, then 11 agreed on the fine.l goal of ..
'they had di.ffer.ent ideaa on how

Japanese foreign po:Ucy.

. the e;o&,l was to b$ reEtched; but if

it~

oft,me to a. showdown,

they \vould be found standing side by e:l,de •

'to:r.lting together,

they set. the stage for ·the '-lvents which culminated on

tn~

evening of September' 18, 19;!1 •
. Q.tS{iJl~~*O:~:t.~~
\'Je

2t lh! .l~t,qt.}~SU•

In the preceding pages

he.ve seen hov1 the a.noiE'nt and the modet-n blen4ed in many

diffe:t>ent

'~.trays

to form the

~~~Ji~ta!tl

system.

so it wa.e, too,

in the mo:re technical matte:r of the combine structures.,

The

fusion of' old and new elements .created a ool"pora te entity

that d1ffexoed iu easent:taJ. reepeet11;3 from its W'eatern pr<:rto...

.type. 34 one face shcn~tTed

a. modern oo:rpo:ra.M.Qn. the other

e,

.family et.,ynasty which, \'lith i 'tHs ms.ss of loya,l :retainers,.

ruled over a va..at bus1neas emp1:re.

The ap1:r1t xoepresemte

d it i,e, therefore, approp:r:tate t

attribute full s1gnif1canoa to the old.er elements in this
a.maJ.gam daspi t.e the modernity of its outt•tard appaara.noe.

Old and netrJ" in comb1nat1on, moreover, added grea.tly to the

strength and oohaaion of the Jape:nase corporate type.
_1} .•

't

. . · ·, •ril"'~i.

.... ~~-------- --------------------------------- ------------------- -;---------------- -- ---------- ---- ---------------- ------------------
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The economic sprea.d of the Zaibatsu represented a
oruo1a1 structural feature.

Like most other elements of

combine structure, 1 te origins lay in the past.

Economic

divarsi.ty stemmed from ea.rly business a.ot1vi ties of the

l!tJu;;t,a,y families, who were engaged in :re:mified banking,
tl'*ading, and semi.... ma:nufaott~ring operations long before the
Restoration.

When ind.ustey and mining, previously reserved

almost entirely to the clans and the

Sl:Jge;yn~~~~

wet'e fully

opened to pr1va.te business houses in the seventies, the
Za~ba1}s!;!

moved into this area, aided by the 1n1 tie-tive of

the new government.

In a decade or two, the combines had

brought 'dthin their scope virtually every type of oomme:ro1al" 1nduetr1a.l, and financial activ1ty.'5
Down to 1900 ff;\lw legal r•eetra.1nta eltistad to hamper

business leaders aa they set about expandine; old eom'b1ne
l!ltruatures and build.ing new ones.

Their patrons in govern•

ment v iewad. business in the light of Japan' e political

requiremente••the need for rapid a:ppropr:l.ation of' Western
+-------~~~~~~~~~·m~~~~h~~~t-~on~o~~---------------

oentra.li zed author! ty, 3o Economic oono~mtra.tion meant
strength and eff1oienoy in an era whf:m both were required by

ea
the "catching up" pr-ocEH'lS ~.n which Japa.n was engaged.,

That

· such a monopo11st1o oombination was obJeotiona.ble business
oonduot would hardly occur to them-..

The same outlook

pre~

vailad in the drafting of the new Oivil e.nd Commercial Cod.EH'

at the end or the century

p~rrn1 tting

the combines to opert:J.te

freely without fear of local oheok 11 to continue their rapid

·srowth, and to spread their networks over the whole
E;~oonomy.'37
The economic spree.d of the combines enabled the
!fab~t.ll!.

families to bulld structures of bua1n$st po>twr

unsurpassed in $iza a:nd strength,.

It also created an

organizational problem of sorna diffioul ty; one that could be
defined H1 various waysa

integrating widely cU.varaa and

often entirely unrelated anterpr:laee, establishing e:t':f'eotive
oont:rol from one· guiding center, or boldtng in check saO$$•

sionist tendencies of gi,ant operating eubsidittriae. · J$pan'a
bt.:U!liness leaders solved th.e problem by combining modern

oorpora.te techntques with the ancient sanctions of' hierare loyalties,

'nle

ift~!l!fA~mM-nes bro~.eo-1pa.Jl~awy-------

evary device of oorpore,te practice developed in the West,
but applied

ill~

to a ei.ngle business organization.

It

also drel-1 on the fea.lties of. en older e,ge to link $Xecutives

and employees into one body cnd.ng e.llegiance to tbe qont:rol•
~~~q~~s,y

ling

family.

Dete.ile of· corpot-ate ore;ani2;a.t1on in the do :ten or
mol"$ larger

;e~batmLJ

combines varied widely, "tith the newer

ones departing furthest :fl"Otn the

norm<~

ln the combine

structure as a. whole, however, the .simila.ri ties outweighed
. the

di~ferenctHh

In the big6est oomb1nes ........ M1.tsui,

~-

Miteubiehi• Sumitomo, and Yasudn•-the differences were
min1me,l.

Their dominant position Justifies a discussion of

the et:ruetural form concentrated in this group.
The baaic structure

levels#

li~!l.f!.~m~

the

ot the,se

fa.mily or

four combines had :fou:r

famil~es,

.the top boldine;

company ·usually termed bSUUWtl:• the major op$rat1ng subs1d1·
aries, and the

underlyin~

corporate 1,1ett-mrk of leaae:r·

I'!Hibsidie.r1ea. · It was through tbess four d1ffe;roent levels

ot organ! zationa.l structure the.t the

Z!lb!?-~;~

mans.ged. to

consolida.te and hold their dominant poai tion in all phases
of ma.nufaotur:tng, commerce, and fina.nce. '38
+--------,--'------;'E~~Mlfi!.;o!.i!;~...------.!.H---tH.J
.. ~tr-w&-~-~H3S

bu sina$....S~-----~-

$Ut1t1ee, even if they were not legally incorporated as .
such.

~ls

'l'be :M1 tsu:1 law,

a.dm1niete:rad by the house council,

governed t.he business titnd personal lives of the eleven

____

Mitsui families in detail.

_._.

.._

-------

---

Members of the house could not,

84
on their own private account; engasa in business, hold

aacurit:tea. ox- ta.ke oompa.ny of:f'1ce:rsh1pa.

1'be house council

detet'mined all personal matta:t>s of the family members af•
:feetins mal:'riege and succession.

!t allooatecl the

~9IU!b(\

dividend to a joint house :reeer'Ve fund, an indiVidual

l"esene fund of each· member family.

from

ei tber

the· joint

Or

It controlled pa;ymenta

the ,.ndiVidUal reserve funds.

l.ee$

than ten per cent of, house property wae veetad in the
f'atn1l1ee individually; the. reet l'm,s held colleot:tvely with
t:t tle vested jointly in the eleven families.,

The jointly

held portion of the house wealth we,s cUv:tded. :tn the prt.tp():r.
t:t(Jn of

23~

to the pe,rant house, 11.5% to each of the :five

other families· of the parent houae, ancl
fiVe branch tam1lj.e $.

-,.9%

to ~HlCh of the

Breach of the house latv- or unbecoming

a.ots 1 by decision of tb.e house aounoil, might viait on a
family menibe:r suspension f:rom the counGil or :fo:rfei ture of'

his share oi' the business aaaats or joint property.

These

taots ahcrt.r the extant to \'lh1ch the individual :families par39
+---------~~~r4.~~&-t6mbi~~------------------------------~----

lhi.

"'~tsu~ 2alllb1r)!•

Tbe oo:rporate network cl.asa1f1•

'Cation ot the &aibattfUJ is worth a study :tn 1 tsalf', but we

have to ba content with a brief summary of
tion,.

The Mitsui oombi.ne. is

rEHlogni~ed

thai~

Ol:'€Sanl. ~a·

as the leading

figure

i~

the

11&9at~g,

eo 1t is only

fit~1ng

.that we

examine 1 te et:ruotura a. 11 ttle more closely to see the scope

of its 1nfluenoe.
I

~fost

studies list the brea.k-dolm of the M1 tsui inter-

! :. '

ests durine; the 1930's a.s followat

1 llSllf3Jlil or top holding

. o<:>mpany; 22 desj.gnatad, that ir,, me.jol" cpere.t1ng eubsidi....
e.rias of the

pqnf$~;.

48 o:t;'dinary aubsid1ar1ea of the

~r.tel:J~J

27 sube1di9.ries of the bQ!lib!...... ordin~.ry subaidia.):"1tH~3 ·.···,_,.......
.

•;

81 eubsidiial:'ies of d.fJ~~Jignated subsidia.rie s except Trading
and Mining; 12€5 subeid.ier:tes 9f !U tsu1 Trading; and ' l
This gives us e.

smbs1d1ari.ee of M1 tsui Mining.

tot~1

of

:556 companies the.t were directly under the oontrol.of the
Mitsui family. 40
This ta.bulation gives some idea of the scope of the
Mi taui combine, though perhapa not enough to ahow tht,lt, liTi th

it's three million

amployees~t

business orga.n:t:ze:t,:J.on.
Jap~rnesa

1t was the world's greatest

Its itlt'luence extended to many

oompanias not listed a.e aube1d1ariee,

-t------'6fltwe.p;f--~:J±~~1-a-l;>---mftl~

of th$ ii'a.r

other parts of the world..

E~a.st,

re~u~hed

out

s.nd.-radia'Wd 1nl-\l.t......
o_jm1Jllo~·eC-JtU-._ _ ______,__ __

Major operating subrd.d.iaria s of

the big combines, as with Mitsui,

we:r~

often holding eompa..

· n1ea themselves -with an even larger arra,y of subsidiarit!'H:\

. t,han the bqlJ!b.t\•
,""*f~-~fi(·li~--i:,'iii.~Tf

-·.

·:·;-r~~P-141f.

$11't

,,-------------------------------

'l!he avera.ge oontrol by the M1 teuj. family among 1 ts

various enterprises was 63.4%.

This e.saured the Mitsui

di:reot control. . Indirect control was exero1se'd over many
other companies through the placing of combine man on boards
I

of.oontrol and through

•

m1no~1ty

investments.

The position

-

--------------

1

.of the ;a1ibat,f!!J
we.s, to say the least, solid.
.
;

:Now for a.n even closer

brealt•~own

of the. M:lteui com.. ·

At t,ha peeJt of tl:l.e py:r$.m1d ttlae. the·Mitsui
Gomei
'.

bine.,

Kaisha, the fe.m1ly holding eotnptltny which averaged a capital'·~atinn

of' ·th:ree hundred million ;ren during most of the

thirties.

:Ben~ath

this mammoth catchall, the Mitsui

S.nterea'<Jts ran the fh'la,ne1al gamttt with the great Mi teu:t Ba,nk
wh:l.ch did 5. ?>% of Jap,:nese commercial banlt1ng., w1 th the

Mitsui Trust Oompany.wh1ch did mo:re than 17% of the trust
busineas; and with the Mi taui Li:t'EJ Insurance Oompa.ny which

did about 2%' ot the insu:re;nce buaine as •

Mitsui

ran the .commere:ta1

e;~mut

with the largeat

privat(!!l trading company ln the worlde the M:t tem:t Busr:.uan
+-------,----j!H'J;"I:-Rf'~---w~EH'l---f'I-F.ffi-fl~El---Jm'Hf'G-~

and exports.

of

Japa:nl_g_ta.tal-~~;l"-~ttt-£s~---~-

TOe r.rosbin :warehouse Company did about 19% of

Japanese wu•ehousing.

The Mi tsukoebi Department Stores

handled 32% of all department store :reta,,11ng in Japan.

It

could even be $f!1d that the Mit.sui combine was "ohioken•feeau

·---------------
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because they con·brolled the gi.a.nt Nihon Mi<xe11 I>oul try l:l"eed

From international

Company •

ba.n~1ng

to feeding chiokans! 41

•tera is a pa.:rtial list of some of J.I.Utsui'a acttv·itiea
td. tn a

peroent.~.ge

indt~stry a.

of the

~otal,

Ja.panase business in.

~a.oh

Kanega.fuohi Cotton Spinning, 14%J Toyo Rayon,

15%; Oji Paper• \<Those subsidiaries. included ~: neat of. lumber
~M1d

PttlP

companies t:md. th('$. grea.t

O~tuitka

Ma.1rtiohi. Ne1-rapa.per•

78%;onada. Cement, 17%; M1teui Mining, 17%; Shibaura
Engineering i4orks, 5%; Hokkaido Collier-y and steamship, ll%' J

Mitaui .Eleotro•Chemcie.l :tnclt.astey, 5%; N1hon Wheat Flour-.

25%~

Tropical Produce, 28"';.and Dai Nippon Celluloid,.4%,. 42
:tn a<.'id.i tion to these,

M1t~nti

factor in the following industries;

was the controlling
h~mp,

vee;etabl'$ oils 1

tobacao, cotw A.nd 1 ta seve:ra.l b;y•produots, chemical dye a,
pharmaceuticaJ.s, synthetic resina. rayon and other
oie.l fibraa,
o~.t:tng

oat~stio

a:rM~f1•

lubr1~

soda• eoda ash, fish otl, soap.

o:tla 1 synthetic oils, oa:t:>bon biau,l;fide_ carbon

sulphite, e.mmonia
sulphate,
sodium .ail:i.ct:~.te;~
flotat:i.on'
:
.
.
'
.

.

,.,,

products, carbol5.o p:t'oductfll,

crud~

'

.

oil :r.sfining and by•

Pt:Oducts, brewing, .cold storage plants, ooal, bauxite, salt,

lea.d•

~inc,

e;olct, sulphur$! mica., copper. silicon, b;r1olt a11d

u

__

7_.

mu

o- - --- ---------- ------------- ---- ------

sa
porcelain cle,ys 11 phosphorus, em$lt1ne;, refining• :real este.tEJ,
general contr.aot1ng, enginee:r1ns, conetf'uotion l'rorks,
mortgage and. loan businesses, shipbuilding, ship t-epairing

and marine engineering, ma.rine tre.nsport, ma.ohine tools,
light and hea.;ry industrial machinery • farm tools and imple-

ments, automobiles, radio sets and instruments, vario.._e
types of :rubber goode, eleot:rio furnaces. air conditioning
plants, buying, selling, exporting, forwarding, and 'tlfare..
hot.ud.ng. 4 3 This does not complete the list, but 1 t will
give an indication of the sweep of the Mitsui combine.

The

only way • however, that one oa.n :realize the power of the
lf:'!.~£a.~fl!3

is to see the manner by which they used their

position to buy, three.ten, cajole, a.nd intimidate political
parties, the Diets, and
ends.

pr~miere

to obte.in their desired

TheBe "ende" were destined one day to bring the

,la,~b§W)SU

houses tumbling down like tbe proverbial houee of

cardth

4JAlon~o L, Baker, ~•'l'he Influence of' the Divine
ltmpe:ror Dootr1ne upon Ja;pann (Doctoral D1sserte.tion• The
Un1i1e~ei ty of Southern Oalifornia, Los Angeles. June, 1948) •

• a..--::sao.

t--~-----------------
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CHAPTER VI
l-

In

19~1

Japan came to an irrevocable turning

1 ts fora 1e;n policy,.

Lat~e

poi~t

in

1n 1929 the Ne"r Yorlt eillt me.rket

had. collapsed, bringing acute distress to the Japanese

o9untryside which depended heavily upon cocoons as a cash

crop. . The m111 tary leaders became. concerned lest the
eoonomiQ orieie cause dissatisfaction in the army; '"'hose
compos1 tion and outlook \'tare largely agrarian.

The situa•

tion also presented them with an opportunity to gain the
political dominance they ha.d long sought and to d1sc:.red1 t
the c1V1lian moderates, durine; whose briaf' ascendancy J81.pan
had subscribed in the treaties concluded at the Wnehington
Conference of 1921•22 and the London Naval Conference of

1930 to policies of self... reetra.int toward China and to
lim1 ting na.v nl arme.mants.

Mil1 ta:cy propagandi ets denou;nced

the parliamentary pa.rties and big business for allegedly
ational interests
assailed the Un1 ted Bta.tee for discriminatory treatment of
Japa.neae and for erecting tariff walla against Japanese
ma.nuftMltured goods, declared that Japan as a. ha:ve•not nation

must expand in order to survive, and proposed a program of

ism, and of a strong and

irH:lependeim·~

foreign policy.

The

aacendaney e.tte,ined by the army .in the goVt'lt>nment and the
role of the mil:t taria:ts in the formuls.tion of foreign poJJ.oy
t~aa thEil key to Ja:tHitn • a

interna,tional x-alationa during the
''d$o1a1ve decade" from 19'31 to 1941., 1
'!be poli tio&l and intellectual libera.li:am of the

1920 *$• whiob was discussed earlier~

1$-mi ted to the larg$:r oi ties..

tft:tS

:for the moe t part

Faa.eanta and residents

of~ thE~

thousands of villages and srMtll towns# who still constituted

the bulk of the popul$,tion, looked on at what \'las happening

in the cities with wonderment and often 'tltith di.aa.pproval;
and certain elements among the more ed.uca,ted classes
r~gardea

the 11ber·a,1 11 sometimes radics.l, po11 tical theo:riee

of the city inte1l.igensia w1 th g:ro,dne; hostility and reeant...

ment. ~

Al'!Uy a.nd Navy officel:'s, rural landowners,

lo\vEu~

middle class o1 tizen$ of the smaller tol'me; a.nd many petty
government officials found it quite impossible to e,eoept or
even to tolerate the growing challenge to eeta,blishad. polit ...

1oal and. social authority.
-l-----------~R----n-------+.-t"t-n-:-m;E'fre

members of

~on

and prod.uots of the new educa.ttonJ but with them the hea.vy

nationalistic a.nd militaristic indoctrination of the achool

Yorkt
--~------------------

ib&q.,

pp.

-------··-

1:36· 37.

-

----·--
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system had weighed more heavily than the opening of new
horizons and thEJ influences from abroad.
.

'

!Ibey "t>tera in com...

'

ple·te symps;thy with the autho:ri ta:rian rule e.t home a.n<l the
strong expansionist progra:ro abroad of the Me1J1 leaders,
~e

post war 11bel"o.lism and 1nternat1onal1sm seemed to them

e1gns of weakne sa and Xler'IHU.. s1on.
they ha.d 1nher1 ted a compelling

l'i':rom the Mei31 leaders

n~lt1onal1 stio

urge to malt$

Japan even stronger, but too mueh na.tional1st1c and m111 ta...

rietio indootrinration had :robl:>ed them of the b:raadtll of view
o:f the Me1j1 leaders they sought to emula.te"

Ultra-nationalist and militarist sentiments from time
to time -found expression in political parM.es; but theae
easentlally reactionary

el~nnente;

w1.th theit' inherent. dis•

trust of representa-tive government, -leaned more to direct

action through private p:reaeure groupe e,nd ext;ra... legal
Cliques than to politicr:d acM.on by means of the ballot box.

Ultr$-natione.list1c

$EH3i"~t

eooiat1.es quite nature.lly

developed as one of their me.jor forms of poli tice.l exprea...
+---------,-i~~.-----~fiDee----&o!"'!-'tVJb~e:H.e:Hei:t-.-ee~x~e~ted

eon side rah3:e l nflueneEr-·1">-.rt.------~'---

Je.panese poli t1os by .terroristic rtctlvi ties and v1o.lent
p>:lopaganda

attacks fAge,inat tbeir opponents~·3

Viewed in this 11ght, the strange mixture in Japan of
wha,t bave been tra.d.i tionall.y oona1de:red anti the tical forces
..-,- r., ••

l,.joll_f'l!

n jli!

·wa; of

·~_.w

uH-1

---------~---------

--------------------

of left and right takas on e, new

!ln'ld

sinister meaning.,

We

have, in recent dfH.H.tdes, bacome e.ll too·familia.:r with the
toteli ta:riml perversion of egali ta.rian ideal$ and eoientific
knowl~dge

in the more baohrard parts of Europe,

Japan, · ae

the mdst adve.need oount:ry of Asia, we.e the first to show us
that this terl"ible patt$rn could· also appee.r in Asia.
These d:\.atrubing tendencies grew elowly and almost

unnoticed du:rins the

l920*e~

then, in the <ila:rly 1930*s the

blatant mili t.e.rism; :fanatical tlationalism, and e.nti.... liberal
and. anti ... democ~·~!tt1o p).'>f)jud:tces of the younger Army ~md. Navy

officers $,nd other reactionary groupe Sl•rept over Japan in a
fi\!Uo.d$tl :rever~al

decade.

of the dominant trends of ·t.he ·p~·t:HH~'1i.ng

The pa:r-11a,mEmttl:t'Y coa.l1't:l.on of' the

bureaucrat$ and

poli tio:ians, td th more or lt:1se active support from the uroban

middle elaeses, htld been tha
olige.rehy,.

No'(lr

first~

eucHJesso:r of the Me:tji

it ;;.re.a pushed aside by the mili t.a:ri ets w!l.th ·

t1he noisy backing of the ult;ra... na't:l.onaliet:tc BO(d.eties e.nd
the te.oi t support of the rural population. 4
$
lib~ra.lism

and

d~tooQ:t~e.cy

reaction e.gainst

"re:re certainly influenced, if not

<l&te:rmined. by outsidf.l forces, just as the :t•e.pid growth of
liberal tenaenc:iea httd been· fostered by the externt:ll factor
<H' t4o:r1d Wa:t?
1---~

---

I!~!

F'o:r one thing, the world... w1dn

----------------------------
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(tisillusionment with d.emoc:t."e.oy, which follov4ed soon e.:f'ter the
war and helped to

erf~Htte

totali tat•:tan reglm$S elsewhere •• did

not go unnoticed by the Japanese.

we:r~

Many of· th€lm

1mpl'4Htsed by tjhe vaunted super1o:t"1 ty of tota.li te.r:tan

govern~

mente and the1.r points of agreement 1-r:t th tra.dltional

Japanfiee concepte of authOl"'i ta.r:ta.n rule.
Another outeide influence 't!a.s the

\'70l'ld

widt't depx-es•

e:totl of 1929 and. the :resultant collapse of interne.tione.l
tr~lde~

Japan started ita clepression lot1.th a bank ct'1a1s in

19~7 1 but 1 t was of

11 ttle cotlsequence tl'u·oughout the world

as a preliminary 9.ffa.1;r for the 1929 depres.aion.

The "big

bust" seemed to apell ul t,imate disaster fo:r Japan • s foreign
tJ:>ade.

The busines sman'.s program of eont.:lnUEld economic

expa.naion and. p:rosper:t ty through e, growing export, tracla was
suddenly revf.llaled. i•o be dangerot.;ely dependant on the goocl
,.1:1.11 e:nd tole:r·tmce of foreign pm.ta:t"a.

flue;$ :poli tioal units

like Russia and the United States could rida the storm of
'¥'rorld depx•ess:lon 11 for they had

tha~.r

own sources of supply

-t------,f?.;~YiU'I..,...,___,.nwr--m-J~~~xm•jh.a:r~,ll--lls~aw,n.r:dl--+t.t-.hct!:ie+i't'll"'>-On<.wt~k.!fc~eA-'tt.1B111-c.;;---~BHU1~-t~t.--------~--

a smaller unit, like Je,pan* ll<thich depended on othe:r le,nds
for much of i te :ratt materials and on China, India, and th$

Occident for a vtt,ttl part of 1 t,e c'.meuming market S$em$d
entirely at the mercy of tt1e tt:triff pol1c1.ea of' other

In the early 19'0 • a ma:ny Japanese believed that the
only .answer to r:talng protective tariffs in othev lands was
for Japa,n to resume ita old program of colonial expansion
and win for i teelf the eouroEH3 of r•aw mater•iale and the

ma.rkete needed. to make 1 t self-sufficient and invulnerable

aa a world pot<Ter,.

The m:tli ta:r:teta ware there to fa.n this

feeling to their own s . dv anta.ge"

To the m1li tariats and the

reactionary groups this :raa.eonj.ng seemed obvj_ous.

Those

businessmen H.nd intellectuals who remained moderate and
internet:tona.l in their vie'"S· were not. 11.ble to refute theee
argument.a to tjhe eat1.afr!-ct:ton of the ma.jo:ri ty of the
J p.,pane ae pub 11 c.

There was a gradual awing of popular support to the

m111ta.:ry expansionists.

As these eama groupe also stood for

a.uthori ta.:rfan rule 'd th1.n Je.pan* much of' the support for
1mperialiat aggrandizement abxooad ree.dily became popular

backing fol:" the attack on demoora.t1o inst:t tutions at home.
~ra.pan~.HMt

The incipient

total:i tariaus, however, did not wa1 t

,----

+-----~~~~~~~~ea~puu~laa~r~su~~t-sb~~ns-tb~ictory at•-----+l---

the polls..
tft.t~

That might never have come; and. in any case 1 t

a mer:me to

repudia,ted.

pOt'lfU' t>thich

t.ney, as a mfltter of principle,

Instea.d, they 'bf)gan a direct, frontal atta.ok on

liberal beliefs e.nd democ;ratic institutions,.

They had no

t1on, such as he.d helpe(l the Ge:rme,n Nazis and the ;Russian
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Communists 'to ldn power.
1nc11 vi duals or small

The attack was mad.e piecemeal by

org~mize.tions,

but it was a.lmoet as

effective as the better co-ordinated efforts of the
tota.li tar,,ans in Europe.5
Scores of small

of fanaM.oa.l nationalists

g~oupa

stirred up vo:pular support for the mili ta.:rists and hacked.

away at the foundations of parliamentary e;overnment.
_I

sionally young hothea.ds

to commit political
i I
I

''~ere

Occa-

inspired. by their rabid elders

~ssaaeinatione,

which not only elimi-

nated their unfortunate victims but, through intimidation,
silenced lt:arge numbers of other potential opponents.

Most

important of all, the Army on 1 ts own authority embroiled
Japan in foreign wars of conquest.

This• while forcing the

nation back to the strategy of military conquest, also
~roused_.

the na.t1ona.l1et1o emotions of the people and thus

won their support for tbe authori tar! an a.s well as the

imperialistic aims of the military.
The ease with which the Japanese to tali ta:ria.ns
+-------A'!'i+'t"-'Hll'1"1-~~:M'il'Tbt"''rl"t--h'f''---f't;IIM'fh~ra~,r-in

Japan--1-H-ua-t-ra-te-d:---tb--------+------

obv:tous fa,ot that the roots of liberalism were still ahal·
low.

It also revealed certa.in specific weaknesses in the

5aerber·t Feis, ~

.!tQ

P~;rl Harbot (Prinoetona

Princeton Untvarsi ty Press, --r950 , P• 167.
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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democratic mecha.n:tsm, attJd.butable to 1 ta author! tarian

background and haphazard growth.6
One be.sio flaw in the whole Japan(;!! sa political system
had. been deli'bera.tely fashioned. by the Meiji oligarchs and

carefully prese:rved by the pa:rlj.amenta.ry groupe of the
twenties. until it. contributed to their own undoing.

This

was the mystic position. of the Emperor as a demi-god whose
per~wnal

will, in thEiJory, took p:reoedence over all law.

The

Meiji leaders, who had oome to power by championing the risht
of the Emperor to rule,. had ore&- ted and fostered th1e tradi-

tion since 1 t gave them, e.s men who surrounded the throne
· and spoke for the Emperor, far greater a.uthori ty over the

.people than they could he.ve achieved otherwise.,

By building

up an elaborate state oul t of Shinto centered. on the person
of the Emperor and the Imperial line e.nd by indoct:rinating

achool children with fane.tice.l devotion to the Emperor and
blind fa,i th in all statements said to :repres(mt his w111,
they s&oured for themselves the unquestioning loyalty and
c------~VW"~~~O---\;IL,£.---v+,le'Q'--pf.,#'e:ll-'o;.~:~p~l~a....,..c----J'Ch.e,_par~ta ry

le ad.a re w h c v O - - - - - - - - , - - -

suoo$eded to power chose to perpetuate this system; for it
seemed to give them. too, an unassailable position of
a.uthot-1 ty as spokesmen for the Emperor.

Consequently, they

o_r ___ ----------
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parmi tted the tdldest sort of utterances by members of the
ltUle.tio fringe of the militarists, beca.usa they were couched
in te:nns of devotion to the »;mperorJ but they vigorously and
ru.thl.essly eupp:r.e.eM1d e,ll :r·adioal thinkers who

ch~dlenged

the validity of the Emperor con.cept.7
Th.e parlia.mente.ey leaders me.de their fa tal error in
failing to see tha,t the m:t.11tlitriste presented· the most

1mmed.1ate thres.t to their continued supremacy, a These
. groups neatly ·turned the tables on . the ·oi vil government· by
claiming that they, not the government, represented. the
Imperial will..

t~ue

Tba claim in the case of the Army had a

certain validity t for in theory the ar-med forces ware the
personal .Army and Na.vy of the Emperor. enjoying under him a

status of equality with the oivil government e.nd, therefore,
equally qualified to speak for the Emperor.

l?ro:fi tins from

this ·break in th® solid front of government e.uthori t.y and

taking e.dva:ntage of tacit Army approval. individual extram...
1~ts.

we:re able to go even further in olaim1ng Imperial

se:nct1on for their pera(Hla.l
agg:re~sion

view~ecf,)efld~g~.------cf..t\.~ie-HtM:e~o~f'----------'---~

abroad and at home, acts of oi v 11 d1sobed1enoe,

poli tiee.l murders, and open

m~.tt1ny

~1lH!5ti:f1ed

were e.ll

as

being 1n accord with the true will of the .B:mpe:ror 11 l-thoae

7~·---P-~-_191_._ ___,________ --------

- m n m m u m __

_

v1e\1St 1 t was ola.troed., were

mia~presented

by . the corrupt

politicians around the throna.9

,I

1

-----

Confronted ·w1 th this monstrous perversion Of their

I

:-

own policy, the weak•knaed parliamentarians failed to take
drastic me8,sures or even to eta.nd firm. and un1 ted.

Instead,

they all but openly admitt$d the justice of the charge by
remaining

~!lent.

and by oompromieipg Tfti th their attaolters.

The more liberal elements in the urban populm.tion. while

dismayed, t-1e:re too weak po11 t.S.cs,lly and, for the most pe.rt.

t()o timo:r.oue to fie;ht back.

The general rural 8.nd small·

town populat-ion accepted thaae acts of supposed devotion to
the Imperial will at. their face "Value and c.reatad an atmoe...

phera so sympathetic to political aeeaea1ne and other
extremists tl:Hlt, such offenders were usually given only

absurdly light pun1shment. 10

Tbue, the theory of the Imperial will was a, fatal flaw
in Js.pa.ntEJ politice.l structure; but- the

not have axploi ted 1 t so

suocassft~lly

m111t,eJ:•1st~

if the

a~ed

(:ould

forces

+---------~~-w~Q~t~i~n~.~pNr~a~otiee enjo~qbl~e~1unuae~p~e~nL~cl~e~n~o~e~ouf------------~---

publie contt>ol a.nd a.utonomy within the government.
ano·thar ser,,ous cons.t1 tutional flaw.

This was

Pi&t control over the

Cabinet 't>rae never fully eetabliehed ~ven in the 1920' a
d>
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be.ca.uee the Diet never won full control over the purse

strings.

If the bude;at was rejected by the Diet, the

Oa'binet had the right to continua in force the budget of the
preceding year; and the Army controlled the Cabinet through
'

the policy o:t' nomine.t1ng only aotive duty officers to the
pos1 tion of War Minister, off'10$X'S li'ho would abide by the
will of t.hs l'1ar lords..

This ruling permitted the armed

forces to destroy Cabinets or prevent "undeeirablett l.eade:re

trom ·taking the prem1a:reh1p ·simply by

~fusing

to let any ·

qualified officers aecept portfolios in the government.

The

militarists not only established their independence of the
civil government but they

Oab:lnat.

The

'~:ray

~ton

a virtual veto pot-1e:r over the

was open for ·any action the Army wished to

take. and the eyes of the wa:r·-lo:r•ds -were on Me,nohur1a.

Mansln.u;la,. # A b,t4~g. b§gl$eitStUJQ.•
a.nd th$ opening months

of

During the yea.r 19:30

1931 11 although evidences of grotlf•

ing hoetilty between Ohineae arid Japanese res1d$nts in
1-ia!lcht:~ria t<~ere

not :ta.cltingp the official l"ale:tions between

r-------~~~~~~~~n-ta~nusuall~~b.~.--------------

This l'Tas largely because of the fa.ct that Baron Bhidebara.

as Minister of F'oreigri . .Affai.rs for Japan., had ma1nte,ined a
policy consi.stently friendly to China; advocating among

o.ther things that the eovereign r1e;hta a.nd terri tor1.al
t-------------JlL_ --'-'---- ~~----'-'--·~-·----~J--~_._oo ___m_gJ;_l'l_1;!!_1rtf)_d;_~ml_th~E!__ J'rlnciJ;>_l_e . _Q_f__·---- -------

absolute non-.1ntervent1on .in her internal affairs :fa1 thfully
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adhered to, the.'t relations in oonformi ty with mutual soli•

dari ty and economic oooperatio.n
should be .p:roillotec1.
a.nd that
.
.
.

the :reasonable desires of the Chinese should be l"€Hlognized
lw1·th sympa.thy and good will and reasonable assistance J>en...
de~d for their :realj.zat1on. 11 This polio; '<Te-s aleo

euppqr.ted by such p:rominent sta.teemen as Ha.ma.gucbi anCI.
;Inouye and by many of the principal hanks and. business
houses of ,Japan.

The ulte:r1.or motives of theme elements

. will be d.1scussed later b.ut suffice to· say that active
i

agg:t>$es1on was r1ot. one of, thetr aims.

Had this ;policy of

I

Shidehara been adhered to, the eubsequent ·chrontcle of Sino•

Japanese relatlonships might ha.ve been a very different
story; and (Tapan a.nd Ohina, indeed the whole world., might
have been saved a multi tude of sQrrows.

Such a pol,.cy • hotf•

:--~1
1

ever, did not meet with the a.pp:rova.l of the mili tar1ots,.
'l'hay felt that the policy of Shidehara wa.a not bringing in
the dee:t:red raeul te, Emd they "tttere 'Vocal and vehement in

their d~nunci~tion of the polioy. 12

The militarists f$lt

+---------~~-Q~~~rJ~a~•~s~pvo*l~1Q~·~~'~1~4a~~~Q~t~~1mari1~~------------~--~
Ma.nQhur~~a

Chang

,.,here Mtn•shal Ohe.ng

Heuen~l1.ang 11

Tso~lin

and

l~;tte:r

his son,

had pursued a policy of competi M.ve
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$Oonomic development designed to build up Chinese 1:nat1tulll!
M.ons· and to break dmm foreign monopolies, which weve

An outstanding fea.tura of this policy of

tna1nly Japanese.

the ObEtngs "ras an &.mb3. tious program of raS.lroa.d const:ruotion

whj.ch offered· aJ~'l effaoti ve oompeti tion t·o the
South

P~aneburian

Ra:1.1wa,y.

Ja:panEHte*(fW!lEIH!l

Such a program of ra.il:road

development wae not a"t all in keeping 'lfrith the tdshes and
aj.ms of the Jape,neee.

Another disttrr'bing faato:r '1aa tbe

em tr-y of Chine.· :tnto the d.E.ntelopment of :Manchurian :railroads,
and this bece.me e. ma,tter of grave concern to t.ne Ja.paneee
m:t11. tariste because :tt was leading to
between

P~arshe.l Ch~mg

of Chiang .Kai ... ehek.

irler{~Hudng

friendship

Heueh.,.;tiang and the Nanking government
A rela.tionmhip of good will a.nd

cooperation between the st,rone; me.n of Manchuria s,nd th$

oantral govel:'nmant of the Repub11o of Ch,.na. was a tM.ng.
unwant$d and frowned Upon by tbe Nipponese miJ.itarists. 1'
In this ma.tter they. ba,d abotm their hrmtJ., though perhaps not
intentionally, in the summer of' 1928.

Peking had at last

+--------'!OOHeap-:l..tulatecl to· the Nat1-onaJ :tst Gmta:rnment; and the ·:reign of
the

Kuom~.nta:ng

ha.d l1een inaugurated throughout all of

south of t,he Great
the Young

r~a:rahe,l

~fall,.

Ohi~a

Na,nk1ng 't-le..n malting overtuX<es to

Ohang Hauah"'liang, who in turn

~as

on the

point of throwing 1n hie lot with the newly established.

1------------·. .

~1_....._,..._...,,_•...,.,,. _________________ ,_________________ _
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Na.t1ona.liet Government.

Into this piotul"$. of approaching

Sttab:tl:t ty a,nc1 trnificat.ion stepped a specia.l envoy from .Tokyo

Who itlt'Ol"med the Young

r~al'•sba.l

eucb a..etep '"ould no:t b$

in no uncerta.in

r~gard.ad

'irlOl'dS

I
'---~-

that

with favor by the Mikado•s

government, and p;reeeu:ra so strong •,;raa. brought to bear upon.
him th&.t :for six

moni~hs he \faVere<l~14 l'erbaps wh:Lle he

mi~d d'~elt{

wavered hie

upon the violent dea,th that ha.d over-

taken hia fa,ther who was killf:1d

oy

an explosion, l..rhiah

vtraeked the train upon which he t'las :riding..
I

o~hne

Gu~.l t

has never been discovered" but all evidence pointe to

the theory thrtt tba Ja.paneae
because the Old Ma.raha,l had

m~.11 ta.risto

were the plotters

~fuaed

to conform to
of .Te:pan :tn tjhe matte~ of railroe.d development. 15

Ma;;rshe.l played the game o.oeording to Ja.panass

loet.

of the

The Young Marshal remembered,.

t,h~

rulett~

will

The Old
and

Finall]T,. Chang Hsueh-

liang took the step; e;nd on December 29)1 19261) he raised the
flag of Nationa.liet Caine. throughout Ma.nchUX'ia Stnd pledged

:toya.ltyt,o the Nanking Governnlt:mt.
+-------Q-l:~~t..ima

That be <Ud so and at the

n:nzealed the attempted coera,on

fr-Olll-'.rO:.A.kif-YvO-WJMat:!..~S--,------+----~

something. for \'tb:l.cb ,fe,pan neV$r. forsava htm •
.~~

1

tl8;!Jla~QQqa.nltf..f.8:!t•

ries and. a,nimosi ties eJ(iet

fUld

In a

le.nd whe:t:>e such

rival-

where both parties to long

standing disputes are supported by large bodies of armed
rorc~3s~

there

if3

certain to be no laok of incidents capable
.

.

o :f' e.ffo:rdine; a epa:rk sut•r:taient to eat off t.ha p(n.rde:r ·
m~gazine.

rule.

Manchuria. in 1931 wa;s no exception to thE:J g(l;rnera.l

ln A:pril, 19:31, at

miles f:t"om Chane;chun,

e.

~fanpaoshan,

e. point, a.bout sixteen

Chinese middleman lea.sed :f'rom a

group of Chinese farmers about f':tV$ hundred acres of

which he· in turn
aub~equently P

eub~lee.sed

tbeee

l~HH!!&es

to a group of

Itore~n

:t~J.id,

ft!l.rmere.,

u.ncte:r.took to dig nn it>rie;ation

canal running f:t>om the lo:;used. land to a. point on the Ituns
RS:ve:r· eight miles away whE>re they alao Pl"'oceeded t.o build a.
dam.

This ca.na.l

trave:rE~ed.

la.n.d owned by

Ch:tneae~

some~

but

·. nott all, of whom had lee,sed their land to the Chineae eon•

tro.ctor.

.Claiming thf'J.t thi,s irt•igati.on pr-oject \'lOUld

obst:ruot. ns:vigatd.on on the !tung River a.nd place some six
thousand aot'es of la11d in dt;J;nger of being flooded, the
Chinese farrilere p:rotettrtutH.iJ and l!l.s their prot.est we:nt trn,..

heeded,

&.

mob of some five hundred Ch1neaa, acc()mpe.nieo. by a

1------GI'!-~'i--+--ff'E'-----{:;i-l"PI--'!'*~~---'~"IA-:tc'l"P.C-Re-=11 ----flOr~l ~

f1lle d ap a

pftf'"llt---flof~tt.~ll'M::se~---~--

oanal.10 Japa.ne se police sent out f;rom Cha:ngcbun appeared
on the acene J ·there
Ja:panese

polic~

w~s

and soma

some exchange of shots; more
Chin4H~e

troops ware

s~nt

to the

spot; argQmEmte rand lnte:rmi ttent hosti,li ties continued for
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severs,l days but quieted down after July '3.

Subsequently,

the Koreans completed their project under Japanese protection,.

Report.a of this affair, greatly exae;gere.ted,

appe~.red

in the newspapers of Korea with the result that widespre&.d

and violent anti ... Ohineee riots developed in numerous Korean
According to official Japanese estimates, 103

cities.

Chinese were ltilled, 75 were eerlt)Usly injured, e.nd 26

.

slightly·. hurt.

17

The a.pparent 1nactiv1 ty of the Japanese

police and the fact that the a.rroy was not called out led the
Chinese to charge tba.t the disorders '"ere encouraged by
members of the Japanese mi11 tary clique..

China demanded

that Je.pan accept full responsibility f'or the c:Uso:rders and
pay an 1ndemn1 ty to cover Chinese losses.

Japan expressed

regrate, voiced the intention to indemnify tbe Chinese
families wbo had au:f:fereC::t losses, but refused to accept the

reepons1b111 ty 1'or the atta.oks.

While diplomatic negotia·

tiona drag8ad on, a vigorous anti-Japanese boycott commenced
to develop within China which in tu:rn forced some of the more
r-~------~p~aoitist

eJementS-in-dapan to dftmand that something be done

to alleviate the s1 tuation.
~~ Nakamyr~

Affair.

Suddenly• in the middle of

August, the Wanpaosha.n e.nd Korean affairs were entirely

eclipsed by a startling pieoe of news.

!-------------"""""'---------------- --- -

Captain Nakamura

L
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of the Imperis.l Japanese Army, so the repC);rt :ra.n, ba,d been
summarily executed. by Chinese soldiers in. Manchuria.
Although this E:rven1i was thought to have talren pla.oe late in

June, 1t had not been immediately discovered; and, even after
1 t had become

know~,

news of it. had been for a time sup...

pressed by the Japanese Foreign Office.

According to

accepted reports. Captain N.aka,mura and three companions,

tra.veling in civilian clothes through \festern Me,ncburia,
were arrested by Chinese sold.iere.
was found that

N~kamura

Upon 1nvestigat:ton it

possessed a Chinese passport issued

at Harbin but tba,t be had conces.led hie 1dent1 ty and. mili-

tary statue and was representing himself as an educator

ene;a.ged in a geplosical expedition.

Tbe Chinese mil1 tary;

after a. full 1nvestiga,tion, oond$mned Nakamura a.nd his

companions as spies, shot them, and cremated their bodies.

18

Owing to the ta,ct that Captain Na.kamura had misrepre ...
sen ted himself as an educator, 1 t was suggested by the
Japanese· Foreign Office ·that his m111 ta.ry ,status be kept
+---------~~~~~~~~~~ggaation,

however, was

reJ~e~c~t~e~d~d~e~f~i~an~tl~J7~--------~--

by the. Jape:nese mil:t tary authori tles who, in the face of

strenuous protests from the Foreign Office, published the

full details of the oase. 19

Now the struggle of the liberal
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~U.neei to

Government against the aggressive measures ad.VO•·

ce.ted by the mil1 tary group with _rega:r;d to.. Manchuria, which

for months bad been going on under cover, came out into the
open.

The attempt of Baron Shi.dehara to negotiate a settle...

ment was made especiall1 difficult by the fact that
:tnveatie;a.tors sent out by the Mukden author:\. tiee reported.
that they found no evidence of the alleged murders.

The

mili ta.ry clique, on the other hand, <iee:trins r<tJvenge,

exerted themselves to the

~tmost

to inflame public opinion

and sought to dictate the policy of the government by a.

threat of independent punitive actio~ in Ma.nchuria.. 20
"Japanese lives," thf.ly proola~med. loudly, "must be protected

a.t all coste.

The Japanese A:rmy must rise and strike 1n

$elf• defense. "21

On September 12 1 Colonel r10ihara, Chief of the
Kwa.ntuns garr:tmon's Special Service Corps, reported to
General Kanaya, Chief' of Staff, regarding a concrete plan
~ot-

measure a· to be taken against China; which had been

+---------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~f~t~h~e~K~wantung Arm~----------~----

T.he action to be taken was thereupon carefully worked out bJ
the General Staff s.nd the W'ar t'eparttpemt; and instructions
were wired to Ganera.l Honjo, Commander of the Kwantung
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Garrison.

On September

ll~,

Colonel Doihe.:re,

J.~ft

Tokyo for

Mukden al'ld immediately after hie arrival ieeued mobilization

orders to all Japanese troops in the area in the same manner
as at a time of actual 'Ytta.rfare. 22
for a major conflagration·.

Thus, the stagtJ was set

Only a epa.:rk we.e needed to set

_:1 t off., and it t..ras but a. matter of a few days before such a

spark

~t&s

furnished.

Anti!.·

"ln.S~dent. n

Save for tho fa.ot that there we,s a

sp1r1 t of expeete.noy in Je.panese mili tacy cirolea and a
ten~eness

on the part of those who had :reason to fear that

i

'

Japan was planning a coup• all was peaceful in the city ot
:Mukden on the night of September 18, 19'31.
3,nhabi tants had already retired.,

life was in full swing.

Moat of the

For others, the gay night

Suddenly the peace and gayety o:f'

the city was shattered by the news

th~a.t

serious hostilities

had broken out between Chinese and Japanese troops a few
miles away, the.t the Chinese were being driven baok 11 and the
Ja.pa.nese wa:re advancing on the City.
r---------~~PF&fr~1H~~~~~k4en

Jm. inaidant had

an

explo~1Gn-ha4-take·~------~----

plaoe tJn'ld had damaged a few teet of the tra.alra of the South

Manohuria.n Railway..

'!'his damage, which the Japanese

described as e. nblowing up•' of the ra.:tlra.od, actually
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ootlsieted of nothing more than the ttora.cking of the fish~.
"

'

'

. plate at the ,juncture of two rails, damagirAe; .the rail flange

tor

t\'10

feet on each side of the junction• and knocking a

fet-r spl1nter;s off a w·ooden tie. ~- 2 '3

The Japa.neae claimed

that their railroad police had a.ctual.ly w1 tnessed Chinese

-I-

soldiers engaged in perpetrating the act; the Ohineee denied
the a.oouaatlon, oha.rging, on the contra.ry • that the Japanese
themaelvEJs CH'lmmitted the deed.

Furthermore, the Oh1neee

etnph$e1zed the fact that t..he South Manohur1a11 Railway wa.a so
thoroughly policed by the Japanese ae to have made it prac-

;-

- - ------------

tica.lly :tmpoeaible for a.ny Ohinaea, more especially

soldiers, to approa.oh olosa enough to the tre>oke to commit
such an act.

The truth :wiJ.l proba.bly never be known. and

perhaps 1 t makes 11 t:tle dif:f'arenoe.

\IJhoever wa.s responsi-

ble, the incident wa.e not of sufficient importance to

justify what follo1tred.,.

ifapan' s militarists -w-ere all set to

eweep :into action, and thi a seemed to them to be the r-ight
time.

F'or yee.rs the Ohineae

~md

Japr:meee ha.d ltnown that

+---------~~LO~~~~~~~~·hns~·-Lforma~ wond~~~g-tub~eY~----------~--~

could atall it off 11 the latter how soon they dare ring up
the curtain.

Furtherrnoroe., almost every observant Westerner

living in the

Ori~nt

knew that sooner or later the day would

L _ _ _ ----------·
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come;. 24

Only the gentleman :tn the swivel chaira at home
th~

b(!ll1eved that the pea.ce of

Fa.:r Ea.st wae secure beee:.uae,

forsooth, Japa.n had set her hand, wi tb eight other nations.
to a treaty of peace and good
who fired. the shot that was
very important,.

't~lll.

he~.rd

mo. after all, to know

e,round the. world :ts not so

The important fe,ct is that immediately aft$r

the explosion detachments of both Chinese and Japanese

'roops had appeared on the·scene• and the :t:ighting bad
ensued.

I=

-

--

Some four hundred Ohinese sol(liers :f'rom the nea.r...by

bar:ra.oke of Pei ta.ying had come to .the aeeiata.nce of thei:r
comrades; and with the a,lmost simul tam)ous arrival of la:rge
Jap~.neee

reinforo$mEHlts, hostilities had assumed serious

:proportions.
all night.

The und$clared 'Vrar was on.

!righting continued

By 2&'30 a.m. the Japanese hall tal-ten possession

of tbe l?ei taying barraokat and by 4i30 a.m. they
tJomplate Qont:rol of the o:t ty of Mukden,

wer~

in

T.he fllmoo·thnese,

rapid1 ty, and efficiency with which t.hese operationa were
carried ottt led to the Ohi:neee contention that the attack

s premeditated, 25

Mor--e~w~~~Ul'll.l------.-----~

Mukden that the Japanese were ready to strike.,
flashed over. the wires

through the ether to every

f:trld

n

Word was

.

.

U

.
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Jape:nese army commander on the Asiatic ma.inhead.

By day ..

l+ght _of the nineteenth the Japnnee.e garrison in Korea was
mobilized and troops were en route to Manchuria.
dawn Lieutenant-Genel:'al Shie:ru Honjo,

command~r

Befo:re
of the

garrison of. Kwantung; Ja.pan • s leased ter:t•i to:cy in South
l1anchur1a, had transferred his headquarters from Port .t'U'tbur
to

Mukde~,

a move of 146 miles.

W:t. th him, in oro\vded troop

trains and rapid tr:a:n£'li t lo:c·ries, \·tent the infantry and

a.rt';illery stationed at Fort Art.htn".
arrived in Mukden ·thttt morning.

Both he and his troops

A squad:ron . of Japanese

bombing planes took the air in. Korea and shortly tharea.fte:r
la.nd$d

Mukden while in Jn.pan several brigades of

nEHJ.l"

1nfantey, ca,.•a.lry,

r;~,nd

arM.11eey v-rere mobilized and \'1ere

waiting to erose the Yellow $ea. by midnight of the

n~ne ...

. teentht only ·twenty.. fo.ur hours· after the incident had
This ·tends ·to show that

ooourrad.

m:lr~culously

to he.ppen,

~H. ther

the Japanese were

well-prepared or kne.w tho.t, somat.hing. was going
The trend of well-informed opinion seems to be

.e.nat1on.
On Septembat• 21 China

appee,l~d

to the League of

. Nations invok1.ng .Ar·M.cla XI of ·the Oovenanti>
tba league

Oouno~.l

In response

addressed to the governments of· both

OhimJ. and Ja.pa.n oommun;toat:tons urging both to refrain from

peaceful

B~tt.lament.

China accepted the recommendations.
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Japan stated that sba bad al:ree,dy ta.ken steps along the

linee

sugg~ated • tlv~t

,Japanese troops had been w:t thdra:wn ·

w1 thin t.he ra,:tlway 7.one, and that the Japanese <Jove:rnment

intended to continue. wi thd.ra.wing as soon as ti"e.nqui11.ty was
:restored.

On September 23 the Japanese Government issued a.

. . communiqUE? in which it stated:

·. · It. may be

I.

eupe~fluous

tq

~pe&,t

thEl..t · the Japanese

Government harbors no terri to rial designs on ·
Manohtrria., Whe:t ''~e desire 1.$ ·ttnat Japanese subjects

shall be· ena.bled ssf~ly to engage in v.arioue peace•
· ful pursuits and ba given tha opportunity to
partio:l.pate in the development of the.t land by
mee,ns of capital a.nd labor.~ •• The Ja,pa:neee
Go'llernmetlt, true to its established policy, is
prepared to prever1t the pree$nt lno1det1t. from
developing into a disastrous situa.tion between
the two countries a.nd. ·to \'fO:r1t out such oonetruot1ve
plane as "rill onoe and for all "i~clicate a.ny

causes for future ft>iotion .; • •

.Q

While the JapB.nese were stating to the world 'that

their only aim was to atabilize ·the ai.tua:t:i.on in Manchul:'ia
ar1d to strive for pea.ce w:i t'h
'ltTfH'e

Ohin~ 11

the armies of the Mikado

S"t-1ing1ng far and wide throughout the oount.ry.

On" October 13 tha L$a.gue Council convened at Ganev.a
+---------~~~~~~~~~~~~~T~~$~ed,~s~t~at~e~s~-~------~---

tnen expreeaed surprise tha.t Japan bad not wi thd:rawn her

forces'"

On October 23 they adop·ted a resolution ca.ll:lne; for

the immecH.e,te

in~ tiation

of a prog:t•eesive evacuat:ton by the
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. Jt:apane sa to be completed 'by November. 16.

At thie meeting

'·the repreaenta.td.ves' o:t fou:rte~n nations we:re present •. The

f:tnal vote aho,v-ed thh"teen m:ltions \Toting in

f~a:VoY.

.of the

rasolutj.on and one, Japan, voting against 1t.~7
Japan

ane~n:n"ad

this action of the League Opuneil by

e)ttanding hex- occupation ('}f !>1a:nohu:rla.

On November 18, tw()

days after the date. set by the League for complete evaoua•
tion, a strong JIJ.panese force took possession of Te1 taiha.r,
o~p1 t,e.A

of the Heilung-kiang Province • no·t-tr1 thstand1ng the

:f'aQt that this c1 ty

of any

po~tion

w~s

several hundx'ed miles to the north

of the South Manchurian Railway and far out..;,

stde the zone of the treaty :rignts lrh1ch Japan cle.imad in

Manolnu."ia.

On Janua.xw 2.•

1932~

in spite of' vigorous

p:rotaste by the L-eague of Nations and the State Deptu•tment
at 'fashington, Oh1nchow was seized by Japaneli!e forces; and
1mmed1a.tely therea:rt,a:r, tJ;'la terri tory bl9twa~n Ohinohow and
· Sha.nhaikwe.n ,.ras cleared of Chinese troops. 28 ,Japanae$ eon•

trol \faS thus
J------/ill1'-9ebcv-.~Fruary

ext~nded Soltth

5, Harbin, tbe great

to the Great

On

.....

cmnme~l-o~a~n~tw;;.e~r:.:-...t~....wni----Ut.~.~h.ao;z____ _ _ _ _ __:____ _

tft\S

taken o·var 'by vapanesa troops..

Oi'.H~Upe:titon

of Manchuria t'fn,s now complete.

n{)t'th 11

vtall~

Japan's military
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bh~ng

the

§c~n'le!

1¥1.

JSrllan.

A clash be tween the

milita):\iate and the o1v111an branches of the government
broke out in Japan immediately following the n1noident."

The Oa.binet' s view was that the aitue,tion was local in
nature and could be handled t.hrough normal diplomatic

oha,nnels.

The Cabinet asserted 1 tself

by :revoking an order

sent by vtar Minister Minami calling for troop reinforcements

to be sent to Manohuria.a9
· The m111 tari eta, however, put all the blame for the
"1neidenttt on China s,nd stat.ed that the world powers would

not intervene for this rea.son.

They tfould not listen to

Oe,binet pleas that the armies be removed from Manchuria in

order to fac111 tate negotiations.

In fact, after

l~ar

Minister Minami's order to eend troops to Manchuria had been
killed by tbe Cabinet, the mili ta,:riate, under the leadership
of' General Haye.ehi Senju:ro,
$19t1ding of

too~

the responsibility for the

reinforoementa on their own.

The

rsin:foroett~ente

t-tere sent, and the Al"llly progra,m for the occupation of

anchur:ta wee ca~rieo out t-lithoU~a,.__3_0_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~
The struggle within Japan continued for weeks# and
finally 11 the A:rmy emEtrged tr:tumpha,nt.

29F$1S, aR• S1l•, P• 201.
30

It bad succeeded in
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what it had started. out to do and had shamed and ridiculed
the Cabinet by,

its

refu~aal,. to abide by the
wishes of· the
.
'·

civilian component of'

goyernnu~nt 11 •

O.iv~liap

us.elees, powerless., s:nd disoredi ted~

autho:ri ty was

From this time on•

the major decisions. of Japan i:n foreign

relation~

were to

be made by the militarists and those in favor of their
1
progra1n, '
The Minseito Government fall in December, 1931.

It

could not cope "td ~h the ever inoreas:tns power or the mil1""'

ta:ey.

It had been presented with an aoeompliahed fa.et in

Manchuria, e.nd 1 t was forced to assume ra sponsibili ty for
the actions.

It eame under atte.ek from 1nt.arnal forces

bEH)EUH3!51 of 1 ts l~lok o:f ~nthusiasm for mi11 taristie achieve-

ments and externally beo::U.1se of 1 te 1na.b111 ty to cope w1 th
the wa:r;..lords,.

The mili ta:riets

~ere

one step awa:y from com'"'

plete control of Japanese domestic affaire.

Pe.:rty government

the fall of the Minseito

~ad

one last chance in Japan.

Governm~nt,

+-------~~wo:u~~-'-----Cl'o--f"ll,IJI-J~mant~aLwouJ

poli tics.

The campaign failed.

d

After

the militarists cam•
be----fi>-a\'QJe~.--~oi.hf"-.-.~oP~a,...r""'.tl3-y----------

The new e;overnn)ent ws.s

formed by the vetere;n Seiyukai lea<Jer 11 Tauyoahi Inuka1,

under advice
a~atesm~n.

of

Prince Sa1onji, the

one

remaining elder

This action involved party auooesaion rather

'z'ZI\"'f . ·'----'!!h"'--'---_1~~_j_!__, __ ~·
-·I - ' - - ' ' · - - - - ' - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - --------- ----
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than the assumption of internal pplitipal. power by tba army
The Se1yukai, however, had always been e;n a,dvooate

laa.d.ers.,
of

.~

Mins~i to

stronger foreign policy thru1 had the

e.nd thus

could be expected to give. more vigorous support to the
Manchurian policy of the army leaders.
their reaction to, 1 ts establishment

mtUit

For that reason
be thought. of in

domestic terms l"S>ther than in those of fo:reisn relations,.
Elections for . the Diet were. held 1n

F~it)t'UtU'Y J

1932 3

a.ntl since 1 t controlled the elect ton machinery, a Seiy:uka1
niaJori ty was returntiid to :replace that of the M1nse1 to.

etz-uggls to overthrow the party system of government
therefore, r>esumedl,

ns.ted.

About

a mon.th

interests, was shot.,
laun()hed

~as 11

:EVen before the elections on

9, Inouye. former F;1nance J.U.n1ster, wae

F~bruaey

'l'he

aseasst.~

later Bs.:ron De.n, head .of the M1 tsui

1- ---

1h1a was only the beginn~ng.

i

e. oe.mpa1gn of terror throughout Japan.

1

'rbe e.rmy

As_e$,ss1na-..

I
1

,_
I

tiona, attempted aseass:tnationsp bomblngs, speeohes..
pamphlets, rabble• rousers and demagogues were employed. by

i
II

T----------+-~~hH~~~~aerve no~1~~a-m~ Jiba~a-l~e-J~e~m-e~n~t~s~------~---1

that their e.dvice and coun$el were no longer needea..'32 No

I

one was se.fe; a,nd the conservatives wondered who would. be

'lf*'lt"l'";.["'rtiCj';_·,

------~
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The Mq 15 inc! dent. played. ·an importe:nt. role in the
con.aoli<lation of mil1 tar1st1o powers. . As tTohn M.,. Mald..

· statas;
The a.seasaina.t1ona1nd1cated that no prominent
civilian was safe from attack by &xt:remiete either

1n or out of tha aarvicea. Th~ conduct Qf the ,
tna.ls of the men involved :l.n the aasaeeirtat1one
showad t,hat aotual and potential victims of assial!H'l5.ns
not only la.cked the proteeM.on ot law, but that public
opinion was definitely against them •. The a.ttack on
the oap1taliets mea.nt that it was not healthy to be
eitbe:r a businessman or a spokesman for theprotection
of the interests of big business. The attacks on
poli'tical party haadqua.rters and the attempt to
involve the parties in the corruption of the business~
men a.lso indicated that pa.rties \qere in a po.s1tion
where they could no longer play a dominant role in
thEt· politics of Japta.n,. · The t~dst.ack on the groupe
td thin Ja.ptul the,t m:1.ght possibly eta,y the sweep

toward powta'r of

th~ mil:tt.ar~.sts

was bearing fruit. 34

ll'he assassination a continued, and w·i th them. developed
an OVfH"lV'h$lming fear on the part of most influential· men· in

Je,pan to do anything
1n111 tacy •

oontr~:v.'i.ictory

A.ssa,t:Hlina.t1ons,

howe"~ter,

to the wishes of the
were just one method

used. by the m111 ta:r1sts to solidify their. posi t1ons,.

They

also inoraa.sad t.he already at:rone; imper-ialistic e.nd milita•
T---------~~~~~~d~e~cttr.r~i~n~ati~-G%~~eopl~~tb~h-e~3r~b~e~s~t------~---

to whip the llH'itesas up to a. frenzy of na.tione.li stic fervor.,.
They coined the phrase unat,.onal crisis • tt a.n tmdefined term

which hinted that war was imminent.

There was open

•

- - - - - -

'

llS
encouragement of e.nti-foreign p:rajudioas, a.nd the people

we);"a taught to look.upon all foreigners a.s possible spies.
On top of all this, the militarists issued hundl"eds
of vehement pamphlets l>lhich furthe:r 1nfla.med the people

age.inst the United
~arti(fH3,

the

Ste.tee~

liberals~

Ruseia.• Engle.nd, the governmente.l

China, and every

ooneeiv~ble

person,

country, or thing, the diecreo1 t1ng of' which would ,enhs,noe
the position of the clique.

Ja:pa:.tl be3tUl to s:paak freely of

liberating the people of Asi.a from the yoke of colonia.li sm.

The people of the Western. powers laughed. this off, but the
3a.pe.nese e,ocepted 1 t completely a.nd ca.me to believe tha:t

Japan was the champion of the downtrodden peoples of ft.sia.
and would ~ome day free

t.hem

from their \'lhi ta oppressore.35

On the home front, th1.ngs not to the lilting of the

mili ta.:ri ate ware termed un•Je.panesa and, 1f possible, supp:resatJd.

Liberal educators were forced to resign, leading

statesmen \1-Iere driven out of po11 tiee..l life, and threats of
death were passed out liberally.

erfooted a.nd uae<t with sld,l-l.

Smear techniques were
So~~~i-tte-~-------'----

to enter the ears of the Ja:panese citizens waa news praising
the m111 te.rists and damn111g their opponents,.
didn.'t have a

QhancEr~,

The

o~ponenta

J.l9
lierhaps 1 t is only :f'i tting the.t a l:>l"'ief sentence be

inserted here ste,ting ·t,hat in

19~:3

'

'

Japan. und.e:r the domina.•

·t:ton of the mili tariAts, re jectad the League of Nations and

lett Geneva.,
eugg~stlons

The rea.son fo:r

th~

refusa,l of t.he t.eaguat m

by (\J"apa:n was e;:tvan by General .A:ra.k1 S&deo. \'rho

\'tept in front of

t.he Lytton Commlss:ton

and

stated that they

('the members of. the !J?Jasu¢l,) didn • t. see the true apiri t of
Je.pan towa:t'd China e;nd the rest of

As1e.~

That if the tl"Ue

sp1:r:tt t-rere seen by the W$st$rn nations, they would

pra1s~

and app:t•ove of the men of Japan who had such bumani te.:rian
ideals.

The Wast was eondemnEJd by the Jape:neea for some•

thing that was f..mtiraly the

do~ng

of the m1B.ts.ry • a.nd the

true cu.lpri ts. the ali que • walkerl off with honors.
In 1933 a new Cabinet headed by Admiral Sa1 to toolt

of:fice.

.Although non.,.pa:rty it did include three represent""

ativea from the Seiyultai an.d two :from the Minsei to, thus
making it partie.lly acceptable to

them~

The tttro most

important figul'es in the new. Oab:tnet '\'tere Gene:re.l Araki• the
+-------..........._...~...__.~»ii-___,.,._,.._.............._..__,,,..s.;'----"~i-a;a.,.~.-r_M~S
n Later

e.s l?inm1ce Minister..

and Kore k1 yo Takahashi.

This. Cabittet was of short. dul..ation and

did not contribute much to ei the:r the continuing :r:tne of the
a:rmy or to th9 bolstering of the foundations of civilian

government..

It aoted ae

9.

breathing spell for the mili te.ry

t-------~~-··-----'--1'--"-"----------~------ _________________l'l __l1~!_(}_~--~_!l-~ __'l'!~}!;_tl __ ----- ---- --------~

:round.

l~O

Relative calm thus reigned in thEi. internal' po11c1EHl

of .rapan until ·the bag,.nning of' 1936.

Ths new leaders of·

the army a.nd the navy had apparently reverted to the same

typ$ of alliance w:l tb the oa.p1 tali at and pe.rty forces a.s ·

I

that which had existed for

t~wo

deca.des after 1900 to whieh

they had auoh a strong revulsion.

Ho\rever, the eleot:tona,

which were held. on February 20, :1.936• and which seemed to

.-e.ugur a ratu.:rn t,o eo.rlier condi tlons* rlil3pret1anted the last

of the calm before the storm.
,k

f.~2t.u~~t:;t

.ti 1!1.~\sl~~t,. As a :result of the

.elec""'

tton of lSrJJ6. the M:lnaeito regained its position as tbe
leading party in tbe

Dic:~t

,,r1 th the Se:lyuka.:l second.

The

return of the. Minseito to control of t.he Diet probably ha.d

somethtng to do

\\r1 th

pol:tticti!,l met~hod .• :36

the resumption of assassination aa a.
The threat ·Of such direet a.ction had,

htnieVer, beEHl oonsta:ntly present durine; the prececling yeareo

Then."e had bt:)en no revulsion of popule.r fealing against. the
. earl1eJ:> t..1-S$aesd.na; in :fe.ct, th®ra seemad. to be a;n a.eceptanoe
ttS:t-a.v

+----------<"rl"--Ri.

Ecl~~!Hibs-e-~1-en--t-~~ien

"· " • is like voting..

Things g~rt settled.

in

•lapan---~-

The peo~ple get

too much of' f.H">tnething and someone is t.uu:m.ssine.ttld., n31

. ~w------------------1

l2l
The high po:tnt of the sasa.osina ca.me during
Febl:'Ut;tr·y 26 Incid~nt.

Th5.s \-;as· more like

than a minor uprising.

It took

t:r

th~

ama,ll seale wa:r

early in tba morning

plac~

or febt>ua.ry 26 when appt-o:xima.tely 1500 young 'Al"'rr!'Y and NaV'f

officers attempted. t.o ovff):rtbrow the government and for three

days vi:rtually had the oi t.y of Tokyo in their erasp.. These
a:l:'!UY un1 ts oce~pied. the Metropoli te,n ~olice Headquartel"SJ

the l'ta.r Minis.t:cy, a.nd the Diet Build!r16•

Many of the mo:re·

liberal :ne'Vmpapere we-re t;,ttaoked rutd bu-rneei.·

The (.l.aa:t.h 11 st was appalling a.nCJ 1noludec1· G&rll!.(re,l
'lf1e.tanabe Jot.a.ro, !nspecrt.or-f,;et'lere,l of I-1111 t~try Education;
TaJr.e.heu;~h1.

Kot>ektyo, Finance lJU.nister; e.nd. Visoount Sa1 to

Ma.koto, Lord

Sa1 to· who

1\~&;per

o.f the. l'rivy See,l.

h~td. bes,de~.

This .is the same

an earlier government. and wae referr$d.

to by Amerie&.n n~:n\fs;pap$ra a$ Japan• s. ••e;rtmd old. man,. J the

same Sa:t to

r~gl:lt

lf.rho

:ln 19!5:? had t;'Jaid.,

"Evexw· th1 ne; t-til:l

be t1ll

as long ae "re old. man· are he:re to put on the brakes. u38

Whe-t happened ·t,o Sa1 to• s "old. men*'?

Some bv.d the sam~& fate

+-------~~~~~~~~~~~·~-~~~~~uhm.~j~ttme~d~--------------

wea.ltly ·to the will of the mili t,ari sts..

l~cn\f

there was no one

"to put on the brakes. n
. In sp:t te of t,he fr:tct thtAt the F~eb:rttary 26 Inc:ldent
was 'begun by :r•a. d:toa.l. army off'lo$rs. th~ mi11. te.:ry did not
.

.

-----,-------------- ------------- ------ -·------------------
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los• praetig$ in the affair.

They put seventeen of the

radHH:tls to death and absolved

themselves of' any blame

by

$tat1ng that the cause of the revolt lay outside of the
army, that is, in civilian life and tha.t efforts must be
tak~m

to insure that such a thing never happens again.

accomplish this the militarists proposed two poi.ntst

To
first.

a olarifioa,tion of na,tional policy which waa desie;ned to

attack lvestern ne,tions and oustoms e,nd. to •-purifyn Japanese

beli$fa and second, a stab:Lliza.tion of national life which
was a thinly designed program for putting the country on a
war and eXpansionist footing.

The Cabinet, sa.id the Army,

he.d. to be strengthed while the author! ty of both tha Diet .

and the Privy Council bad to be lessened,.

1his may seem odd

until one remembers ·t}lat the Army held complete control over
the de.binet.

This 1$ exactly whet bappeneo.

In 19:37 the Al!"my toppled. the Hirota Ca.binet and

refused to srant a We,r
~ramiar.

~~inista:t>

to the new propsective

Lieutenant General Ugak1.

at1on. tlf a Cabine--t.--"by

Thi~

Ugak~v.e-n--thQUgh

prevented the forhe

hM--t'b,.-~~~~~~~-'-----~~

Emparo:r-' e sanction, the backing of the people, tlnd the
loyalty and respect of many genera.l.s 't.rho would he,ve gladly

served \vi th him.

Ugaki • s

v1&\fB

were deemed too liberal by

th$ clique; a,nd the premiership finally went to General

19~1

and sent tlf'Oops to Manchuria over the protests of th$
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Jremier and Cabinet members.

There could be no d<>ubt as. to

whether Army wishes would be followed with Hayashi in the
driver's eeat.~9

i_

The first seven years of the third decade of the
twentieth

c~mtu:cy

saw the military men of Japan

the Asian continent by the conquest of

aJ~:pe.nd

Manchuria~

on

At home,

they had. <1enounoed the League of Ne.tions e.nd gotten away
w:t th 1 t.

They left the League e.nd promoted itppal"ialism.

They denounced the London Naval Agreement and resumed the
building of a huge Navy and the strengthening of the Army.
They controlled the Emperor an<.'!. the os.b:tnat. · Wha.t was next?
ln the decade from

19~1~19141,

the foreign policy of

Japan 't-Tas dividEJd. into dealings with three nations;

China,

Russia, and the Western Powe:ra, notably Grel!lt Britain and
the Uni tad. State e.,

The dea.l1ngs

'been discussed e,t some length.

,.,i th

China he.ve a.l:ree.d;y

:tt 1a interesting to note,

however, that during this decade there were over 300
different

diE;~putea

+-------f~!lT'ttl~~'W'H'H+'i"'l",&d

Manohu:ritln bo:rd.er..

bet'ltreen Japan and. China,

in North
,

Most of these

Ghi-n-a--fmd~!-~c-V±e-1-n~hft------.
.

There was actual l:-¥arfara over Jehol

Province, which was settled in 1932.,

Otha:r disputes in...

volved smugglingt narcotics, Japanese suppression ot
student demonstrations in r-l!anohu:r1at; revision of textbooks.
,~

" -Tr-lnt;--;---

-~-,_T~-:--~ r-f-4~~~-:-;,~---------------------

---- - ---------------

------------------------------------------ -- - - -------- -------------------------------;I
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and the harassment

or

educational leaders in Manchuria, and

en1p1ng by soldiers of' both sides.

Although nona of these

disputes brought the two countries into full scale combat,

they paved the

tray for the events of the. summer of

19157.

In 19'35 Japan a.gain presented to Ohina demands which
were somewhat s1m1lt:tr to the Twenty•One Demands diaouased .
earlier.

Although not s.e comprehensive a.nd .as thorough tae

the T\itenty•One Demands •. t~eee t-rere equally insulting· and

\'lara kno'\>m as the Hirota Three Point Frogre.m.
U!m~e.r' ~ In:r;e,! lfo~n~

j!;rocu;!!m.

In october 19:35

Foreign Minister !told Hirota of Japan presented to General
Chiang Tso-p1n, Chinese Ambassa.dor e:t Tokyo., his demanda

which stated that there had to be (1) poet1ve action by the
Nfllnking Government in cooperation with Japan in t.he e:xtermi•
nation of all a.nti•Jape.nese aot:tvi tee in Ohinta. t.U1d. tbe
realization of positive Sino•Japanasa economio cooperation;
(2)pos1 M.ve pol! tical ooopera,tion, itleluding Ohina.t a

reoogni tion of' Manobukuo (Ma.nehu.ria.); e,nd (3) mili ta:ry
~-------t'tf"ltrperation

bet<treen Ch1na. 11 Japan,.

ar.Hi--l~Q~l'l,~-------:------

1ng the spreo,d of. Communism in .North Oh.ina..

40

It was

l:'eoognized 1n Chit'la that the signing of any suoh agreement

would place the nation in the position of a colonial

,.·

1~5

depenc1enoy or pl"oteeto:.ra.te of Japan.

The first principle,

under the guise of suppressing anti•Ja.panese aotivitif.Hl,

whutd put Japa.n in control of China's police administt"atiQn;
the second would, of course, end in China's reoognition,ot
Manahukuo 1 and the third \orould make China partr

to a

m:l.li ta.ry alliance w1 th Japan against the Sov:t.e·t Union.

>,

~fl

Oh1neae. refused to sign the a.gveement, and the m111 tar,. sts

hesitated in calling ·a. full

neal~

war against the Chinese.

They had other matters to olea):' l1P first •
.&;:l;.~1 t,;lgn~ t!~ll i~tJ&1«:.

.Ja,pan and Russia etc>od on the

bx>1nlt of war sevara.l time.s dtn•ing the mid ... thii'tiea due to

incidents along the Manchurie:n... Mongolian bo.rdel":.

This was

not surprising, since the frontiers had .not been olee.rly
defined

aft~r

the conquest of' .Me.noburia, by Japan,

The

'RtuuUana e,sse:rted that tha Manchurian.siberie.n frontier had

bean '"ell de:f3.ned by trae.ty a.nd by a.ooompa.ny1ng ma.ps.

Tba

j

,-

da.pa.nese. however, insisting on a new demarcation o·t bound·
a.riee., refused. to ae¢ept such treaties a.r1d. maps as

8,

basi a.

+----------t~~-a~-A~~~~~~ohea, b~4~--------~----

dieputes of e.t lee.at a minor sort ware oli1r.tain to continue.
But \'that began as a. series of mtnor incidentr1, wi.tb
1nd1vidua.1 eentri.as and patrols sniping at ee.oh other, g:raw

progressively as the border foroea.on both sides were
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major clashes in 1936. 41

Such a major incident on the

Mongol-Manohurian border Februar,v S-10, 1936, brought a
crisis when several hundred Japanese and Manohukuoa.n troops,
using truoke. tanks, and planes, penetrated some six miles
into Mongolia.

-I

In the encounter which followed, the

Japanese, definitely worsted, w1 thdrew behind their own
boundary.

An even more dangerous crisis was reached on the

frontier in the latter days of March, 1936, when a Russian
force of about 4,000 men faced a mixed Japanaee ... Manohukuoe.n
force of about 2,500.

A little 1nd1eoretion on the part of

either commander would have probably committed the two
. countries to a war for which neither was ready.

at a stalemate.

Things

~rere

Japan accordingly gave up such provocative

tactics and resorted to the safer strategy of probing into

Ohina rather than into Russia..

On March 31• 19,6, a Pact of Mutual Assistance was
signed between Russia. and Outer Mongolia. which sta.ted that

an attack on outer Mongolia by Me.nohukuo, supported by
+---------~~~~euld b~id~~~~~us~~s.ia~----------------~

itself.

This

def~ne1ve

Manohukuoan aggressions.

alliance

ohecke~

Japanese and

At the eame time; however, it pro-

vided Japane ae militarists w:t th further arguments 1n their
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efforts to secure larger appropr1nt1ons for m111 taey
p~:rposes

..

Faced with the

Ruseo~Mongolian

Treaty. Japan's·war-

lord.s decided to make a, treaty of their own; and .tbe result
was the Anti .. Oomintern J?a.ot of _November 25. 1936, between
Germa:ny • Italy, and Jt?:pan.

'While di:recte.d against the

policies of Russia, this pact also fur>n1shed working pol:t tical relationships between Berlin and Tokyo a.nd. gave Japan
the basis of association with Italy,

This collaboration of

Japan with two strong European Powers on the hl!l.eie of

hostility to communism helped to immobilize the Soviet
Union and to weaken the vigor of 1 te opposition to cTapanE!ee
policies in the Far East.
top*

The. militarists a,ga.in emerged on

The Anti... Oominte:rn Pact emphasized the words of

Gene:ra.l .Araki when he said:

Japan must defend h~reelf against those wolves
Which are sharpening their tangs, and castaway eats
showing their teeth tor attack. In one "TPray or another
sooner or later, Russia mu.st be destroyed. 42 ·
Re~atitQn,ff,

l.'l1.1m ~be Yn.1Je~4 §~a~eg ~ g~~~~ 1!£~~~1n.

In this case, threata·and intimidations took the place of

actual fighting, although seV"ara.l times \\far was closer than
the great me.jot>i ty of people imagined.· The Japanese warlords knew that their policies were directed towa.;rd an
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eventual war with the W'eatern Po'l,lrers.
was choose the time. and plaee.

Al,l they ha.d to do

They even want ao :f'a.:r e,e to

openly predict the coming catastrophe ltno1d.ng full '"'ell that

both Gretl.t B:ri tain and the United States would look upon
their threats as only idle bol3.sts.
these threats trtere commonplace..

Throughout the thirties

Lieutani.mt Fujita d.eola.:rada

.. Great Britain i a in the t'Vtilight a.nd an Anglo-Japanese war
will· J~ead. to GreB.t Bri t.. ain* s setr. . de struction. "4<3. One of
the highe at ranldng

m~mbers

of the mili t,a.rist clique •

Genere.l ·. Sa.to, dE:H&tined. to become Foreign Minist,er in the
latter thirties decla,;red that;
Ato~rican desig!ls threaten our existence, the.
future of our country, a.nd our posterity. :tf wt'
do not thwart those designs now·, ttta oa.nnot die in
peace. A Japan-American war is inevitable. We
emphatica.lly c1eo,4ip"e that America is our open and

immediata.enamy.

1~eee

then

we~

.

the warnings given to the Western Fowera3

but as the war-lords predicted, they went unheeded-

Even

actions fe.iled. to a.:rousa the ire of America to the extent

that she would declare war against Nippon as wae proven in

the iana:L case •
.i3Jlg.•J.tl?ille sa te 1, a,.t iSHli a 12l§.-J:yl~,

1.m.

One

source of dissatiafaotion among. the Chinese people with the
Nanking Government

'\oTafil i

te apparent 't>tillingness to 81 ve way

t---------4,----:-·------·-----------------~.

44~.
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to aome ex·tent to Japanese pressure rather' them attempt

nnationa.l salve.tionu by toesiatance even to- the ultimate
point of war.

In other wo:t•dst while Chiang Kai ... shek was

attempting to get along with Japan by negotiatins settle•
mente of issues which e.rose or were oree.ted, the Chinese

This

were stead11y growing more a.nt1•Je.paneae in sentiment.,

was shown by the proclaimed objectives of me.ny of the
in:flu~:mtia,l

time,

parties and

individu~ls

There \'le:r>e striking

in Cbil'la during this

indication~

of the growing anti-

Japanese sentiment among the Ohinaaa 110pUla.oe.

These

· oocu~red. at euoh widely aepara tad places the,t the feeling
must be considered to have been national in cha:racter..
·Japanese druggist
province..
Js;pan~ee

wa~

killed by a. mob at Pakhoi in Kwangtung

A consular policeman

wa~r

killed. at Har1kow.

'!he

consul at awatow reported the d.:l.ecove:ry of a bomb

in a Japanese restaurant at tha.t place.
a

A

J~paneee

It was alleged that

officer and hie orderly ha.d bean a.ssaul ted e,t

F'engta.1, a short dista.noe out o:f Peking,
+------~'*~~~e p;t~nm-~i-n--the

Three Japanese

Internetio-:tla..~.---------~

Settlement at Shanghai, a.lthough the al"$a was beyond Ohineee

juriad.ict1on. 45.
The Japa.neee rea.ction to these outbreaks

w~ts

to

increase their forces which; in tjurnt al"ouaed even more
5T,. A. Bisson, lft.RGsll In.· Qb~.n.'! (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1938 , P• 9. · · ·
4
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:resentment among the Oh1nese.

Thim resentment manifested

itself in further outbreaks, which brought Japa,neae fleprisals.

Things, seemed to be hea41ng for a ehowdollm.

Thera was

a period of comparative quiet about the tim$ of the over-thl"t:n'l of the lii:r•ota Government in Japan.

It

a~emed

thRt an

agreement might ba reached,. but Je.panese ina1atat'.lce t}.1at
their armies ba allowed to moile independently within China
quenched this hope.

The m1li tarists, made eu:re that no,

agreement was reached.

They had pla,nned for another

ninoictent 1 " and i t was soon in eomi'ng,.

1\i.
19~7;

.~YGQ9.q1~ iD914~A~·

Japanese garrieon troops at

7,

On the night of July

r. ukouohia.o

held an

~nuaual

maneuver and 11 alleging that a. Japanese soldier \'tas m:tae:tng.,
demanded

~ntr-y

:tnto the city of Wanping to conduct a. search.

Fighting broke out while the Japanese complaint was still
under negotiation; and on the ert.4!!:rnoon of .:ruJ.y 8, the
Japanese lasued an uJ.t,imatum for the surrendel" of the city.

Xn

th~

cas

battle which ensued, the Japanese forces sustained

and

10, a truce was agreed to

u~on

the

proposal of the Japane ae command$r. 46

The incident might have been regarded as closed. but
that waa not the Japanese intention.
,.,!:4<

~

lfithin 'twenty ... :four

' '. t t .f

., p. 15. Bisson giVes a oare:tul review of the
--o:t:roumatanoee surr-ouna1ng-tna--1nl.riaa-nt-1n-Ohap"er_I_o:f-tb1s_______ ---~
work. :tt is probably the most :faotual and accurate account
of the actual proeeedi:nga.
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hours of the 1n1 tial conflict. ltu•e;e unite of the Kwantung
Army

b~gan

to converge upon the scene of the fighting.

Reinforcements having reached North Oh1na. new demands were

made for the wi thdra.wa.l of Ohinase forces.
Army

I
I

On July 13• the

General Staff decided tha.t, 1:f Clhina se troops were sent

to North China., :ra solute steps would be talten to meet th$
e1tuat1on. 4 7 In default of compliance with the new Japanas$
demande 11 fighting was resumed at Lukouobiao upon the following day.

The war with Chine. had bee;un.

The incident at Lukouch1ao was the culmination of the

Army•e scheme for bring1ns North China under Japanese rule.
Plans had been made-nrontns-befora-.- -Now

th-ey-we:re-r~dy-

t-o--

be carried out.
The war itself is of such recent history that it need
not be carried into sreat Cl.eta.il.

Suftice to say that the

militarists me$t a strong set•baok in the refusal of Chiang
and his government to give in to the overwhelming super1ori•
ty of the Japanese.
+-------AA~'P'i-f~l!arttraeefid-'into

Instead of a quick victory, the war

a stalemate.

Al---1i-h~tH~-t-r~a-d--"tMh'tt:e~-----,---~

plt?.ns of the milite,rists, it enabled them to ga.in an even
stronger strangle-hold upon the Je.p11nese nation by their

1ns1stanoe that production be diverted primarily to war
materials.,

More important in fact than the purely trl111 tary

~------. . . . . . . .~-~~---. .
-.. iii!i'ii'-----------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-

preparations of 1937 wa.s

th~

degree in, which the Army had

achieved the :realization of 1 te broa.der scheme to mobilize
the entire strength of the

~apanese

nation for.wa:r.

By

electing to :renew the \'Tar in Chine., the .Army had seen. 1 ts

major schemes adopted by government and nation with a
l'HH'HS

read1~

soa.roely possible of atta.inmemt in t,1me of peace..

The

!la.tion was united behind the m111 ta,riste, and they were
un1.ted in their determ1ne.tion to brins the doctrine of. !1'1-JslsQ

\Qb&u to fulfillment.
In Japan itself, the nation wae placed on war footing
all through the latter thirties.

'lbe Army placed ita

!

pel"sonnel in charge of the newspapers ll p:ropa.e;a.nde. outlets,
and even in the schools.

The Diet was purged of member$ who
f!tRa2~Y

refused to aec$pt the m111tariate• schemes.

The

were eourtad and won over to the Army side..

The Empe:ro:r was

issuing Imperial Reeo:ripts prE!lpt.u•ed by the war-lords.

___ _

\

II

I

Ii
I

Cabinets came and. went, and. every new Cabinet

et~ngthenad

the poei tion of the mili taey by the inclusion of more and

ore rabid expans1on1sts. 48

!h~atern

Power$

w~~o¥pe~n~l~Y~-------4---

denounoed; and the United States in particular was damned,
&specially after July llv 19,S, when America placed a moral

embargo upon aircraft and war materials shipped to Japan. 49

George Allen and

-~{London;

49

!W••

P• ll:S.

The handwriting was on the·wall, but the diplomats of the
Wast basked in the

$bJ~atz

sunshine of pa.o1fi sm arid neutral•

1ty.
~'apanese

fotreign relations during the period

f:l:"'lll

the

outbreak of the Sino-Japanese W!itr until the bombing of Pearl
Harbor can be ~oneolidated into her dealings with the Uni tad

States and Great Britain on one,hand and Garmany and the
Soviet 'Onion on the other.

Her dealings '.'tith China. at this

time were wholly militar-y as would be expected, so we will

confine our scrutinizat1on to the above mentioned nations.
~~attgns ~. 2$tWSlD¥

!US! ..1tJl!

had been asseptially on the defeneive

~ov,i~~ U.n1~!l·
agairH~t

Japan

the Soviet

Union, at least after 1935, when, Japana ee pre seu:re had

affected the ea.la 9f the Russian interests in the Chinese
Eastern Railway to

Manoh~kuo.

Sino-Ja:pane se confliot, the

concern the prospects of the

After the outbreak of the

Sovie~

Union, which viewed with

e.beorp~ion

of China by Japan,

gave the Chineee government extensive aid in the fo:rm of
+------~~L--IR~'------el~i.N--~~'"-J.I.~·e.obni-oe.J.__adllica and

d1.spoa1 tione along

t~he

by her m1-llta:ey--------,--

bo:rder 1mmob1H.2'.ed. in lJ!anchuria a.

considerable part of Je.ptat'lt s beat troops.5°

:ln Ju1y 11 19,8,

betwee~

An armed clash

Soviet and Japanese forces at

Oha.ngkufeng lUll led to

t~n

clash· in 1939 along the

l4ongolia~

days',

f:tght:t~g,

anci. another

border :tnaugu:re.ted

extenetve hosi tili t:tas lasting from May until September.
The Army and war-lords, knowing· tba.t a conflict was !nevi table, ware powe rla sa to resort to force due to the boeti11-

tia e in Ohi.na.

As a. means of checking the Soviet Union, the

Japanese Army, after the outbreak of the. conflict with China_
worked actively for a closer tie with Germe.ny than that
l4ff6rded by the Anti ... Oomintem Pact cone luded in November,

1936.

Garm&ny,. which had extensive commercial interests in

China,

~ra.s

none to pleased with. Japan • e program thff}re e.nd was

willing to consider an alliance only if it assured

Germ~ny

of Japan• s support against Br1tain and F'ra.noe.51 · J·apa.n'e

leaders opposed making commitments \vhioh mie;ht involve 1. t in
a. Eurppean we.r.

In May, 1939, Baron K11ch1ro Hiranuma, who

in .January had auooeeded Konoye am premier, undertook a

trash initiative tot1ard an alliance.

sua.denly, on August 23,

the conclusion of' the German... a~v1et Nonage;raee1on Pact was
+-------fuu'!VU~u:np.;c;.>.::;eu;.;dt-...-·-\ilae~rmany'

e a.ct1on without giving prior notice to

Japan and the fact that the plea for an alliance had rested

on i te expected value age.inst Russia Nsul ted in the dis,..
crediting of tbe pro~German po11c1ee of the K1ranuma Cabinet
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52
.
and forced it to resign.· · l'ihile 1t is true tha.t the
German..-Sov1et

All~.ance arouse~ th~

ire o:r .tha. militarists,

i't also enabled them to spur the people and government into

even mora fra.nt.io attempts to prepare for \-rar.

It gave the

mili ta.rists an even tighter grip on the nation.

After the

r-

German attack upon the Soviet Union, ties between Japan and
GermatlY grew evan closer; and they l'tere united .in a single,
anib1 t1ous. m111 tarist,ic • expansionist pi"ogra.m.
B!!~at~.Qnf! '(IJ'i~h, t.lt~ }.Tn,~!e.S ~iav~i·

From the outset of

hostilities in the Sino-Japanese War, the. rights and interests
of. other powers in China suffereo from Japanese acts.

Bri ti ah property :tntere sts in China. were granter than those

of any othe;r power, but Great Britain was largely preoccupied with the orisi a an<l the eubsequEimt \'lar in Europe.
Consequently, :tt
efforts to

we.~

~strain

chiefly the United States that led in

Japem.

On De.oember 121! 1937 t Japanese

. atroraft bombed and sank the U,S. s. :Par111t in

~he

Yangtze

River under airoumatance.s which pointed to either a del3.ber+----------n~1e~·~d~1~s~r~a~s~a~r~d~.~o~~~~~or ~~~~~e----------------~--~

responsible person.

The Ja.pa.nese government called the act

unintentional and made a prompt settlement consisting, of an

expression of regret, aasux·anoes th'!t :neasures would be
taken ae;ainst infringement of the righta a.nd intar:ferenoe

J------------.. . . . . . . . _.. . . ,. ___ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -' - - - - - - - - - '-

with the interests of the Un1 ted States and other pcrw-era.
di sc~.pline.ry

e.ct1on

a.s~d.net ·t:.he ;r~ r!ponsible commanders, and

indemnification amounting to $2,.214 1 007. 53

Hillis Lory

states tha.t the s:tnldns waa. done on purpotJa under the direct
o:t-ders of General Hayashi w1 th the hope the.t 1 t \'muld lead
to a declaration of war by the Unit$d States.54 The warlords were prepa:red to engage in actual warfe.re with the
Un:t ted States as early as this.. To the disappointment of
the mi11tar1sta, wa.:r.

w~o. n~t

declaredJ and they resorted to

t1me ..b1d~ng.

The Jape.nese :f'ailu:ra to keep the assu;re.noes given in
conpection with the Pe.nax aettlement tmd the vain efforts by
the United States to obtain t,he diseontinuanoa of and
redress for Je.panese violations of' American rights tJ.nd. the
oeaeation of indiecrjJnina.te bombings

:f~om

the a.ir, which had

oa,used the death of tnany t.houaa.nds of' Chinese civilian
populat1on a:r1c1

\'ffJ;t'Ei

jeoparct1 zing the lt vee of thi:rd-powex•

nationals, eventually 1nduoed the United states on July 1,
l.9~8,

to pleoa a moral

embargO--U-po-l'l-the-a~:Lai-l"C..'aft-----'----

and aircraft equipment to Jape.th

On Octobe:t• 6, in oonse...

quence of the Japanese government's continued fa.i lure to

5~dw1n 0., Reieohauer, ~: ~
Yorkt Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p.mo.

1\Uq, Pi!seQl

·

(New

1:37

fulfill its repeated aseur$-ncee to

oh~~rve.

the pr1neiple.of

equality of commercial opportunity, the UniteCl.

addressed to

t~he

St~Pttes

Je.pa.nese government e. oomprehaneive note on

its discrimina.tory practice e and interference w1 th .American
I
_I

I

rights s.nd asked t.hat these be et1scont1nuad promptly.. · The
.Japa:nese government' a reply, on November 19; . was a.n open
che.llenge to the iifastarn powers in the aesex~tion of Japan's

:pretensions to the domine,tion of China; a.nd it oonsti tuted e.
repudiation o:f the treaties concerning China. 55

The note.

etated in pa.:rt that Japan was devoting her energy to the
establishment of a ne1>t order based on international justice
throughout East Asia, the attainment of which was indlspen•

sable to the very existence of Japan and was the foundation
of the and.\U"ing peace and stab111 ty of that region.

conviction

'tltas

expressed that 1n the

na't't

The

eituat1ol1 fast

dErveloping in East Asia e.n attempt to apply inapplicable

ideas and principles of the paat would neither oontr:tbutEil to

the ast,ablishmen·t of a

t'f~al

peace i.n East Asia. no:r solve :the

Since the Japanese note contained no satisfactory
assurances for an a.melio:ration of t,he si tuat1on, the United

$tatas on D$camber 31 delivered to the Japanese government

a.nother note expounding more fully the Ame:d.ce.n

No reply to that. nota ws.e made.

position~

on July 26, 1939. the

tJnited States notified Japan of. :tts. desire to terminate the
Treaty of Commerce s.nd Navigation of 1911,. 56 The tTni ted· ·
I

States raasone<l

th~t

the treaty was not affording adequate

protection to Amel."'ican commerce either in Japan or in
Japa.neae ... oocupied portions of Ohirm., whila a:t the same time
the opera tiotl of tha moe t fe:vored nation cle.usf!) of the treaty W8.e t:t bar im

t.h~

Ja,pans sa oomm(fn-•ce.

adoption of retaliatory measures against
r.!'h;ts notif:loation came

tlt

a junotUt'$

When G:rea t :Sri tair1 was bal.ng subjeeted to pressu ra. through
&

partial blockade by Ja.pe:n of the Bri tinh a;nd ll':rench con•

eassio:ns a.t Tien·tsin, to surrender to a local Je,paneee

oontx-olled court four Chinese whom'
''

of eomplioi ty in the murder of

~l.

the Je..pane sa hall accused

:puppet Ch:lne se official.

On August 18, hcn'l'eve:r1 the Brltish amba.asador informed the
JapanaE~a

government thf:tt Br.i ·te,:tn would be unable to

ooneid.er, in a conference with Japa,n a.lonet
+-'---------.l~'r--\lf.j,l-Q-..1,~·...,_·..~r'·..,.__,.d~hi rd pOl'lte rs.

disuni ty of the l'lestern

pcn<~e:re

p:roblemr~

affeot-

Thfl___lt1ar- J o rds---tUlW-:---tb.t:J·--------

and were quiok to take

advantage of the sa:me.

The a1tuat1on kept deteriorating steadily.· The
mil1 tarists refused to answer l!lSny American protests let

139

a.lon$ accede to them,.

F'ina.lly, concU tion.s

that a new· Japanese ambassador, Admiral

b~c$me

so bad

Kio~isabttt~·o

JITomura,

was sent to the United Ste.tes to discuss with Preetdent

Roo·sevelt and Secretary of Sta-te Hull means of :lmpl"'ving

5
relations bet\'10em the tt>to countr1ee.
. 7
.

Arabassador Nomura

was assured by Secretary of State Hull that the United
States '\'las ready and w.ill1ng to di souse any and all· means

for alleviating the Fa:r Eastern crisis.

This marked tbe

beginning of the negotiations wbiah

to oont:tnue down to

l<Te!'e

. December 7t a period of eight months.

During the time that these negotiations were be:tns
carried on, Japan allied herself even more strongly "':tth
Germany through a strengthening of the. Axis Pact and e.t the

same time signed a non... aggress1on pe..et tdth Russia.

1'h1s

~---·

'

a.ll lent added prestige to the militarists who had been the
guiding hand behind. the two diplomatic e.ch:tevements.11

Japan

wa.s now olosel.y attaobed to Hitler's Germany '\'thich was

reigning supreme on the continent of Europe e.nd

l!tas~

at. the

~--------~~~~~~~~~~~.~~g~a.~~un.~e~t~a~t~.t~.a~ck-~he treat~1th~tuh~e----------~--~

Soviety Union..

The war-lo:rd.s could now concent:ra.te entirely

on the Un:tted Sta.tee ..
The die ,!!

happened..,
_t!J_~~-..,, .. _

~·

Orl October• 17 the inevitable

The army took over the govel"nment in name as well

__:_ ---.,.!L~L· ._ : - __ L

.__ I 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------------------

· 57Gayn, ai• ~·, p. 149.
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as in action. Hideki Tojo

ass~maq, t~ha

War Ministry, and 8AilB.mned the Home

P;remiarehipli kept the

Ministry~

F'or the first

time in cent uris e pol1 t1oel., military, and policE!
concentrated :tn the hands of a. sir,tgla man"'

pol-IS r

we%'$

'.t'he mili·ta:r·ists

ha.d decided th$. t 1 t was time to shO't>f their true colors- and
this they did•

ranted,

raved~

On

'!'heir policy, known ae ''a:rQJed diplomacy,n
tlt'Jd

l'Jov~mber

threatened.

'l'he clouds of war

g~w

5, hope for maintaining peace in the

Paei;fie rose when the Japanese Government dispa.tohed one of

1 ts moat able diplomatef Saburu Kurusu, to w·ashington to
a.eeist

on.

Amb~'lesador

Nomura in the negotiations be:tng carried

Hopes soared but in vain.

The aims of the militarists

had been made clear several times.
periodically..

n1ey had been reiterated

They were in such direct disagreement to the

stated aims e.nd pollcias of the United States .that it was

now apparent that war w·as almost inevitable.

Experienced

observe:rs sent their words of warning, but many Englishmen
+--------&HU---ilE!.I~e,..,;r:':ii;-(;Jo:-aa.-Hn-as-l¥11·1are

eo

G~e-thought

of

wa.~cA&-'t'.t-------'----

they laa.ped at any sign or indication tha:t peace might

preve.il while disregarding the blate.nt 't>le.ets of the war

lor<l.s"
Some of these warnings and speeobe e a.:re wor-thy of
I

-----------------1-

sta.tedc
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~"~hat is it going to be, a wa,y to peace or an
approach to war? Japan ha,e chosen to speak for
peace. At the aa.me time, abe makes 1 t pla.in and
ugly as a tank tha.t she ce,n take care of herself
and her neighbors and will brook no threat,
intimidation, encirclement, or blockade, or other
acts near war. Japan does not go to America or any
nation with hat in he~d, but stands conscious of her
power for peace or war~ The enc1rcling nations can
have 1 t either way. Lest there be misunderstE-lnd.ings,
people everywhere should understand clearly that
Japan 1 a not tu~king favors, rather she i.e ready to
confer them. Her people do me.ke dema.nds :for
cessation of various f'orms of hoet111 ties; which
must :not be interpreted a,e a. weakness. \'leak na.M.one
all'm.ya plead in vain. Strong one a demand, and. they
get, their rights, as this country intends to do.
This Empire ie nobody'e tool. It understands with
full clarity the implications of any combination
against it_ arising out of a world-wide v1ctory.58

On November l, 1941, Domei News Agency declared that Ja.pan

was completing her war preparations for an armed cla.ah in
the Pacific, "Which now seems inev:t table a,nd can be averted
only if. the United States alleviates economic pressure on
Japan • .-59

On November 10, Finance Minister Kaya declared

the.t it was Japan • s aim to " • ,. • force Britain and the
United States to retreat from East Aeia." 00

These threats

oould.n' t be any blunter or clea.rer 11 and yet they were almost

wholly ignored.

The Western powers thought that nothing

would happen while the special emissaries of the Emperor

.

. !58otto D., Tolisohus, ~of'o ~cgrd (New York: Reyna.l

and Hi tohcock,

9

194~).

pp., 27 - .0.
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were in t'lashington w1 th proposals of peace.

these proposals.

Just what were

Tolischue lists. themas,;t'ollowe:

l. All military and economic ai9- to Cb~ngk1ng must
cease.
.
·
.. ·
.... .
... ... ... . _
··---2.-0hina must be left "tree to dea.l with Japan," and
Chungking must be advised to make pea.oe with Japan.
3. Military and economic encirclement of Japan must
end.
4~ Japan' e "Ooprosperity Sphere" must be acknowledged
and Manchukuo. Ghina, !ndo .... Ohina, Tba~land, the
Netherlands East Indies, and other states and
protectorates must be a.llowed to establish their
own poli tic~l and economic relatione with Ja.pan
without interference of any k1ndo
··
5. Manchukuo'must b~ reco~ni2ed; uNobody will undo
what baa been done there.
6. The freezing of' ·Ja.pa.nese and Chinese assets must
be ended unconditionally. .
,
7. Trade treaties must be resto51d and e,ll restrictions
on shipping and commerce ended.
With proposals such a.s this, it tvas apparent that the
mission of Kurusu was doomed to :failure.
that this was what the militarists were

of

t~eir

this end.

It is now clear
re~lly

To Tojo and hie assoc1atee, it seemed the.t the

but

the

;§ak}So tg,b~Y ltas the principle that guided them.

way of the Emperor was clear.
another "incident. n

The

All that was needed was

This "totas prov_ided in the early hours

of the morning on Sunday, December 7, 19.l•l.

The war... lords

struck, ancl the world was a.t war.
1---------·

All

planning and their efforts ha.d been directed to

time had come for them to rule, ,not only Japan,
world.

after.
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OH.AP'l~R

Vl I.

The :rol$ of the ~!!'gat~Ua in the ten yea:rs from 19;>1

to 191n might fall into th$ category of ~·a. riddle wrapped in

a myetery 11 inside an enigma, n

lbera ara mtl,ny c11fferent

views v.s to the aot!lftl :pe,rticipation of the eombj.nes in the

:formulation of imperialistio and m1lita:riat1o policies.

Ons

school of thought agrees with the statement of Joseph B.
Kennan, Chief of the Int.erna.tional Prosecution Seet1on 11 when

ba said a '*No evidence haa been unearthed to sho\'T that
businessman were responsible for the war; n that industrialists e.nd oapi tal1ets helped the militarists only nat the

point of a. c~un. nl

This group would absolve tne ~a.~l?i.1H!,~ of

any guilt at all in th$

~eponsibility

of Japanese -v1ar

plans.
'.t'here is a.nothe:r group, however, whiah aoousf)e the
~~ipa~~y

of guilt equal to that of the militarists in the
g to Pearl Harbor

Professor

~r.

A. Bisson states;

At all. stages of' J'a.Pan•s modern career, the
combines were closely ti~d to th$

!li~~~~~

Alonzo L. Be,ker' a .,The Influence of the .
n

t--------...Uni v a rsi tyo-f~Sou tl:iC.f:i:'n-Cfaiifcfrnf~;--tom--Knge letr; -Juna;-'1948 ;-~------ ----------
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m1l1 taey ...bureaucra ti o elements that planned and
exeouted the st:r-ategic phases of the expa.nsionist
program. 2
Willard Price, another member of this school, wrote, "Mitsui

(largest of the Z~ib~}tay) car:t•ied the amy in its pocket--

except occasionally 'tthen the army slipped out of the pocltEit :
and carried the Mitsui."'

lt seems that most students of

Japa.neee a:f'faire during ·this period agree tha,t if the
~a~bl}tSij

did not actively endorse tbe policies of' the

militarists, they did nothing to obstruct them.

It 1e on

this premise that we continue with our inveet1sat1on.
On the surface it has often seemed that the ''aib.at§JiJ

were the chief opponents of the army extremists in the

political struggle of the "decisive decade."
partly true.

this is only

These two groups had been the stroxlg~H=!t,

political forces in Japan..

Thay both sought to win tbe

bureaucrats and public opinion to their si d.e, but they were
in complete agreement on many ,pointe.

The

Za*ba~!Uh

as well as the mili te.ry, ·ware interested
en advantage of it

reeul ts.

Many of them favored the

~4anchur1an

invtil.sion.

beoa.ur!!e they saw that it would give widespr-ead social

-c--~-._,W111i:!.rd-Prfoe~--~~i

Company, 1946), p.

,6.

19. Je.~ap. (New York: :

The

John Day ,
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discontent in Japan a safe outlet •. Bu:t a:t. the. Sf!!.me ti.me,
the Z~tqfa~ay tended to be more catrt1oua than the a:rm;v· lead-

ere· in foreign poli.ey.

They d.id no.t want tp te.ke risks or

to plunge raaklessly into a big war if' the chances of

success we:re slight.
Even ort the home front, there was a.n area. of agree•
ment between the army extremists and thf3i business men.

Both

wished to m~in·tain their ruling poei :tion aga~.nst the threa:ti

of a social
.uree to

:revolut~on.

at~:MJlP

Tne Minseito government took meae-

out revolutionary groupe· as ea:t1y as 1829-30;

the height of ndemoore.t1o" go\7ernment in Japan..

There -was

full agreement on :reg1mentat1ot1 of this kind, but the

Z!3rbaygy bitterly opposed the army• e ef:f'o:rte to taka over
all political power or to seize Qontrol of their business

. '

.

enterpriseth

4

Keeping these general thoue;bts in mind,

\VEl,

oa,n tum

to a cons~dera tion of the bib~~~~ in the ''deois ive decade."
i2£Hl~~~S ,qgpf!e,gue;~ss

.2! .Jal,!

.;.a.~q~tsu.

Any full

.J--------1iPJ~t.l.l3cfU_nl:-Jjhe economic consequences of the J~lUL~~Y

te.ke into account an extremely
ments.

b~ad

mus

range of value judg·

So much has been said of t.he social evils latent in

monopolistic aggrega.tione of

wee~ th.

and financial power

146
that 1 t is easy to o'Verlook other ..cons.iderations..

Market

struotura and busine ea pl"a.ctice must ba judged in part at
least by their etfeotm on lo~g"'"run economic. de:Yelopment.
:Beyond the question of profits is the question of hO\'r they

are used'•

And the ul tlmate teat of efficiency is not any

particular structure of entel:"pr:tse but whether wide scope is

allcn1ed. for in1 tiative 1 whether steady improvements ta,ke
place· in products arJd px>ooesaes, ,.,ha.thar output grows a.nd

diversifies with 1ncreasit1S m€:'l.turi ty and falling oosts.

whether the_ system wot•ke for or against economic. atabili ty,
and the wise use of resources.
Looking back at the b¥'oad histoey of
p~wa:r

~apan

in the

.era. one cannot fail to be impressed w1 th the con•

struct:tve

1~ole

of the

JapanetH~

combines in teohn:l.ca.l

progress, espeeie.lly in the earlier d$oades.

The

~at,'tf@.tt:}y

were not merely political tdra-pullere or financial
m.anipt~latprs

or even :renti(;tr investors.,.

essential function in la:rge•ecale

They performed M·

entE~rpr:lse

"'hieh could

be State an4 not

nem;,ssar:tly wi tb greater public benef:t t.

If they rea,ped

fabulous gains. as they did; they continUed to plough baGk
the, la.rger sbe.ra in entrapreneur:i.e,l
e~panding

activity.

~.nvestment

in neW' and

The new is always \U'lcerta1n; and as
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ward off oompeti t1on 1 e apt to be the condition of euoceeeful innovation, especially where large outlays are at etaka.11 5

Very likely the concentration of control was excessive in v.arioue fields. even tak;ing efficiency alone as the
criterion.

Yet the combines were able to risk major under.

takings of a combined eba.raoter bee au sa they were large and

to gain substantial profits from new products and new
pr~oeeeee

even if rival firms subsequently copied them.

By

virtue of their resources, they were e,ble to command and
tre.in the best business s,nd engineering talent to staff their
companies.

Their operating companies pioneered many of the

major innove.tions in banking, le.rge-scale industry_ a.nd
tradet ce,p1 ta.l1zing on the frettelom and support extended by a
solicitous government. 6

In so doing they built a new frame-

work within which their top

e~aoutives

reign$d ae oligarchs

but '\'there millions of small businessmen also found new
opportun1 ties for productive activity.
;a.~btlt!Y

A good deal of

aot1v1 ty 1 teelf $ it is true, was centered in
n 1 nower of

Japan more tha,n her national income 1n goods and ser-vices.
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Fortunately for Japan, the dangers .of restriction and
~tagna.tion

latebt in monopoiistic ooncE!nt:rations of power

were held somewhat in check by one

o1roumete.:mn~ •.

Thi$ll was

.·.the countey. a continuing depe:Qdenoe on imported materials

and machinery, which made for vigorous competition in many

domestic markets.

Ja.pan was forced to import all of her

oottcrn. silk, wool. rubber, and aluminum; moat of her iron 1
lead, zinc, tin,
machinery •

a~d

me.ohin~

petroleum;. and le.rge amounts. ot

tQols, vehi olea~ .and equipment.

More ..

over, the combines with their numerous a.ff111ates were apt
to be heavy importers as well as domestic producers.

~fuere

this '!rras true, they had a consumer. interest irl bish quality

an(t lotf pri<Ha•, perhaps also a. m61rcha.nt' s and shipper• s
inMa~eat

in a large trading volume.

The torce of inter-

national compet1 tion could be moderated by tariffs, govern...

ment buying, and aube1dy.7 Sometimes it was entirely
excluded.
~owerver,

Through a very wide range of producers' good.s,
it could not be eliminated \d thout blockading the

dustr1al expansion.
Andt"ew Roth ha.s pointed out that this inadequacy of
the interna.l market provided the shotgun which, was present
at the wedding of the l§tia~s,M and the militarists.

a·

T.be

.
wages pa,id to the '"orkere 1n the factories and to the
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.

farmers was not tt.n1ough to enable them . to puroha.se . the
products of the

.ittbst~!a

ple.nts.

The combines, therefore,

.round it necessary to link bands with the militarists in e.
driv·a for territorial conquest by force of tu·mrh
Against the

technioe~

achievements of the

~~~batsy

as capitalists and. innovators in prewar Japan must be set
the mo:t'e repugnant social and political features of the aye•

tam,

Extreme 1nequalit1ea of W$alth and income· oharacter-

1zed. Japanese capitalism f:rom the beginning.

Under

different forme, this per-petuated the inequality of status
~nd

oppor•tuni t.y which rune ao deeply in JapanGJae history

and tracU:tion.

went

~11en

The actual concentt-e.tion of economic power

beyond the eonoent:ration of property ownership,

through the wide re,m1f1ee:t1ons of economic and political
influence exercised by financial magnates.
, The inequal:t ty. of wealth oe.n be shown by the. follow-

ing example.

!n 19:30• half of Japan' a 12.6 million

r-----~-;HTIHH~~e±~~HHHmJee~s~bae~lo~l~1~4~Q

qua~ter

of the aggregate household. income,.

accounted for a
:t.'J:HB eeoond

quarter went to 28 per cent of the fam111e.e in the
yEln range.

hoUSEil•

4oo~aoo

The remaining half e.ocrued to the most pro$per•

ous 16 per cent of the nation.

011er ten per cent was
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p£~tople,

therefore,. was below. the

1.ooo

yen laval while only

1.7!>9 families enjoyed 1ncomaa o.f 50,00.0 yen or mo:re,.9
these 1, 7:59 f'am:tlies with .incomes of more tht:m 50,000

Of

y~n,

.only tw$nty he.d inoom(!}s of 300,000 yen; and al.l of these
twenty fam1les '\t.rere members of the Z~~~atay. 10

This small.

select group a..ooounted for over 2 per cent of the ent:l.t'$
nation~l ~.ncome

of ..Japan. .This is surely 1nequal1 ty of

'real tb at 1 ts :woret41
the

f~tct

What maka.s i:t even mor.e terrible .is

that tax laws we.ra directed towards the people· e,t

the bottom of .the soc :tal pyt>am 1d.

The

i!1b,a~m,~

were

pe~

mi t.ted to keep almost all of their income '"hil.e ·the man in

. the street, needing every yen he earned, was fot-oed to pe.rt
with n1uoh of his income throush the te.x sy.stem., 11 . How was
this dont.a?

course •

lt we.s done thr9ue;h "lee;i tiraa.te•• means, of

The Diet and the. Oabinat passed lawa which regu...

la.tf!ld the ta.x system., This sounds fine until one ree.11zes
that the ·liaJ?!:t@y_ either controlled or had e. le.rge say in
' \:1, '

.. · •

.
·
T
· twood,· ~~i~ ·~~!i9~mi!l~ $!
,Z&l.JJ!Jll G,rgw.)Ja !f:J;ld ~lJMSi!dX'I~ ggy;W~ ~a=:2~~Px-inoetona
Prinoet,on University . :reas 11 95 41 P• 273:
10aake:r, U• SU•$ pp.290.-9l •

. 11tocltwood• J!lh s.ll•, ·p. 274. lockwood heJe probably
done ·the most complete and author! tative survey of the
industrial growth of Jap.an. Hie book covers all of the
aspects of ind.ustrialism from the Meiji Restoration until

l$1

the operations of both the Diet a.nd. the Cabinet.

!t ()an be

assumed that they would. "rrownn upon a:ny move to increase

·their. taxes,

The ·combines

m~de.

the profits ·an(J then mad.e. up

,.i
I

the la.ws. saying who $hou14 pa:y the .tax.. .An unbeatable com""
binat1on in any

leag~e.

Aside :from
bet~>Teen

~he .obviou~

evils o:r sxooae dispa:ri ty

the. wealth of the few and the .poverty of the me.ny,

there \i'ere other social oonsequenoea of profound signifi-

oa.nce.
~e

ex:tstt.-n1oe of great

e.gg:r-~gates

of financial power.

· reinforced by pol1 t,ical influence, tended from aa,;rly times
to discourae;e the growth of a sturdy middle class, 1 ~e., • a

broad mio.dle class of independent businessman endowed with
i'

suftioiant cap! tal and freedom of opportunity tl!o the,t they

1--·--

could develop madium•.ld ze~ modern enterprise (f:f'fioie:ntl;r ruld
t>n their own.

Equally, the power of the

lt!'9ii~.§M

concerns

in the labor market •. where they were careful to maintain a
common

front~.~

helped :to stifle the growth of a vigorous

h$r obatQolas to trade
unionism to be sure.-. ... the pressure of popula.t1on, the
p~valenoe

of female la.bor in factory 1nd.uet:ey, the wide

disper-sion of emall enterprise throughout the countryside•

a.nd the .lack of e:xper1$noe in democre,tio, mass Qrga.niza.tion.

i

'

I

[-·-
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pt-og:ress 1n factory and sootal le,gisle.t:ton, must be attrib·

uted to the int$nee Ol)poa:t tlon. .lad by the 1*\&~~~~u, which
greeted EIV$ry proposal tor advance in these fields.

ever the business r:i,e.lt-1es of. the

IRt~~it.tU!•

What-,

and thfl}:ra were

olosed ranks and presented a solid front !n th•.
faoe of .any and all· reform rnov$mant$. 12 ln the political

many,

th~y

realm, as well, the exi.stence of eqncantratecl business

po~l'

retarded
the growth of democratic movements at home while
.
'

providing a pliant instrument for m11i te.t\V e,ggresaion
abt>Oad.

1his eXplanation o:f' the rqle of the

li~ba'lfrau

in the

eoonom:'lc l:U'e of Japan was cited to show that in order to

maintain its position the

~~~MQY

had to exploit the people

.and deprive them of' the fruita of e, demoora.t1o government.
The people had to be }leld in line.

collusion between the

~i!l?.,~~~S

This was done b;v a

a:nd the Arrny.

They were the

bro et:rone;eet g:roups• and they Joined their force$ to hold

clown anr attempt by the people to voice tbei:r aantiments.

e of the ma.tn pointe of
bet~.taen

the

~l.i."~~~sy

e.e;~ement

·

and the mili te.rists we,a the recognition

by the combines of the-fact that.they needed the militar,v to
ma1nta.1tl "order" .at home •. J\6t'$ement here led to further

•

tte;:reement in the field of d1plomatic relatione A.nd 1n the
expansionist policies :ravo:r.ed by ,both fac.t:t.ont.h
Z.t&&9~:ieJ~!i

The case of the

in the economic aspect· of.

Japa.nase life has been closely .f<lllowad and studied by
Professor !1\ A. Bisson.

He .summarized the problem a.s

follows.:

Altnougb the

.za~J>(!tiJY

case was not

l~~oking

in

.

el•mt!tnt~ of

strength, its weaknesses were fol?m1dable.

independent

labo~

.

The incidence of the IG*'l?AriU. ey. st.·em '"'as tbe po1n.tt
above· e.ll• on which 1 t stood condemned. It offerEn'.t··
no real protection to the worke;r, the f'arm~r, and
the consumer. Its· spokeamtn cooly weighed the
adve,ntage of nav1ng a poverty stricken farm populo.•
tion that provided· a surplus labol;" force to hold
down wagest Employe:t7e, who m~ght reta.in a· sense of
paternal responsibility for their workmen, neverthe..
lese invoked the police a.rm of the st,ate to restt>ict

organization.

Glaring ext.ramea of

wealth and pc.werty ff:Xistea., and little o:r no effort
tfa$ mad.e to m.i tigate condi 'tiona by welfare mea.euree.
The sooiet;r f!tS a whole l'ras marked by g;r-e,v~ il1Steb11""
itias. Ancient sanctions of hierarchy and statue
end.u;rE~~d. .in stl"angth, yet an increasing roaasuN~ of
overt force and rep~ession was :required to keep the

;ruling caste in its seat of powar.l3
This, then, is the role of the

economic

1~.fe

of

Jap~J

:--

l!~'b!!:f:.U

-

in the

dominating, cruel, and p<n·terful.

~------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-=hae-nto~r~a~1~g~n~a~ft~a~.1~r~g~~~f~----------~--~

Japan and. the degre(\t J!Jf theil? oo•operation 1'11 th the war...

lords.

l1ll

!i41alJttf!~

rtn9.

tqt.re~eill .t!;\it&Qll~·

!loth ste.ta'=' that

ttThe l~~~!t§ij was just about as peaceful in 1 ts :foreign

policy as 1t was democratic in ita internal policy. ttl4
Historical events have pro'Ved this statement to be true.
~a1b~,t§Ia

leaders .. in the main, were firm supporters

of the principles of bak)So ichi!a e.nd kodo .15

Their disa-

greement w1 th the wa);\lo>lorde was not over the ultimate ends
of the policy but how the ul tima.te ends were to be achieved.
They a.ttempted. their me thode during the ttliberal n twenties,

but the world wide depre seton of 1929 forced a cancellation

of their plane.

§fteql

.at

the de;e:re1s~g~ g! ~

.2.!! the Z!;tbatsu.

Most stud.ents of Je.pa.neee politics agree that the depression

of 1929 disor$dited the great combines.
especially strong from the
policies of the dU'ferent

military~

Opposition was

who disliked the

~a.ib~ttu so'tTerl'lments

whi oh a.dvo-

oa.ted "pea.oe:ful penetration" of China and the mainland
through eoonom:lc cha.nnels.

The war-lords favored the

"positive policy*' as eat down by Baron Tanaka in his

infamous Memorial.

Again, the );"$a,der muat remember that the.

f------me-'lill'Tru~.----t"lftt~hhee-.~gttJOOJ.a!.t:lt-;11;-1JW~$re

the cause fox· thi a d1 aagxoaement.

At any rate, violent, e.ttaoks we:re ma.de on the itdbtf£Eru
on the ground that, in promoting their own :fina.ncial
p:rosper1 ty, they had jeopardized the inte.rests of the State

a.

155
and had done great harm .to .the·
producers and traders.

.peas~mts

and the small

These. atta.cke oe,ma' to. a head 1n May,

1932, with the asea.ss1nat1on of :aa,ron Dan, the ch,.ef execu . .
M.ve of Mitsui, at the han(ja of a "young officer" group,

The

~ttib~~ey

~sentment

retreated.

They tried to disa:rrn. popular

by relegating to obscurity o:f'ficials who had been

responsible. tor their previous bu s1ness policy. · Mi teui,
which was

in

th~

main target of c:r1 tici em, withdrew from trade

mi~or

agricultural products and. sold. to the public ltlrge
holdings o:f' sha.ree in some of 1 ts leading companiea, 16 It

made a

donat~.on

of three million yen for the relief of

distress, and 1 t established a. fund of thirty million yen
for the promotion o:f. eooia.l services,.

The

~aiba;tsy

attempted to show. their devotion to the national interests

by establishing, or investing in, new enterprises of
.st:ra.tee,;ic importance, sueh as synthetic oil production; and
thflly provided most o:f the ca.pi ta.l for a new bs;nk intended to

fir:u.tnoe thoee amall trade.rs and

ino.u strialists who wet-a mem-

r-------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·o~r~t~Guilde.17
'!his decay of

~~~.q~~~9.

influence p:rovid.ed the mili ta-

riete with the opportunity they needed.

They moved in to

;r$oa.pture some of the pre atige that had been lost during th$

anti-war eentimant of, the poet World War I era.

~e

first

move.· they ma,da \!Te.s the creation of t,he l-1apohurian Incident.

The oou:rsa of events followed by the m111 t&l"Y

prev1ously.

Now we will see how the

s:t tuai~:ton, a si tua.tion bX>ol,.lght, a,bout

~~~qa;t,sS!

'\f&e

noted.

reacted to the

pr1m.~.ri1y

because of

the lees\Slnh'lg of. ~~;\:q~,¥~9. influence due to the raparouseione
of the depression of 1929.

:tba Mana,nYr:t.e.n :&PQ.id,§Ul1· The
invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931 \'ltUJ heralded by

l!l2 za*'bp. tllY

~·

H1dek1 'l'ojo• the blatant trombone of ,Japanese mili ta.r1am, as
"a hea:ven .sent toscin signalizing at home and abroad the
epoch-making dawn in East Asia.. nlS

ttow did thEt Ja3.ba.tS!!;!

view the developments in Manchuria and the road to ws.r

policy of the
The

m1lita~1stet

~~~~."~§.Lh.

together \11th the government, was faced

w1 th a ei tuat1on in ».1anchuria. that they oould do little about.

!t'he oooup9,tion ot' Manchuria was completed be fore

m1l1 ta.ry eagmen·te in .Japan.
or lea.ve 1 t.

The

1noreaeed trad.e

litba~tJ~Y

~nd

t~hera

could

It was a.lmoet a ease of take :1 t
could take

~.dvantage

of the

prof1 t.s bound. to come from the
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Manchurian venture, o:r they could leave the bene:f'i te of
.m111tariet.:lc alrpana:ton
,;a~be,tft}3

to

were willing to join with the mili tarieta in ·shar-

ing the loot, but they. wexe atraid. that Je,pan' e
would

the

othaX"a • . It seems that

o~rry

lfar.-lor~s

them into a. major "rorld conflagration which tbey

Reisohau$r surna up this feeling as followtH

opposed.

The average ~-~l,l§~!ll executive remained a:t're.id..
of the.:risk and expense of a major war, but he was
not advcr;t>se to cooperating with the nd.litar1.ata.1n.
m:l.nor colon1a.1 ~entures e.nd in the profits of' build...
ins an empire. 1
.
.
, At the beginning of the Manchurian Incident, the

1!1bta."f::l9.

leade~a

felt eu:re that tne Weate:r·n Powers would

step in. and put an 1mmedie,te and effective halt to the plans

ot .the militarists.
the

~~~9a~5Q

This. did not happen.

The att1 tQde of

leaders :tnfur1att!td many of t.he most povre;r:ful
towa:r~

,tnilitarist,s, soma of whom harbored .11l... feal:tngs
1ndustx-1a.l1sts
to army

~mb,. t

bec~uae

io:ne.

the

of the threat posed by the combines

Tl'H~r$

was open talk of mass assa.se1na-

tions of al&!a~~~p .leaders. 20

'!'his d:td. not happen

ely although the slay1ne;

ot

:Baron

Dan~

leader of the

H6uae Qf Mitsui, co.ul<l be traced. to military soux-oes.

Instead, the war... lo:rds urged tha.t a new group of

158
1:ndustria11srte be organized. .Th1 e g:roup tfould be in

of any and all 1mpe:r1e.listio gestures by the
I

'

-

'

~rmy

favo~

because

'

they ·would. be orgatli~ed by the wa:r•iorda, and thai:r'
oontirn~ad.

e;2tistenc$ would

business..

depE~md

This group of na'!'r

upon army and ns.vy

induatr1al~sta

had their

baptism of fire '·n Manchuria and \'lar.e kntnm as the ShaD
(New) ~e,~bta,~Q·

k
lib!

,f!\li~ ~f!&bit~u

.Si~Ulla4Jlei?

lD

f4~noJ!Y.tAf!:#.

Wb~a~ ~ ~~1,:,:

!Q.

Sines 19:31~ the ao oaJ.l~d nyounger" business

st-oups rosa itl 1mporta.noe in Je.pa.n together with war indus•
t:riEH£3.

O:f theee the chief firm was the m1fi§!£m (Nippon

I

Sane;yo Ka.isha) group under the lea,de:rsbip of Y. AUtawa.

I

Aikawa. was a proteea of' Marquis Kaoru. Inouye ot the Mitsui

r

1,;

ole-n a;nd beosxna prominent in Japanese business circles when
he. took over the iuh8.ra Mining Company anC! th$t'Etbf prooeEHled

expand hie activities by supplying tha inol..oaaed d•mande
of the militarists. 21 Apart from i te graeA:. mining proper,..,
~o

tie.s •. .lli~Hfll was rgapecia.lly 1.mport&..nt in the field: of.
as held in e;X>Gat esteem by the

militarists.
ln Ma:nohuria,
the

-.

Jitl!)?,,!M•
. - .

•

Jt1.~s,sq;g

was given .the green signal over

Ae was mentioned, rugs~a~! fortunes were

"

0

Macmillan Oompany,
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wholly bound up with the promotion of
the leaders of the

influence.

!~s~san

J,ynsenJ~ i&,i!~J

and

were t:unenabl$ to m111 ta.riet1o

The m111tar1ete had set up many business enter-

prises in Manchuria, and they needed the guiding hand of
some

ot

the magna.t$s of Ja.pa.nese industry,

\Vhile fostering

new business groups in Manoht.u:•ia., the war.... lorda kept strict

control over business act1v1t1E:Hit by means of the Kwantuns
Army.

Army persor.mel cheeked and

doubleo~tchecked.

all

a.ct1v1 ties in Manchuria; and, as a result of this intervention, none of the main objectives of industrialist and
militaristic expansion were real1zed. 22

The State controlled

South Manchurian Railway Company • in whose hands moat of the
large scale undertakings were concentrated. found it
difficult to rrd.se adequat$ capital to finance its ventures;

and with the probability of war with China eminent, it was

deemed necessary to revise the organization to produce the
desired l'$SUlt.

To further these aims, the Manchukuo Heavy

Industries Development Company was organized,.
t------C(>mp~f-r--.:ti'btliee-·--Jli!ii&#,!Jfti!\!Jlt-.--sg;proG.lUbfJp~be-el-4--balf'

In this

of--th$ CHlp!tal; and-tl'lfa.e-------

~mainder was held by the Manchukuoan Government. 23 EvEUl

this, however, was not enough.

...

.

..•.

'I!

Brown and Company•
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Much to the oba.gr1n of the war•lorde, 1 t soon became
'
.
'
appe.r~nt that a. country the size of Manchuria, couldn't be
tully developed without the oapi te,l which the huge oonoerns

alone eould provide a.nd the.t the capital \<tould no.t be forth-

coming under the old system of :r1g1 d State control. . In ·
other words, the army wa.s forced t,o accept the
full-fledged partners in Manchuria.

l!4b§~~9

a.e

The combines were more

than '\d.ll1ng to Join in the venture one$ they saw that
Western intervention would not be forthcoming.

They saw the

possibility of huge prof1ta, and the,- jumped at the chance
to make the possibility a probability.
there~

Was
· the olde:r

a difference between the ib1n ;a&t)ar$Y e.nd

lt~'t1lit~sy

fatniliEua?

In all. probabi.li ty, no.

'l'hE~

alleged oontrast between }11£!!19 and the other younger
industri~lists

and the older families is more apparant than

rt:~al,. 24 The faot 1 s that the holders of many of
in

l!eq~;

the shares

and its subsidiaries were members of the older

families. as

C:ouplEHi w1 th this 1s the fact that J1est~na wa.e

oed to borrow $o-tley from-t-he old

•19:&:9!~1!:1

to proceed with its program in Manchuria.

elane in order

Although some ot

the banks 1n Japan were willing to lend money to

lf~.rUl!lh

op-

the
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total amount available would not be enough

~o

guarantee

s.uocess to m$esa:o•~e ventures. . :Besides this, tbe bank~ had

many other preoocupatione and could. scarcely supply $Uff'i•

o1ent tunde for lone;.-.term investments

outsid~

of Japan

Furthermore, the head of the lft!illl.l gX"Oup,. X"

proper.

Ailtawa, had family oon:na oticma w1 th leading pe :reons in the
Mi tsUbiab1 alan; and connections

importance in Je.pa.n.

s~tch

as· the sa are of great

The fact ia that most of the ttyoungeru

groups had conneotione of one kind or another. with the older
Ja.t'q4:lHU3.~

.~Sb.E11HUa

An example of this is the Ildori group of the

~

which had o1ose family oonneoM.ons with the Yasuda

clan, one of the Big Four of the .•~].'le.~al! group•26

OntJ

author statGea
. As :f'ar as surfa.ce ind1eat1ons ~, the iA£¥,BfttQ
interests are 1ndEJpend&nt of the older" e;roup,
but fitt.Hlh personal connections would be far from
likely to preclude interrelatione, not necessarily
open bE1tt'teen the "younger_. f1nano1a1 1ntereats and
the uold.ertt tina.noe capital groupe.27
·
:rhomas Bisson states that events have demonstrated;
,- • • the absence of any real di sM. notion between

The old•

$Stab1isbed Z§ib§~§!a combines, owever. ranged
mora widely over the whole of Japan's expanding
terri to rial sphere, a.nd, when 1t cams to Army .
2fSN. Xasuo, "The New and the Old Combines, n
~fa•tf.h (Jun~., 1938) ,, p. 3:5:5 •

.~7

•

!191~~2
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contracts, could hardly be sa.id to play a. aol$ eeoond ·
to that of the newer and lesser oombines. 2· .
''l'h1s seems to indicate that ~en' the membe~e of the old
clans and. their sympathiz$rs b1ame th~ ~ ~~~·~~~sy tor
supporting the military, they are, in :rea.11ty; 1ndiotins

themselves.

If, as all infqrma,ti.on seems to indicate, the

~§il.?t:tl!Y supported the. military, 1 t 'liTas the "old" J!~ba~f!Y

'"new. n ·

a.e well as 'the

'lhe shadow of guilt hEu'Jgs over tham

all. _
'

;e~ll~lHl!l.. Mil'~~l:l§l~ su~~crs~~~~~sm

1 t was clear to th_e

IJ~·lla,~~~

1n Ma:runuu:~.R:· once

leade:r<s, both old and young.

that the United States and Great Britain would not

in

intertE~re

they proceeded to work hand in glove with the

~1anchuria

military. 29

This co•ope:re.tion was to continue thXloughout

tbe thirties, right to Dec$mber 7, 1941.

In Manchuria team•

·-work between the two parties was a.ppara.nt in all activities
f:rom railroading to nax-eotios.
facets of the

ao~operat1on

A few of the most 1mpo:rtant

betwecam the two w&rre,nt furthe)."

attention.
The beg1nn1ne; of active oo•operat:ton could be 11 sted

as August 8, 19:;:3.

On this date, leaders of both factions

de.c:tded that they would#
N ..

t

_u

:ti:¥~111

·r ·

r

.1

16;,
• • • d(;)velop Manchuria into an independent nation
possessine; indivisible relatione. w1 tb the Japanese
Empire. They would strive for the un1f1oa.tion ot
Japanese and Manchurian economies in order to
emtab11sh seeurt:Jly the foundation for the expansion
of the Emp3.re • s economic powers to the whol$ world•
Oo..,exiatence e.nd co.... prosperity of Japan and Manchuria.
was to be restricta~ by t.he de,manda of the national
defence of Jape.n.30

According

io this <lootr1ne, 'transportation, oommunioa.tion;

an~· other anterp~ieee

ln )'d'anohuria. were to be developed. by

special oompa.n1es directly or 1ntU:reotly under the super•

vision of Japan so as· to contribute to the "national.

defensen of the ·Elnpi~.'l · these nspeeial companiea•1 were,
of

oou:rae, the

81tn~~i.Y

and their subsidiaries.

The term nns.tional defense" ·took in quite a. bit of
In fact 1 t enoompaesed all of Manchuria • s

terri tory.
~toonomy.

First the m.ilroads wel"e seized.

The Chinest

owned railways north of the Great

·Wt~tll; a.nd

the money

1ng in their oredi t in

banks was

confiscated~

r~a.nchurian

eta.nd.;;~

All ra.1lroa.o.s w¢.u~e oo•ordJ.nated, eormeotEHi \11th, e.nd. placed

under the ma.na.gamant of

ll'.ttt..,.·.

·.·:

'I~

agency knotm as tbe
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Electrical supply and distribution systems

"'rare

quickly

taken over.

All sources of revenue were taken by foroe, and

the revenues

expe.~ded

to finance the new government..

The

customs were seized on the pretext tha.t Manoburta was a
The . Central Bank of Manohur,.a was eetab•

separate state.

lished to replace the old p:roveneial banks. whose funds

used to capi ta.1ize the new
issued,.

organization~

we~

A new currency wae

1"he telephone, telegraph, and radio systems, being

state owned, were seized :t;l.nd placed. under Japane.Hl$ con·trol.

:tn all Of these publiC. services, .Jap&l10Se officials and
advisors were placed in the main political and. adminietra•

ttve offices and
organizations •

exereitH~d

effective control of the

'l'ha only people 1.n Japa.n >td th enough knowl•
'

'

edge a.nd experience to step into the various a.dm1nistra.t1ve
. . .
3:3
offices were members of' the .;f!~be,~ay ol~ms..
They were
$ntrusted. with the economic program in Manchuria.
This economic program was announced by the puppet
government o:f.' Henry Pu Yi in 1933 under. the title:

"An

t was
announce<;l.

that~

economic development was to be based on the

following basic pr·inciplest

.. (l) To supply state control and t~alte .measurEHll, in
regard to the important 'branches of economic activity,
1n order effectively to open up the various ne,tional
resources w1th which this country is endowed and to
.. ·. k 1

_

,

M ,.11 I

l'

1'

,, •

promote a co""o:rdinated. development iri ·all fields of·
economic endea:vorJ (2} ·To aim at· the oo•Ol"dination.
and rat.ionalization of the East Asian. economy, to
place the emphasis on co-ordination with the good
neighbor Japan in view of the economic relat1o:r!sh1p
ot mutual dependence between the t'Wo count.riee_. and
to make .inc:ree..aingly. closer this reln.t1ons.h1p ·of ·
mutual b$lpfulnees • 34

In· accordtmoe with basic p:r1no1ples, i:t was announced that
the Government proposed ~tto malta 1 t a. guid.ing principle that

important enterpr1aes of the na.ture of national defenae or
public utilities should be managed by public bodies or
special companies. u3!5

'l'his could. only mean the ;ai~tit~!H

for as was pointed out, tbey were the only ones with enough
experience or finances to tsJte up the task •

!''rom the

t~.me

that intervention f':rom the Grea.t Powers ceased to nuate:t>ialit&l;>a~~ij

1ze, the

worked hand in glove with the militarists.

JD~a!n•Hfinswt\lf~o, ~.Qlnt
~~~11flt~ita

csmmt:!rt!~·

The

and the mil:l ta.r1s ts eont1nued. to wo1•k ·together and

increas~

·. to

ie3.9nemis

thirties.

their eo...,operation in· Manchuria during the midThe high point of this co•operation was the Japan-

Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee established in 1935. ·
e.g1"E1emant provided

th~~.t

the CommittEH\) was to oon$ist of

$1ght members, four from each oountrw.

:

.•. r' :to

Japan•s members were

Chief of Staff of the KWantung Army; the Qouneilor

to bes
r;v. J

~e

:r

:·1t2

·r

» .,

,
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of the Embassy in Ma.nohuku.o; the Chief of the Kwantuns
Bureau; a.nd one member especially appointed .bY the J!l.pa.nese

Government.

1he latter w-a.e usuallJ a spokesman for th.e

~~~s~t.s.Y.•36 Ma.nohukuo•s members

\'te:re to bet

of Foreign Affairs, Commerce

Industry, and Finance, and

and

the Min1ate:rs

the Japanese Director of the Genars.l Affair's Board.

All

questions before the Committee were to be decided by
tna.jori ty vote.

In answering s. question as to the pose1b1l~

1 ty of Japan• e being out--voted" iremie:r Oki Hirota replied a

l ask him (the questioner) to consider the fa.ot
that three out of the four members of the comm1 ttee
from Manchukuo are Ministers and the remaining one
is the Director o;f the GEJneral Affaire Board, who
is, and. will be a Japanese forever, I am confident.
Although he is an official of Manehukuo, he 1a a
central organ assuming lee.dership of that country.
Therefore, in case of a difference of opinion
bet'W$en the two countries, it oanmrt be imagined
that he will make any di.oision that will be diS•
advantageous to Ja:pa.n.'37

Here we.s a.n iron• clad. guarantee that the wishes of' thf3
m111 tarists and. the Zt~JattfUl ware to be

carried out.

Now, we turn to the duties of the Committee. It was
J J questions oonoernjng the economic ties

between the two countries and supervise the Joint Hold1ns
Company to be organized in Ja.pan and Manchukuo.

It wa.s to

36Raymond Vernon and Caroline Wachenheimer, "Dissolu•
of Japan's Feudal Oombine e; •• li!n!.ttmen' at §ta~e
~--~~~

37

iudfSEHn!~~.

sm·

o:Lt.,

.

P• 636.

'

-
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control the

indust~ies

ever, that matters
.

'

govarrl~ants,

o.f

~e:nchuk;uo.

im~or~e.nt

to ,the

It was provided, how•
economi~ t1~e

of botb

but which were in Japan's power, would not be

d1souseed by the Committee.

Since such topics could not be

delioerat;ed by the Committee, those matters :r.rrera to be made

into un1la.teral contracts binding only upon Manchukuo,. 38
All points of doubt were dealt w1 th admirably by the
1~1}aa,t!\!

and the m1l1 taey.

One of the first acts of' the Joint Economic CommitteEFJ
was to integrate the currencies of the two countries.
November, 1935. the yen bloc

w~s

In

eetabliahedJ and Manchukuois

currency was no longer basad on silver but was_ stab1l1 zed a.t

par with the yen.

This enabled trade to flow mora freely

between the new industries of Manchuria· and the combines of
Japan.
'lbe

next 1mpo:rtl.i\nt atep was the o:rse.nization of the

Industrial Bank of Manchu}tuo in November. 1936.

The bank

was begun td th a oa.p1 tal of 60 million yen. and served ae an

ust:ries to be developed under the
plane. of' the m111 taris ts and the z"~l?.us,u. 39

This bank

handled all imports made for industrial purposes in

Manohukuo.

The Manchurians were permitted to

m~ke

deposits
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1n the Central Bank of

~anoh~ku9. a;pd ~ts

t-rere not allowed to borrow f;rom

Japanese

"~re

pranohee, but they

~he I~dus~rial

permitted this privilege..,

A lfaW of ea,.ings

was enacted to force the people to save money
in the Central Bank :f'or the JapanesEh

Bank; only

~nd

deposit it

At . the high point of

tbaS$ compulsory savings, over 600 million dollars we!'$ 1n

the

·:aank~

money that was

ea~roarked

for the industrial plans

or the ,l~,b~te.9• 40

lll!. Stoonsa

l~r,lQ<;i ¥2ns,~t:taot:tt?D

V..tU•

The ~fora•

mentioned· act1v1 ties were included in what was known a,e the

First Period Const:ructlon Plan and took in the period from
19'!51 to 19!$6.

In January- 19'7, the S\\'toond Period Construc-

tion Ple.n went into effect.

It \'Tae dra1'tn up by Vti!.t'ious

Ministries of Manobukuo, the Cabinet Planning Bureau, the
South Manohurie,n Railway Company, leader•s of the .litba£&lh
and, the·. Ohie:t• of· Staff of the Itwantung Army, 41 Thie .Second

FiYe Yee,r Plan followed the batU.e principles underlying the
First Five .Year :Plan and le.id f3mpbas1s on open in e.; up
l----------l:if.!J-SnuiP<HiHl--1»-111H9.ru!H:"ru-lHl1e--f.me~:-ma-!£Hl~ilab le for

ttntttional d$fense, » that is to say "war. n

the plan

decla~$d

the policy with

,

~egard

The outline o:f'
to minins and
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industries, fields in which, the .bibfAit!iU! were primarily

interested, to b$l
• • • that mun1 t1on il1dust:r1ea for :weapons of war,
airplanes, automobiles, and rolling•atook will be
:f'it>mly esta.blishad and. basic major industries ·sucb
as those of iron, liquid :fuel, coal and electric
·power will he developed•. and emphasis will be laid .
G$pec1al1y on the development of iron and liquid fwatl
~n~ustri"m• ,.,hi oh me.terials are necessary for· n~t.1onal
dei'ense.,"f'~
·
It is 1nta:rasti.ng to note how the term ••national defanaen is

continually associated with the aims of the
·'

,,

laib!~QY•

At

any rata, the plan was adopted at· a conference of Provincial
'Governors and the Chiefs of the General A:f:t'a1:ra Bureau of

the various lUn:tstriae in Manchuk:uo in January • 1937,. and.
ratified by the government of Ma.nohultuo on February 17, 19,7.
For the tn111 ta:riate and the &?-1bf!;tey, tbinge were proceeding
.
.
'
according to plan. 'l'be de signs that ltera :lni t1.a.ted in th4!1

Firat Five Year Plan ware
Se4ond.

At the same· time,

oar~1ed
mo~

even further·:tn the

pro :fits we:re· available to

the l'?t~lUl~S!H for theit- partners in crime, the militarists,

bad instigated the Marco Polo Bridge "Incident •• and we :toe now

involved with a full scale war in China.

lQ! l$1gaySJ!

~ ObiS~·

After the Japanese Army had

made deep penetrat:tons into the interior of China. steps

were taken by the Japanese to review the administration of

~---
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It wa.a decided tha.t some sort. of China

the ooeup:ied area.;

Af'fa1x-s Board be ol:"'ganized to

supervi~e t .. ne

economic :reoon•

atruotion s.nd development in the occupied areas of China.

A

'special Commission orl Chinese Affa.11.. s ''~aS created on
July 26, 19:;8; but 1 te main purpose ttras in crushing the
resistance of the Na.tiona11st Government and. in organizing a

pUppet x-egime in i te place.

1ts scope.

:Ec:wnom:to matters \\"ere bejl'ond

In the eyE!s of the

if!,~b,ati!b

a special boe;:ro. was

needed; and tl}ey got 1 t.

lQ!

ls~A·ln

9J:. .AW

Rfr.."te;tsa~m~~~ t3Qa·~· · on

D$oember 16, 1938, the &J•~iU or Asia Development Board wa.s

ore;ani '"ed..

According to the regulations governing 1 ts
.

organization, the Board \1ae put in chat-ge of the following:
poli tics. 11 economies. and oul ture and the formulation of
pol1oies :relative thereto i the supervision of commercial
oonc~rns

to undertalte enterpr1sea ill China under special

l$Ws or to do business in Obina; and the coordination of
admin:tstrat:J.ve affairs in China conducted by Japanese
4

~ Xta heQd offiO$ wa0-i~n~~o~k~~H'Oh,~~~d~t~b~--------~---

four bra,noh offioE.:te in Shangha.i, Peipine;. Jtalga.n, and Amor

and t't>ro stl'b•b:ra.nch offices in Canton and 'l:s:tne;ta.o,.
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Two
l\9:t~A""IU•

1mpox-t~nt ore;~n1%at1ons

were ee t up under tha

These were the North Ohine, Development Qompan·r

.for North Oh:tns. and the Central China, Pt>omotion Qompa;n;,v tor
I

Central OhinB,.
t.be plta):lS of the

Togetha~

Za~;b.fll't~~

they playad ar1 important part in
and the.

militarists~

?.'ba objects of' th$ North Ch1.na. Development Oompanr
~rere

to further economi¢

<l~velopment

various undertakin$s 1n North China.
carried on

l(l)ading

e,nd. to consolidate
Its operations "t>rere

as a holding. company. :tt finanoed and controlled

en.te~Jl"iees

developmenta. an

in transportation, harbor and port

~leetr1e

power generator plus mining and

ma.nufaotu:rins.
The North China.

Developm~nt

Company operated under :

the supervision of the Japanese Government and t-ras subject
to the ordara of the government.

ln

:faot~

except in routin$

_ roattera. it l"equ1:red the ti!.pproval ot the government to:- all

of 1 tm deo:i. ei(>ns J and ln the maj ort ty o:f CHases' the orders
o:r tbe J'apaneee Govarnreent wel'e prapa:red by the laadera .of'

hele:~l29i~li· 44

For example. the a.ppro!VaJ of the Japanese

Gova:t:"nmetlt ,.,a,s r<r>qu1l'$d for the raiaine; of loans, making .
I

ehane;~u~

in the articles of e.eeooie.t1on, sivitlg E&ffect

me:rg~n:•s

and.. dissolutions and dist:r,.bution o:f profits.

to
The

. Company's plans for. 1n11estment and finsno.i11g for ea.ch fiscal

1'72
year also ·required .the appro:val P.f. the. gov.ernment and pf the
In short, the combines made sure tl'Hi!.t any .and all
'

~·

'

'
,aoti.vit1ea
of the suppoee<'Uy "independent .. companies would
'
'
4
come. under supervision from itt&£a~~ leaders. S

The Central. Ohina Promotion· Company had objectives

very similar to those of .the North China. Development Company
and -was subje ot to eubsta.nti.ally the .same control by the
Japane'ee Government and the

l,e.~ba.l:e.y.

The

operatio~e

in the

development of public uti.li ties, traneporte,t1on, an4 natural
reeou~oes,

which 11iill be shortly referred to, came under the

control of one .or the otner of these oompantesBefora dealing with the

pa.:r~~iaular

ope rat ions of the

Z\tribatl,l'Q and the militarists in China, re:f'eranc• should be

me,de to the ":Progre,m for the Economic Development of China"
adopt$d by. the Planning Board in January,

1~19.

It was

stated in this program tha.t the development o:r natural
resources in China had :fa:r.:reaohi.ng consequences in real1z·
ing the 1deas of .economic colla.boration between Japan,

e

.
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It was further stated the,t

these e.cti vi tee were nae vi tal and.
4

5~b1,~.'

46

lh

196.

e tabliehin

u~gent

as mili ta,ry

a
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operations and pol1 tical activities and· that they should be
carried out even during hosit111ties." 41

Reference should also be made to the nsummary of the

Program for Economic Construction Embracing Japan.
I

Mttnohukuo 11 and China'' put out by the Cabinet Informa.tion

Bureau on November 5. 1940, the principal purpose of which
was the establishment of

self~supporting

and self-sufficient

structure within ten years to strengthen the position of
East Asia in world economy.

Under the progra.m Je.pan• s

functi'on l>taa to promote science and techniques e.nd to develop heavy industry, the chemica.l industry

~and

mining.

Mr:mohukuo wa.e to develop 1mporte.nt basic indu a tries and

China her na.tural resources, particularly mining.
remembered a.t all times that the

It must be

li!t?atmp and only the

~Br~l?~·:M!L! weN capable of supplying the money and the *'know...

how" to do all of these things.

I.n all of these ma.t.ters

they were working with the mil1tar1ete because they knew,
just a.e the war-lords knew, that intervention from the West

flowing from the p:ro:f'i ts of Japan• s 1mper1alist1o, expansionistic policies.

If the

Ztt.~b§tsy

were heei tant partners at

first. they were more th$n willing aocomplioes by the late
thirties.

Johnstone points out that*.
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The industrial monopolists· joined with the.
m.ili ta.rista in the attempt· to o:rea.te the Graa,ter
East Asia. Sphere, where their own stake in eucoess:ful
oonquest appea.t>ed greater than their chance 'tflg
p:rofi ts through: psa<H:~ful 1nterne.t1onal tra.de.
In these two agreements it is interesting to nota
that not only

'\ottUJ

no provision made for consulting Manohukuo

or Ohina, with

~sa:rd

t<;> their approval; but it is made clear

that decisions ae to ita being put into effect in all its
aspects t'lere to be mad.e by Japan and Japan alone.

It is sie;nifi<.Hlnt to note that the plans nm,med ha.d
three main points:

the first ,.,as to supply Japan with war

materials; the second. was to e.xpa.nd Ja.pan• e

armaments~

the third was to meet the needa of peace ... time economy

and

/•·9

The fox-ego1ng gives e.n outline of the general plans
and policies adopted. by the mili tar1sts and the

Za\btt~Ja·

A

short outline of how the seneral plana were applied to
pe.rtieula.r indt.tstriea and special

pbas~s

of economics will

be. of value at this point.
~~A~~~ortaM~SD ~ Oom~un~o§~Qi•

In

dnafted by which Ja:pan t-eek over moat of the

1935

plans were

re.illnty~SI--41-t:~nr---------~

North Ohina and se.oured permission ·to build more roads at

plaoes of their choosing.

Among. the ra,ilroad.s se12E)d were
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the Tientsin a.nd Shihohiaohuan line, the Shantung Railway,
and the Lunghai Railway.

Tbeae

railroads were important in

the development of new sources of raw mtJ,te.ria. la and reoe1ved
first pt'iori ty from the militarists and the

Zai;"qa~I\!Y•

In the f'ieJ.d of communications, the North China
Telephone and Telegraph Company wa.a organized in July 11 1938.

The North China Development Company, which was discussed

earliet', held.
!

new fi:rm.

S$VEH'.ltY

pex- oant of the oapi tal stock of the

Its obj.eot was to c·onatruct and operate telegra.ph

and telephone service including submarine cable between
North China, Japan, Ma.nabuktto• and the rest of the world.

· Other ·subsidiary companies of the North China Development

Company were the North China Communications Company and the
North China Aviation Compa-ny.

tiona
of

btH~

Oompan:~ pp~u?atad

The North Ohina Commun1oa•

3, 760 mile a of ra.ilt1ays• 6.250 m1lea

lines, and 625 miles o:f' inla.nd waterway eommun::Lca-

tions i.n North Ohitua.50

the posi tiona of

In all of the various companies,

influ~nee

!!~!at~l, ~~!~!a~~$1•
~esouroes.

the

;e.1 !b~tau

were held by members of the

In the e:xplo1 tation of na t.ura.l

really showed their true

colors.

«The .Outline of Measures f'or the China Incident"· of

•
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Deceniber, 1937, provided that the· .Nat.ional Polj.cy Company
was to take over the. salt. industries and ·practically the
entire mining industry in ~orth Ohina..52

The first step in this exploitation process wa.s the
.settlng up of the various

orga.ni~s.tions wh1oh

were to super•

vise the. undertakings,.

First, the Central Iron Mine Company, a subsidiat1 of
the Central China Promotion

Oompa~y,

was set up in April,

1938, to develop the ast5:mated one ·hun.dred million tons of

coal in Central China.

Next, dapos1 ts of irotl ore in North Ch:t.na astimE,tted

at approxime.tely

t\10

hundred million tons, or more than half

of China.• s estimated iron ora deposits$ \<tere taken over in

July,

1939~

by

th~

Lungyen Iron Mine Company, a subsidiary

, ot the North China Development
under

th~

la~gr.nl!t

Company.

Of the mines coming

control of this .Qot.'lpany • tl:le one having the

el\1!tirnat"d. ciaposi te of all was the L•.mgyen

Obaha:r l?rov1no$.

~Une

in

Fart of the iron ore from this. m1ne and

~--------~B-~~~~~~~~~~r~~em-ware exp~~aa~~t~o~------~----

Japan.

Of a total produotion of 4;300,000 tons of ore mined

by the company, 700 11 800 tons 't'-rera used for the production of

pig. iron; and of the balance;

l,4oo.ooo

tons were sent to
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Manchuria and over a million tons to ,Te..pa:n.5' · The Z4i£Et~§!Y
tnado sure that not only. tbei:r prof1 ts but thalr raw
materials· came from oonqu&l?$d ar1d explo1 ted areas. ·
:tn Central Ohina, · iron depoai te in the Yangtze yalley
were estimated at one hundred million tons.

For the pttrpose

of contirtuing the· development of this deposit. the; Central
China.. Iron

~Une

Compe:n;v

w~s

leadership in Apri.l 11 19;8.54

established undei>

'l'he company.

.Za1!;l~t~g

·

~1ae Und~r the

direct control of the Central China iromotion Company and
other Japanese interests: payment for Ohinase interests in
the property was arranged to be made in ·t.he form of equip.

ment and goods.
Ooal deposita in North China we:ra enormous a.nd
estimated. to be more than 50 p$r cent of the depos1 ts in the
whole of· China..
ia~bat.flf:!

China sa

In developing these ooal reeouroea, the

adopted a policy of controlling the supply to the
~n

order to ins.ure a further supply for Japan, bav-

, ing parti.culs.r raga,rd :fo:r the :need of coking ooal.
+---------~~~~~r-~~h-~~~~~"~g~nnual

The

production, was

talten over and opel"ated by the Tatung .Ooa.l Mine Company, a
eubsid:iary of tbe North China Development Company.

It

!... 1~1 't. :.1.') "1'1,1.·1 II •· ... ff_ . , . ; . . .

-------~-----;4---~-----------------------------

~-· pp. 191~192.

---- ------- ------ ------------
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sbould be noted that all of the different enterprises were
interwoven to insure the
policy.

~~i~~~gy

of a single,

oo~ord1nated

Although these were the main ventures in the field

of natural resources, the ;atlnatiY extended their tentacles

to all other areas.

In short, the entire economy of North

Ohina and Manchuria was tied firmly to the Zall;>ayS,\,l apron

atr1nga.55
;Pyb~is;; U,'t~l& t~tl•

Immediately e,f'ter the occupation

of' Sha.nghe.1 in December, 1937, the Ja.panese took over
various pUblic ut111 ty companies a.mong which might be
mentioned the Puntung Electric Supp+J Company, which was
then made a subsidiary of the Centrftl China Water and.

Eleotrioi ty Company, which in turn

w~s

Japanese controlled,

and the Chinese Electric Power Company in Shanghai; which
was taken over in June, 1938, and made a subsidiary of th$
same holding oompany.

In these oaeea the owners of the

companies were compensated at a valuatlon considerably below
the real worth of the companies, a valuation that was set by
e

IIUU!r!H4Y

56" ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i - - leade-:r-f'-lS!hi:.•-""-

B,~}:lk3-Sf5•

From th.e beginning of the occupation of

North China. the Japanese oi:reula.tad bank notes of the Bank
of Chosen and in Central China bank notes of the Bank of

t-----------

o ne_ one_,_.su1.•

561.W••

P• 158.
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Japan, together with some mili taey or ·OCcupation yen notee.
However~

the use of Japanese otu•r.enoy. in occupied terri•

tori&e was distulr'bing to Japan's monetary system,. · Itl ·order
to remedy this situation. the

~~~b~tss

ur.ged that certain

monetary ehe.nges be made in occupation policies.

These

changes led to· the promulgation of the P'ed.Eu•al Reserv$ Bank
of China organized in P'ebruary • 1938; the main policy of
which was to stabilize currency and control the money market
in foreign exchange.

It was authorized to issue paper

c.nJrrency, which was linked to the Ja.panEu"!e. yen.. and so made

the basis for J apa.nese inve.stments in North Ohina.

Oon•

trolled by the Japanese Government. this bank became very

impo:rta.nt and carried out the aims of the ;e.tbe;"tf§U! in the
:f'ina.noial field.. 57

As a

~eeult

of Japanese control of the economic$ of

ocoup1ed Chine. and 1ts control of a substantial part of
industry and commerce. many Japanese bu sines amen and

industrialists went to China a.nd· er1te:red into its, economic
+---------44~-m~~~~~~~~&-thei~~el-e~e

ent1re----------------

oomme~o1al f1ela.58
The _adoption of the measures referred to inevitably
ha.d the result of ;d'feot1ng the trade and commerce of other

__ 5_._ ------ -- ----------- ----------- ----- ------------------
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powerth

Consequently, on October 6. 1938; United States

AmbaseEM;tor Joseph Grew w:rot,e to Prime. Mini star Konoye that

the events in Ma.nohut•io. tte:re being repeated in

the exchange control in

~orth

~inaf th~,t

China was discriminatory J ·that

with the a.l terat:ton of' customs tariffs the

Japa~ese

"terould

control e.ll traneporta. tion and communications J and the
proposal to create a monopoly

~n

woo+ and tobacco was

putting Japanese industrialists in a preferred position in
China.. $9

He

oonseq~ently asked for di soont:l.nuance

o1'

( l) exch~nge control and. other measures di scri~ine.tory to

American trade and enterprise; (2) monopolies or preferences

conferred on Japanese int.erests,

e~pe:r1or1 ty

of rights in

oomroe:rce or the economic development. in Qh:lnaJ (3) and.

interference vri ~h American property and t>ighta, ps.rtic_qlarly
censorship of mail and restrictions upon residence an<l.. travel
by, Amer-icans and American trade and intere ate. 60 !l.b this.
protest, tbe Foreign

qr:r:tce,

under the prodding of the

m:tli tar1ets and the !aiqf!tJiU• while a.dmi tting the truth

as being for tbe benefit of China

and East Asia. and

necassary to Japan• e ••national defense. n6l

· - · - - - · ·0 ~o11r--. J>-p-.---30r;;-30~-r~-

61Johnstone •

t20•

cit.

ot
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Natpo~~~fS.•

aimilar policies were adopte(i by the

Japanese in both Ohina and. Manch·ur1.a. ·in rae;aro to narcotics,
This t.ra:f:fic. \'le.s related. to .mili.tary opera.tione, p·o11 tical

dSV$lopments, a.nd il'ldU striali~at1on in that, by .mee,ne o't .1 t,
substantie.l funds.

governments.

l'let~e

Qbta1ned for the va.rious local

These loc$11 governmellte were set t':P, by tllo

Japaneee; and if

it~

ware not for the funds

d~:rived

from the

narcotic tra.f'ficp the money. -peeded. would have to be st:tppl1ed
by the Japanese or though

in~reaeed

which ware frol·n:lt1ld upon,

Incidentally, the effect on the

looal

morale of the Chine ee population by the

tax~s,,

both of

trt5~mendous

1norEHU4e

in drug a.ddicts can well be :tmaginadot

Prior· to the outbreak of the Ohina \fa:r.; the Ch'-rla ee.
Government had b¢an
. opium smoking..

ma.k1~g

determined efforts to

l'tipE~J

out

That these e:r:rorta were meeM.ng ld ·th f!!t!Coess

1s d$monat:rated by a report made by the Advisory Committee

of' the League of Nations in June, 19:39 11 to the ef'tact tha.t
the meaeurea taken by the Chinese Government for the

I

r'

+------A-»~~~~-An-~~'l¥>·~n-un®~g-u-1-at!one J)Nltl-til-lsa-teu-------~-

in June, 19:36, had produced highly sa.t:ta:ra.otor.v reaul ts. 62
In the field of narcotics, one can grasp a vivid
~icture

of the co•or>erat1on that existed between the tnil1 ta.•

.rists and the
1f

f -!

ill .. I

J;

tl ~ .~

~J!~'q{tt&m•

These t'..ro groupe• together with the
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Japanese Foreign O:t'fiee and the Asia Development Board, were
Connected With the opium traffic in China from 1938 on.
Prior to 19:;8, the Mitsubiehi Trading Company and the Miteu1
Bussan Kaisha were making large purchases of Iranian opium
for Japan, Manohukuo, and Ohina.63 By arrangement with the
militarists and the Foreign Otfioe, the two companies made
an agreement in respect to the places from which the opium
was to be imported and their reepeilotive shares in the bua1·
'

ness.

I

Under this agreement the distribution of opium for

Japan and Manobukuo was to be handled by the Mitaub1sh1
Combine and that for Centre,l and South China by the Mi tsu1
firm.

The tUstr1but1on for North China was to be shared

equally.

At the request of the A$1a Development Board• the

agreement we.s revised by provid.ing for the orge.ni zatton of
the Iranian Opium Purchasing Association, the business of
this company to be divided equally between Mitsui and
M1tsubiah1. 64

It becomes apparant that the Je.tJlat§y moved right in
r---------~~~n&;wHH~~~~ifl

expansion,

a

eam~ai~~erialism-ana------------------

They ware not two horses pulling in the opposite

direction but one well•drilled teamD each member striving
toward the same goal even though their purposes may have
beEm different.

r----------......................-..

...

~...---- ~----~~-~~~------------~----~ --~----~------- --~ ~-------~----------
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-~---.-

-----
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_ It is ill!portftnt .to recognize that Japan • s war'!'>maohine

was built w1 th the assistance of' the Zeib§t;Jiij whose repre•

sentatives have never aettvely opposed th$ idea of conquest
and domination a'broa(t,

Ra.th~u:·,

the h.\]i>a tmu have, in fact.

established those aoonomle interests abroa.d, the protection

o.f which became a major excuse for territorial

e~pa:nsion~

If their inter-ests were threatened, they simply called upon
thE?J mili ta:l?1ats for supportt and anoth$r ••incident" would
take place.,
managed to

If an "incident" was not apropos, the lf11l,)a!~\a

uphold their end of the agreement in another

manner; and. tha.t was

thro~gh

espionage.

,1.!1~. ~~~bAt'y !.! t.TtlU\'Q • '- o'l{.~r$&f!S !Hra&onaae a~~t4·
gg~~t~~M·

Besides co•operating with the

field of industry e.nd expe.ru:'lion., the

m111tar~st$

ltrt-~-qatfi!!a

in the

contr,.buted to

the plane of the wa;r,o,.lords in another more eedi tious manner•
'!'he fo:r•e1gn offices of the
th~oughout

the world,

b~bfr~l!l

particul~rly

combines were scattered

in the United

St~tee,

Xt

wae through these offices the.t much of Jape.n• s foreign t:rad.e
1 eo tbrougb these offi ees that many

't•Th:toh

14'ElS

useful to the militarists and relayed this
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information back to Japan through regular trade ohanne~a.65
Roth c:t tas the tact that only six months before Pearl Harbor
t.ba Japanese mili ta.riets \te,re able to secure valuable

info~

ma;tion about the amount of o:tl and gasoline the.t was being
shipped to Ha\'laii.

This information was tra:nsmi.tted through

the tU tsub:tshl foreign office in the Un1 ted st,ates. 66

It

\.re,s informe,tion such &e this tha.t enable('l, the war-lords of
Japan to set a timetable for their plan of conquest in the
l?e~o:tf:tch

The contributions of the

lar tield os:nnot be overemphasized.

Za'bi!J~§!l!

:tn this particu•

Although this facet of

m111 te.ritstio•Ja~q~t~y collaboration is often overlooked., it
is of :prime impo:rte.nce 1p ascertaining the guilt of the

combines.

It must be remembered that eoonomic infilt:t-ation

1slJ in .many cases, mora suoceaaful than military opere. tiona.

'l'he proponents of. the doctrine of
bladed sword~

b~kkQ ~pbiU

had a double•

One blade wa.a t,he !S:!Jl!Jt'§~. swo:tro o:r the

. militarists~ and the other was the economic semi ter of the
Z9.iib{t;t~u.
~

In the field of f'o:reign espionage, this sword

swift and clean,
We have studied the various fields j,n ttrhioh collusion

between the rai11 tarists an<:l the !iibrq,lu;sy took place"

65&th SU?.• ~l t., P• 86.
11
6·

Now

W$

18$
must look into the main reason tor the alignment o:f' .'the
:combines w1 th a.rmy and navy •

l!tlme

E.rof~.l=

X.~i31 son

,r.gr

lr&tbats!a..-IQ;llit~Hl.

gol,lus:ton•

There. is no doubt the.t the inoree.eed pl:'(}fi ts tha.t would
a,corue to the

~ilq,~.~~sa·

through a policy of expansion e.nd

conquest '<ifas the me.:ln reason :for their joining he:nds w1 th
.

the

'

'

mil1t~a:riata.

67

If s.t

:firt~t

of the mili te.r,.ats and slow
wa~loro.s.

tt~.

the

liibi!~Y

were eusp1o1ous

align themselves w:t th the

they mad$ up for S.t with .the sp,ed with which

they co-operated when they

~aw

the size and amount of the

prof1 ta which \lfOUld come to them through a. su<HlEHlsfully and

Vigorously pt.freued polio;r of expansion.

As ha.s

the depression of 1929 made a deep cut 1nto the
the eombineth

~e

b~\H3tl

noted,

p~ofits

of

Manehur1a.n .Incident helped to alleviate

the s:1 tuaM.on; and from then on the money began to flow onoEi
again into the coffers of the :tnduatrialiata.

Th1 a

\V'&$

due

to the fact that a policy of expansion required a ehi:f't1 f':rom
i

light to heavy indust:r:tea.

This meant a t.:remendous gain for

~------~~~~~~~~~~~·e-ih$-a~~me

in

l
1----

!
J~a~~ab~l~e~o~f------~-----

producing the :required materials tor the mili te.ry ~

This

Shift from light to hea-vy industry was especially true in the

a.coelersted growth of aircrr.d't and tank ,_ndusti;rae,
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.Although these two phases of production had bean neglected
during the twemties, they r1,a.ted top p:r1or1 ty in the thirties.
'

Al\other industry 'benefiting f'!"om .the expansionistic policy
of the mili tal:'i s ts was the shipbuilding cor1ee:rns.
thraE!.l

fe~oets

These

of indust:ry•""ai:ro:ra,:t't, tanks, and sb1pbuild-

1ng••then, were a1d$d tremendously by Japan's imper1al1st1o

dee1gmq and. all th:rae of these industries were controlled
by- the.

~~iba,tsy.

typical

e~ample

Roth ci tas the Mi tsub1eh1 oombi.ne as a
of the

~.no:reased

p:rofi ts from increased

mil:\ t~<try $pending;

1.he shipbuilding indus try was parM.aula.rly badly

hit by the depression of 1930•193:5., and the prepare. tiona for e.:rmed aggt"esston came to ite rescue.

Almost 3,ooo,ooo,ooo yen we:re alloted 1n four naval
programs beg:tnn:1ng in 1931 1 anti. three quarters of
that went to private companies. Large subsidies
were granted .to insure the d((Jvelopment of a large,
speedy merchant marine. 1.be declared capital of
the seven large at shipbuilding companies mot'$ than
do~bled

between the outbreak of the China War in

1937 and the outbreak of the Pacific \i'ar in 1941 ..

Mit$Ubish1 shipbuilding itself had a declared capital
of 120,000 • 000 yen in 1937; by 1941 1 t had ree.ohed

24o.ooo,ooo ••••

Mitsubishi profited to an even greater degree

r-------------~~~~~~~~1o~n~ont~th~~nduat~~~~d~u~e~tvO----------------

the war in China. and prepare.t:tons for the Pacific
The paid•up capital of Mitsub1sh1's aircraft

War.
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lo...ooo,ooo
6o.ooo,ooo in 1943- 0 8

subsidiary increased from

to about

yen .in

l~5:f37

The latter date is beyond the scope of this investigation,
but 1 t is included to give an idea of the tNmendous growth
of the combines during this period.

The huge profits were

enough to allay the tears of the ZJ!!bateH that an aggressive
foreign policy would damage their foreign trade and diminish
their profits.

These fears went for naught because the

exact opposite was true.
There seems to be 11 ttle basis for the opinion that
the ZBiq§jsy were forced into active participation in an
expansionistic and imperialistic policy of

agg:ression~"

Facts seem to prove that both the militarists and the com•
hines had the same goals; only their methods d.1f'fe:rec1,.

It

might be said the"t aggression and "incidents*' make strange
bed,.. fellows.

Rei schauer states:

The coalition of the military with the ;a3:b..!~f!l~
interests was perhaps nothing more than e, marriage
of convenience. but 1t was nevertheless a success...

. ful working arrangement. And as time went on, it
became something mo:re. la&bQtey firms, suah as
·

atlJ-Ca.ea s r_apN"""'s'"'-e..s.An_.,.,te=d....________________

. c _ __ __

monopoly capitalism, but at the same time, because
of their very size, they made tha transition to a
68Roth, .!Zfa• .5!1!:.-. p* 65. Roth goes perhaps farther
than any other authort ty to show the collusion that existed
between t.he militarists and. the combines. He attempts to
prove that only trivial matters such as timing, direction,
+---------~~~~~~~~~rl4~~~~~~~~-h~en the ~
groupe-.~ He- atates-tfiat--the--~uv1-sions--b-eeaxne-1norE!fasfngly- ------------ - minor and that the two became an 1nd1 a soluble bloc committed

to Japan's war of aggr$Ss1on.
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t~rtate•controlled

economy eae1er than 1 t wou).d otber-

w19e bave b$en. In p~parat1on for the unepec1f1ed
nn~t1onal crisis" of th$ m1litar1sts, the gov~mment .
1ncre.ae1ngly a«ununed d1reet1on over broad n~gmente o.f

indtuat:rey a:nd oommeroe, and. the gre$tt

lf&b«feW

which were comins to ba :run by profess ona

oombint~e,

maru1serf.l

ratb~r than by th~1r owner~, werEt convenient units
of gover•nmEmtal control. · ~e p~s·eu~es of wtu:•
l:u~atened the s:ro,qth ot euob controls, and the
Zt1laf4lifY combines tentltld more and. more to become
eoonom o branch$S of the state. J~pan appeared to
b$ taldne; th~ first etep$ toward a curious sort of

I

atatl!t socialism, born of l!lbf!ilf efilp1 t.e.l.iem and
a&irtld by m1l;1 te.rte t1~ author! tQ.:r ani em. 09

I=

The ooal1 t1on of th(1t bea!"$re of n:t'ffi$ end the
mente was ooroplete\1'
!l!b,&~,l!lt

g1:rd$<l itself _for war.

ove:rrr.:m,

of a.r-me..•

Japa.n, rultH'i by the m111 tarietSJ and tbe
By Deoembet>, 1941, the two

fa¢t1.ona were a. $rooothly functioning unit..
be.~n

mt~.kers

llfancbur1a ha.4.

The_ ~ar 1n China, wb1le proceeding slower

'

than nnt1o1pated, et1l.l y1$ldecl ltlnd and. prof'i ts to the
Emp1r4th

The Gr-eater b!aet Ae:ia ·C'IO•p:roeperi ty

1nf1l tra.t~d hlto French Indo•Ch1na.
announo~Hl

Sph0~

had

Propaganda broadcasts

the dawn of' e. new tra in the Pacific. a da"m :tn

Which the only l1e;bt war& to be the rieing sun of .,l·a:pan.
hom~

the Japanese people,

opprese~d.

do~trodden~

filled with prom1ees of a New Order in East As1a,
the w!ehel!!l of the tyrants $1'ld tyooons.

tor the fin«:tl

gi'Ten,
4«J:J~I ,1

.. ,f l

t.h~
II 'hW It

Gt$po

"l.H'

tl

and
follo\~d

EV&t7th1ng was set

On Daceniber "f • 1941• the word was

attacks made, and

tb~

At

world was at war.

Sutllmai3;og.

For over a.

d~oa.da,

h1st,or1ans and

student a ot AtU.a.n ·and Japane ee politics have be$n trying to
· fix the blame for the aggressive policies of the .'Japan&se
Empire begin:t'ling vtith the Ma.nohuria,n Incident of September

18., 19:51.

'!'her$ was little doubt that the rn11,.ta.riets were

a.mone; those chiefly :responsible for.the crimes and a.t:roeitiee committed against humanity..

Others plaoed equal blame

upon the giantindustrial combines, the
tales were told of the Z!il2.,~1U:J.

;a.~ba.t~~·

Some said they were men of

peace who bel:teved in economic penetra,tion onl;r.
said that the

za~ba,.~~!!

Stranse
Others

gained stature' prestige !I power,

profits, and equality with the militarists through a

suoces~

sion of successful wars, wars in which they ware forced to
co• operate wi tb the Japanese we.r•lol"de.

Throughout this

thesis, evidence has been submitted to show that the

lfhribf).t.s'cl and the m:lli tariets were one.

They worked and

strived toward the same id.EHil""""world conquest.

The m;rth the,t states that the

li!~atsu

and the m111 ....

+---------~~~~~~~~~~·~f~~t~ke-int~Gi~~tiQ,~·.-----------

the fact that the tt•m have co-operated most faithfully in
the eeventy•five yea.re of Ja.paneee expansion.
.

.

The

t\'lo;

rather than occupying separate a.nd distinct pla,ees in the
I

0

Japanese scene, are to an axtra.ordinary degree intertwined.
____________________________ y_, _p_n_:l:y__ f.£_ f~W______________________ ;.
.
.
.
individuals or factions have ruled the nation. There has
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been a.

oon~inual

jockeying for pos1 t1on by the Zaibe.teu, the
.

.

palace gus,t-d.s, le.ndlorde• A:rmy leaders, Navy leaders. pt'O•
'

'

fessional bureaucrats, and pa.rty poli tio1ane ~·

At times the

fight grew rough, and certain ind.i v iduale were hurt.

A&.eaesina.t1o.ne were common place, but this was all in the
:frunily.

On issues concerning the empire' e

e.ggra.ndi~ement,

as on those affecting popular strivings for democracy, the
ruling groupe oloee'd ranks.

prooetH1 wer:e the

~!&9.rat~y,

power emerged. in

th~ir

.

Foremost in this .,closingn

and the militarists.

1be bulk of

hands •

To those who belierve that the Za.1bateu oppo.sed the
m111 tary; hera are. the words of Ginja.ro Fujiwara, hea(i of

the Mitsui Paper Company and generally recognized as the
spokesman for the la:3zba~su dt~ring tni e deeiei:\Te decade:
Diplomacy without force is of no value.

No matter

··how diligent the Japanese may be, no matter how

superior their tach:n1oal developm$nt or 1nd.ust1"~.al
administration may be, . there will be no hope for
JapEAn's tra.qe expaneion i:f there is no adequate
force to back 1 t. :Wow the greatest of forces 1@

m:t11 t~r;y pl:'eparedne as founded on the Army and Navy.
·We oatl safely expa.nd abroad Qnd. engage in various
,
. .
nt of pr<n->t:ote~cf11c'tt:'i'Ho"~•--------~-:tn this sense, any outle.y for armament is a form
of investment. 70 .

All evfaenoe indicates .that Japan's Empire. an Ernpire

achieved throttgh force, decept1on 11 treachery, espionage, and

broken promises; was built by .a work:lne combination of the
, ,r

,

'

~(~
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big business combines and the militarists.

~e ~tdbatgy

f'um1shed the."know... hown for the militarists, not only in
the manufacture of a.nna.ments and muni tiona, but also 1n the
operation of government.

The eo-operation betw$en the two

was complete.
The

1~1~~~i~

helped

oreat~

and

g~eatly

profited by

Japan's war machine • but they were unable to control the
monster they created.

Failing to prevent the mili tariate

from d.ominatirlg the governmental policies, particularly
after 1931, the industrial monopolists joined with the
militarists in the attempt to create the Greater East Asia
Sphere, where their cwn stake in successful conquest
. appeared grea,tar than their oha.noe for p:rofi ts th:rougb
peaceful international trade.

This tben was the picture in December, 1941.

Japan • e

ple.n for world conquest, unbelievably successful thus far,
had one more step 9,nd that was wa.r with the Western Powers
in general and the United States in particular.

This final

+---------~~~~~&rr~~~~~~mm~~oHf~w~o~r~l&d~o&n~~•t-toppttl~1n~.g~d~o~w~m~-----------

l1ke a house of' cards.
of

bfak~Q &cb~~~h

This final step found the doctrine

the belief in

~~~

the imperialistic dreams

of the mil1 tarists, and. the prof1 t-made schemes of the
§!~bat!Y
1----------

marching headlong into oblivion.

-----------~-

- - - - ------
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